


ROBERT HADOW :
A CASE STUDY OF AN APPEASER

Lindsay W. Michie

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
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Robert Hadow: A Case Study of An Appeaser

Lindsay W. Michie

Presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of
Modern History, University of St. Andrews

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Abstract

Historians differ over the origins of Britain's policy of appeasement, and many analyses concentrate on the objectives of policy using the growth of overseas obligations or more recent historical markers such as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The approach of this thesis involves relating appeasement to the personal beliefs and decisions of those responsible for foreign policy. By pin-pointing Robert Hadow, a First Secretary in the Foreign Office, as an example of an appeaser, such an approach demonstrates how intelligent and capable men in Britain fell victim to a policy which, in retrospect, appears blind and irrational.

An examination of Hadow's fear of war, bias against bolshevism, and sympathy for the German minority in Czechoslovakia is made in this thesis through detailed research of Foreign Office despatches and Hadow's reports, memoranda, and personal correspondence. Much of this hitherto unpublished material sheds new light on the course of events from the collapse of the Kredit Anstalt in Austria to the outbreak of World War II. By following the course of Hadow's career during this period, this thesis seeks to explain the mentality that produced the foreign

policy followed by Britain in the 1930s.

I, Lindsay Michie, hereby certify that this thesis has been written by me, that it is the record of the work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No. 12 in October 1985, and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in January 1986; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrew's between 1985 and 1988.

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I wish to thank my mother for supplying me with copies of Hadow's despatches and letters, and the Public Records Office and Churchill College, Cambridge for further information regarding Hadow's work and his colleagues. Further thanks to friends and relatives of Hadow for valuable insight into his character, and to Betty Anderson for all her practical help. Finally, special thanks to my supervisor Dr. Paul Vysny for his shrewd criticism and sensible advice.

"Life is a very sad piece of buffoonery, because we have...the need to fool ourselves continuously by the spontaneous creation of a reality (one for each and never the same for everyone) which' from time to time, reveals itself to be vain and illusory."

Luigi Pirandello

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1 Unlikely Diplomat

Since the years of the Second World War the word appeasement has become a tainted one with regard to foreign policy. Attempts to redeem its true meaning since this time have failed, however valiant these attempts may have been. Churchill tried in 1950, stating that appeasement from weakness and fear was "futile and fatal"; however, appeasement from strength was "magnanimous and noble" and could be "the surest and perhaps only path to world peace"[1]. Nonetheless, the word is seen to imply weakness, passivity, or a backing down in the face of threats, and it is tempting to be intensely critical of the noble character appeasement assumed in the 1930s. The carrying out of this policy in the belief that it was reasonable and rational and, even when consistently thwarted by Mussolini and Hitler, still the best policy for Europe, reflects a serious mishandling of foreign policy. To decide that this policy was the only course open to countries which had undergone the experience of the First World War appears, in retrospect, to be naive and simplistic. Because a great number of people at the time encouraged this policy, however, and because the foreign policy of Britain and Germany in the 1930s have since been subjects of, at times, severe historical debate, it is no longer feasible to dismiss it merely in terms of weakness and idiocy. The motivating forces behind appeasement

itself, having been examined extensively since the Second World War, are found to be complex and often contradictory. They are frequently attributable to a philosophy of thought and psychology of mind characteristic of the time.

Robert Henry Hadow, a British diplomat posted in Vienna, Prague and London in the 1930s, was absolutely ardent in his support of appeasement. He shared the majority of the characteristics associated with appeasement and remained loyal to this policy through the outbreak of war in 1939. Hadow was not a significant figure in the 1930s as he did not hold a high position in the Diplomatic Service, but his despatches of this time give a very clear and detailed account of his increasingly enthusiastic support of the policy associated with Neville Chamberlain. They also illustrate Hadow's efforts to do all possible to promote appeasement to the point of indiscretion and risk to his position and career.

Hadow was born in Kashmir in 1895 and educated at Harrow. In 1914 he enlisted in the London Scottish Regiment, serving in France, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. He was twice wounded, mentioned in despatches, awarded the Military Cross, and retired with the rank of Captain. He entered the British Diplomatic Service in 1919 and was transferred to the Foreign Office in 1920 where, in the same year, he was promoted to Second Secretary. He was then transferred to Teheran in 1921, to

Constantinople in 1925 where he was promoted to First Secretary, and back to the Foreign Office in 1928. On October 13, 1928 Hadow was Seconded for service as Administrative Assistant on the staff of the High Commissioner for Canada from May to September 1930. On May 2, 1931 he was transferred to Vienna.

Serving three years in Austria, Hadow began to take note of the Germans, sympathising with their grievances regarding the Peace Settlements of 1919 and urging conciliation of their demands. He was transferred to Prague in December 1934, and there he developed a strong sympathy for the position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia as expressed by the Sudeten-deutsch Party. Hadow returned to London in October 1937 where he vigorously promoted meeting Germany's claims on the Sudetenland. When, despite his firm conviction that Hitler wanted peace, war broke out in September 1939, Hadow was posted to Argentina.

The psychology of appeasement in the 1930s is, to some extent, an enigma[2]. A superficial study of Hadow's papers might lead to the conclusion that, at best, he was a man lacking perception; at worst, a man of little intelligence and no imagination. Hadow, however, was none of these, no more than the majority of supposedly well-educated and clear-thinking men who embraced the policy of appeasement. He had a cosmopolitan upbringing, won a scholarship to Cambridge (which he did not use due to the war) at the

age of 17, spoke seven languages fluently, and was felt to have shown great promise in the 1920s while working in Persia and Turkey, especially in the sphere of economics. Given such potential, it seems a tragic contradiction that Hadow should have misread Hitler's intentions so extremely in the 1930s and consistently promoted conciliation of Germany, as did so many promising or respected politicians and diplomats. But appeasement was not necessarily a policy stemming from weakness or mental lassitude. It had a strong optimistic character whose outward rationality held a certain attraction for those exploring possibilities in the maintenance of peace. There was a creative aspect to it which was particularly attractive to Hadow.

If the role of a diplomat, as well as being a negotiator, is also that of an observer and analyst avoiding extreme views, Hadow, according to many who knew him, struck one as an unlikely diplomat. Possessing an overwhelming intellect, he had a strong personality and a quick temper, with a tendency to "hammer home" his opinions when dealing out often unsolicited advice. Hadow was a stubborn and idealistic man, and, according to his sister, at times, "quite impossible"[3]. His behaviour, however, almost invariably stemmed from a strong sense of duty. A fierce patriot and devout Christian, he expended an enormous store of energy, and a study of his papers gives the impression of a

man whom people, however they felt about him, were unlikely to forget. A younger cousin admits that on the first occasion that he met Hadow, "I was paralysed by his intellectual reputation and found it almost too daunting to open my mouth let alone engage him in meaningful conversation[4].

Lord Gladwyn, who worked with Hadow in Teheran, writes that the latter was incapable of delegating work, preferring to keep it entirely in his own hands: "He was a kind and good man of very considerable intelligence, and likable too if you didn't mind being bossed about"[5]. His daughter states that he enjoyed struggling and fighting[6] and it was perhaps this characteristic that propelled his adamant stand in promoting appeasement in the 1930s. Appeasement had an emotional appeal and Hadow was both emotional and excitable. Because the appeasers were men with "a mission", Hadow, with his strong often violent views, was perhaps destined to follow this course with alacrity.

It was in the 1930s - the decade of appeasement - that the elements of Hadow's appeasement became apparent and solidified. His abhorrence of war punctuated his despatches, his suspicion of France found an outlet in Austria as his anti-communism did in Czechoslovakia. His sympathy towards Germany found greater expression in his affinity with the Austrians and focus on the Sudeten-deutsch in Czechoslovakia, while his enthusiasm for British mediation in all European

concerns increased. These aspects of Hadow were encouraged in the 1930s, but they did not necessarily originate in Austria and Czechoslovakia. The 1930s may be the time when the sentiments of appeasement made themselves felt, but the roots of this policy can be traced further back and clues to Hadow's behaviour in Austria and Czechoslovakia, although not necessarily immediately obvious, can nonetheless be elicited from his earlier experiences. His rejection of war as an instrument of policy, for example, is clearly the direct result of his own experience of war, as well as the public encouragement of this sentiment in the years following World War I. Signs of Hadow's anti-communism can be extracted from his suspicions of Soviet activity in the 1920s while he was posted in Iran and Turkey, while the trend of European and British approaches to the settlement of questions and conflicts at Versailles which arose after the First World War also had their effect on Hadow. Finally, changes within the Foreign Office had begun in the 1920s and Hadow, however junior he might have been, was likely to feel their consequences and find his own response.

During the 1920s, although the memory of war for Hadow was still sharp, it was rarely mentioned in his letters and despatches. At this time there was a general mood of hope and optimism that made any cautioning against future aggression seemingly unnecessary. Attempts at peace, although actually

fragile, were outwardly encouraging and Hadow probably felt no need much less any desire to concentrate on the futility of war in reports and correspondence. In the 1930s the mood had changed as illusions of peace began to crumble, and Hadow's fears reawakened his memories.

Some small diaries Hadow kept while fighting in the trenches in France in 1915 and in Mesopotamia and Palestine in 1916-1918 contain short sporadic entries which nonetheless manage to give a vivid picture of Hadow's experience and explain the lasting impression made on him by war. The first entries were made during training and were full of enthusiasm: "Heard all Elliot's war experiences. A ball one evening, a shooting party - rabbit stalking all during advance from Arles to Marne; war has its enjoyments especially for A[rmy].S[ervice].C[orps].!"[7]. During his time as a Second Lieutenant in France Hadow's diaries do not contain more than sketches of ruins and countryside. That he made few entries during this time is a likely illustration of the difficulty of coming to grips with what he was now experiencing.

While fighting in the Middle East in 1916 Hadow was shot in the lung and sent to India to recover. The notes in his diary had now become more serious and reflect particular concern over the casualties of the war: "Men and officers packed on deck like sardines. No adequate arrangements...Private died on board. No

tea, water, food or dressings for anyone. A hot and long night...Men hit in legs lying in rain outside. Fellow next to me with gangrene...He was hit three days ago and has had neither food nor medical attention. Nobody to attend to him"[8].

In 1918, while fighting in Palestine, Hadow wrote of one battle, "Our Regiment had taken the brunt of the fighting and we lost MacDermott, McKay, and Jackson, my best friends in the regiment as well as others wounded. Rather a stiff price as far as we were personally concerned...It's horrid losing friends in this way"[9]. Later on that year Hadow contracted malaria. He remained in Palestine until the end of the war.

Unlike many who fought in the First World War, Hadow did not become disillusioned with the war effort, despite the growth of his views on the futility of war itself. The latter change in Hadow is comparable to that in a soldier mentioned in John Laffin's *Letters from the Front*, who went to war in 1915 at the age of nineteen full of enthusiasm: "it is all so delightfully fresh after England that unpleasant side of it doesn't strike me, though all my friends have been trying to instil into me the gospel of 'frightfulness'". Two years later the same soldier wrote from Somme: "I shall never look on warfare as either fine or sporting again"[10].

What Hadow experienced was equally disheartening but he remained a patriot throughout and after the war. His views

echoed the sentiment expressed in an Oxford pamphlet in 1914: "we can endure all the suffering and horror which war involves if we can sustain ourselves with the hope that we shall make a recurrence of such things impossible for our children"[11]. Hadow's defence of his actions in 1930s are similar to the words of Captain Michael Kettle who was killed in France in 1916: "If I live I mean to spend the rest of my life working for perpetual peace. I have seen war and faced modern artillery, and know what an outrage it is against simple men..."[12].

A further aspect of the war which no doubt influenced Hadow and contributed to his sense of urgency in the 1930s was the effect of the experience on his younger brother Kenneth. A few years after the war Kenneth suffered a nervous breakdown which his sister Cicely believes was largely a result of his fighting in the war. He apparently never fully recovered, and, as Hadow was quite protective towards his younger brother, he probably took these sufferings to heart, having been through the same experience. This gave him further reason to ignore any subconscious worries over potential aggression from right-wing dictatorships in the 1930s, and concentrate on the moral argument in his motives for upholding appeasement. In 1934 he wrote that he would do anything on earth to prevent his sons from sharing the fate of his brother, "whose nerves were wrecked and his career ruined - in common with millions of others"[13].

While Hadow's pacifist feelings are directly related to his experience of war, the origins of his attitude towards communism and the Soviet experiment are not so clear-cut. Hadow was extremely anti-communist and remained so throughout his life. According to his daughter, he wanted to fight communism with his last breath: "He felt it was an insidious danger, and so well-planned and engineered that it would be an undetected take-over...He felt the non-Communist world was much too naive and trusting"[14]. This attitude was made plain in the 1930s, but was a legacy of attitudes emerging in the 1920s, and was probably a product of an initial reaction to the Russian Revolution shared by many in Britain. Signs of an increasing aversion to the Soviet experiment can be found in Hadow's despatches while in Persia and Turkey, and the circumstances of both countries' relationship with the Soviet Union most likely helped perpetuate Hadow's feelings. In Persia, Hadow worked under Sir Percy Lorraine who was less than sympathetic to the Soviet regime (Lorraine had allegedly later been the target of an assassination plot by an Armenian. The plot was believed to have been ordered by the Soviet military attache and Soviet agents were to provide the weapon and protection[15]). Comintern attempts to stir up revolution internationally included the Middle East and aroused suspicions in the British Legation of Russian dealings with Persia. In 1922 Lorraine sent a telegram to the Foreign Office

which stated, "Bolshevism in Persia continues unabated"[16].

In 1924 Hadow, who had been assigned Secretary in charge of Commercial Affairs, began reporting trading tactics of the Soviet Union in Persia. It was Hadow's belief that the Soviet authorities were attempting to recover commercial supremacy in Northern Persia: "The determination of the Soviet authorities to carry these designs into execution is, as usual, mainly dictated by the desire to strike a blow at British interests and influence"[17]. Hadow apparently was told confidentially by the Director of Persian Customs that the Russian Legation, in negotiations over trade, had shown no sympathy towards Persian needs, and was merely bent on securing the most favourable terms for Russia.

Although Hadow's disapproval of Soviet tactics was evident, he seemed mainly concerned with their effect on British trade. In Hadow's eyes, the Soviet Union had initiated a trade war with Britain in Persia, but he noted that, "in the long run", the Persian merchant usually paid dearly for making transactions with Soviet agents and was therefore suspicious of Soviet advances[18]. Regarding Soviet imports into Persia Hadow reported that Russian organisations would not forward foreign goods to or from Persia unless they in some way became Russian property: "This accords with the communist doctrines of the Soviet Government and gives the Russian organisations an opportunity of passing the goods as Russian - a practice which is known to have been

extensively pursued"[19]. Hadow admitted that he had not succeeded in getting definite proof from Persian merchants "because of their alleged fear of Soviet vengeance"[20].

Clues to Hadow's antipathy to the Soviet Union while in Turkey can be found in his observance of Turkey's leanings towards the East. Hadow noted that Constantinople had initially been named the centre of communist propaganda in Egypt, Greece, Syria and North Africa, but observed in the early stages of the new republic which had been established in Turkey under Mustapha Kemal that communists were often hanged by Independence Tribunals. It was Hadow's hope that the "destructive" character of Soviet influence would become clear in a few years to the Turks and that country would then turn to Britain as an ally. Conflict had arisen between Britain and Turkey over her new republic which Britain at first fought to quell but eventually resigned herself to, and Hadow implied that the Soviet Union desired a certain amount of conflict or tension between Britain and Turkey to continue.

From early on the Soviet Union, to Hadow, was a sinister element in Europe. Since both Turkey and Russia were not members of the League of Nations, Hadow saw a close relationship between the two as natural, although perhaps unbalanced. In 1927 he suggested that the inclusion of Turkey in the League of Nations or some sort of Western alliance would

make that country more comfortable with the idea of concentrating on railway projects as opposed to military concerns; "But", he added, "this desirable event cannot easily be encompassed so long as Russia is at her back, a well-armed and outwardly friendly bandit, smiling broadly, but ever ready to threaten if Turkey took a step towards the European Powers"[21]. When in 1928 Mussolini attempted to establish a special relationship between Italy and Greece and Turkey through a tripartite agreement, Hadow believed that the Soviet Union would be definitely antagonistic to this arrangement or any agreement which would indicate "that Turkey is breaking away from her recent isolation and turning her face towards the West"[22].

The antagonism Hadow later felt towards the Czechs as well as his suspicion of communism were partially derived from a certain amount of prejudice against the Slavonic race, which can again be seen as a legacy of his experiences in the 1920s. Even before his attitude towards the Slavs was made plain, his despatches in Turkey contain references to "Easterners" as a whole which illustrate the early development of this type of prejudice in Hadow. Of the Turks he wrote in 1927, "As rulers they are hopeless today as yesterday because with all their slavish imitation of progress they neither take the trouble to understand the meaning of the work nor really want to undertake the responsibilities with the fruits of this word...tomorrow has no

place in Eastern minds because continuity, peace and tranquillity have never existed among them"[23]. Later that year he wrote that progress was alien to the Eastern mind and stated more forthrightly of the Turks, "I like not this race; an uninteresting war-mad tribe of primitive nomads with no civilisation or traditions other than that of blood and rape and lust behind them"[24]. Hadow's opinion of the Turks echoed that of the Ambassador to Turkey Sir Ronald Lindsay who wrote in 1925, "The Turk will not look far ahead, and he will not make preparations beforehand to meet eventualities that are approaching even obviously"[25].

Hadow disapproved of the Turkish treatment of the Kurdish race; a feeling which presaged his reaction to Czech dealings with the Sudeten-deutsch. In 1927 he wrote that in London and in Washington, "the praise of the Turk is sung and we lend a deaf ear to the cries of the Kurdish nation who, to the tune of over a million, are undergoing the same massacre as they were used unwittingly during the war to visit upon the Armenians"[26]. The reference to the Armenians was part of Hadow's revulsion towards the massacre of this nationality at the end of World War I and their absorption by Turkey and Russia - an element further helping to increase Hadow's Eastern prejudice.

While in Canada in 1929 to 1930, Hadow expressed no views on Russia apart from a guarded response to an inquiry on the

British view of the Soviet Union, in which he merely stated that the permanent effect of the experiment could not be gauged until the Five Year Plan had run its course[27]. This lack of general comment on Russia was probably due to the fact that his official concerns had little to do with that country and gave him no chance for expression on the subject. It may be safely stated, however, that his views on communism and the Soviet experiment were by this time pretty well entrenched as they began to emerge after his transfer to Austria. The danger of Turkey or any weak state succumbing to Bolshevism or Soviet pressure was now transferred in Hadow's mind to a greater degree to Austria and then Czechoslovakia.

As well as pacifism and anti-communism, Hadow also later displayed a contempt of France characteristic of the appeasers, being critical of this country's dealings with Austria in the early 1930s and generally dismissive of her defensive attitude regarding Germany. This sentiment may also have had earlier origins. There is no sign in Hadow's war diaries that he felt any antipathy towards the French, common to many British soldiers during the First World War; however, his feelings towards France could be traced to the years he worked under Lord Curzon whom he greatly admired. Through a series of French moves during the early 1920s - including the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 - Curzon grew increasingly hostile to France. This

hostility reached its climax when the Foreign Secretary sent a note to France stressing the illegality of the occupation and refused to allow Britain to be associated with the French demand for the surrender of the German Crown Prince. He hinted that if France's attitude persisted, Britain would withdraw from all inter-allied committees. The threat eventually succeeded and France backed down. Curzon's growing disillusionment with France never made him consistently pro-German, but it did result in an advantage to Germany[28]. A further influence on Hadow may have been the fact that France provided arms for Mustapha Kemal during the Greco-Turkish War.

With the progressive attempts at maintaining peace in Europe in the 1920s, it is possible to pinpoint certain more general elements of the 1920s which, if not obvious in Hadow's despatches, may still have had a subtle influence on his later opinions. At Locarno, for example, Britain was perceived as having reestablished herself as arbiter of Europe[29]. Hadow clung to this perception of his country throughout the 1930s. Also at Locarno, conciliation replaced enforcement as the basis for peace as major powers became reluctant to take any decisive action in the risk of another conflict. Hadow may not have initially recognised the limitations of the League of Nations in that it was ineffectual without an enforcement system; or may have merely used it to support his arguments in the early 1930s without really focussing

on it. He may also have felt in secret agreement with the argument of the Italians and Hungarians during the 1920s that the Allies should have restored the Austro-Hungarian Empire as it was a good economic unit if not successful politically.

Due to his lack of experience during the 1930s of Central European affairs, Hadow may not have bothered to familiarize himself a great deal on the actual details of the Versailles Treaty or its after-effects, and merely embraced the popular conception of its unfairness, this being compatible with his other views. Much of Hadow's perception of the Sudeten Germans and Germany as "underdogs" deserving just treatment or "fair-play" could well have been the product of the belief propagated by Germany herself in the 1920s that she had been badly treated at Versailles. Germany's resentment over the terms arguably stemmed from a desire to regain her place among the Great Powers of Europe as soon as possible, but this country managed to convince many in Britain - and Hadow was obviously one - that the Germans possessed genuine grievances that needed redressing. By the time he was in Austria Hadow, with the majority of Britain, was dismissing Versailles as discredited, although it seems that he had not really studied the terms of this agreement or paid attention to Germany's pattern of behaviour since it had been made. Payment of reparations, for example, had steadily decreased with Germany being increasingly treated as an equal at

the expense of smaller nations, and she had managed to slide out of the majority of attempts to inspect her progress of disarmament or lessen the significance of their findings. Hadow's lack of insight in these matters was most likely due in some part to his comparative lack of experience in Central European concerns until the 1930s. In the 1920s a subconscious prejudice could have built up in him through the effect of factors already mentioned plus a general ignorance of the subtler aspects of European affairs, and, perhaps faced with a slightly higher position in the Foreign Office and greater freedom of expression on a subject of increasing concern, Hadow's views, matching the mood of his country, erupted into his despatches with greater confidence and less tact.

Among the possible influences on Hadow in the 1920s it seems likely that the Foreign Office itself played a major role. In 1925 the Permanent Under-Secretary of State Sir Eyre Crowe died and with him the strong tradition of a policy of collective security in Europe. The death of Crowe seemed to represent the release of the Foreign Office from a tighter control over policy and a clarity of direction, and probably helped create the divergence of which Hadow became an active part. With the feeling among many that a new era of diplomacy had arrived, differences now arose in the Foreign Office not merely on local matters, but in approaches to the European situation as a whole. In 1925, for example, Sir

Joseph Addison, under whom Hadow later worked in Czechoslovakia, took the line that a treaty of guarantee in favour of France was unnecessary, the Treaty of Versailles and Covenant of the League of Nations being sufficient. Britain, he argued, should not give in to the closer alliance desired by France; what was necessary was the addition of Germany with the Allies[30]. It was the argument Hadow took up in the 1930s. The growth of controversy in the Foreign Office in the 1930s illustrates the most apparent influence on Hadow and it could be concluded that the initial stages of this controversy stimulated him to a large degree in his subsequent actions. His pacifism, anti-communism, and mistrust of the French found a basis in earlier experiences during the First World War and 1920s, while the changing philosophy and structure of the Foreign Office provided the means by which such sentiments could influence his future actions.

2 Austria: Appeasement Defined

Economics and Disarmament

When Hadow was posted to Vienna in 1931 he faced a Europe which had become marked by turbulence and instability. Parliamentary Government had already succumbed to dictatorial rule in Poland, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Portugal, and the weakened Weimar Republic in Germany, which had grudgingly accepted the dictates of Britain and France after the Peace Settlements was soon to be replaced by the unsettling extremism of Hitler and the Nazis. The repercussions of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 were being felt and economic distress encouraged political sentiments already evoked by the resurgence of nationalism. Hadow most likely shared much of the confusion of his countrymen regarding Europe and the rise of dictators, and among the reactions from Britain, those sentiments associated with appeasement began to become apparent, not least in his despatches: his concern over Austria and the general situation in Europe, growing disapproval of France's behaviour, anti-communism, support for the disarmament process, and belief in the unfairness of the Peace Treaties were expressed with increasing consistency in the years 1931-34. More significantly, Hadow's pacifist sentiments rose to the surface at this time and remained the basis for all future recommendations in the 1930s.

All of these feelings began to find expression in Hadow's attitude towards Germany on which international attention was increasingly being focussed. His conciliatory attitude did not initially encompass the Nazis, for, like many of his contemporaries he hoped to strengthen the moderates in Germany in order to tone down her potentially aggressive nature, but as the Nazi position solidified in Germany and as Hitler, to begin with, reassured other countries as to his peaceful intentions, Hadow came to accept the German leader and urge cooperation with him.

Austria, at this time, was in the throes of a financial crisis with the collapse of her bank the Kredit-Anstalt and the rise of German Nationalism among her population. The underlying cause of the former was the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which resulted, through the impoverishment of Austria, in the loss of capital in the Kredit-Anstalt, making Austria vulnerable to high tariff barriers. She had, therefore, become dependent on foreign loans, and the resulting collapse represented a major disaster for that country.

There had been speculation in both Austria and Germany of a Customs Union between the two countries, and to many Austrians hit hard by economic crises, the idea was particularly enticing because their country would have the opportunity to share in Germany's growing prosperity. Other countries,

however, objected to such a union and most adamant among these was France. In a Customs Union France saw the threatening possibility of an *Anschluss* which would strengthen Germany and end the independence of Austria. The prospect appeared even more perilous once the Nazis came to power and increased the aggressive nature of Germany. While attempting to maintain her own economic dominance in Europe, France did her best to inhibit any moves towards an economic union between Germany and Austria, and her moves stirred up resentment in Austria which, in his increasing sympathy for that country, it is likely Hadow came to share. His dissatisfaction with France was frequently expressed during these years.

Resentment of France helped to fuel the rise of National Socialism in Austria and the spread of Nazi propaganda. When Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor of Austria in 1932 he adopted a stringent attitude towards the Austrian Nazis, and when the Nazi effort was redoubled in that country after Hitler's coming to power in 1933, Dollfuss banned the Nazi Party. Pan-Germanism was fairly widespread in Austria during this time, but the whole population was not yet ready to embrace Nazi ideology at the expense of their independence. This is illustrated in the failure of the attempted Nazi putsch of 1934 which cost Dollfuss his life and from which Hitler was quick to disassociate himself.

Hadow followed closely the Nazi movement in Austria and Austro-German relations. He was opposed to the Customs Union project, but he regarded Austria as fundamentally Germanic and leaning towards *Anschluss* due to her treatment by the Allied Powers. The Nazi influence he regarded as minimal, but nonetheless a threat to Austrian independence, which he supported. If Hadow could be pinned down to a personal opinion on Austria at this time, he probably would have been pro-Royalist and more sympathetic to the restoration of the Habsburg Empire than to any Nazi machinations. Like many of his countrymen he seemed initially averse to, or at least wary of, the Nazi regime mainly in terms of its radical tendencies and influence in Austria. His attitude towards Germany as a whole, however, was sympathetic, and those views which prompted his conciliatory attitude towards this country caused him eventually to adopt a lenient attitude towards Hitler.

Hadow's belief in revision of the Peace Treaties can be seen as his response to the financial crisis in Austria and European economic problems. Revisionism was a popular idea among appeasers and had arisen out of a feeling of guilt over the treatment of Germany just after the First World War. Almost from the time it was made, defence of the Treaty of Versailles began to diminish, influenced greatly by John Maynard Keynes who attacked the economic unreality of Versailles - especially

German reparations-in his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. To Keynes the post-war settlement had hindered any progress Germany might be able to make in future recovery, and his denouncement pricked British consciences. Increasing unease over the severity of the Peace Treaties encouraged an attitude of making allowances for Germany which was continually reinforced during the 1920s and which Hadow came to share. By the 1930s it was widely held that German grievances were derived from the unfairness of Versailles, and, however extremely they were put forward, their basis was understandable and even reasonable.

In September 1933 Hadow wrote of his support of revision of the Peace Treaties on economic grounds and advised that it take the form of an economic understanding between the seven countries of the Danube Basin. Britain's part in the process would be temporary loss of some of her markets which, Hadow felt, would possibly come back as purchasing-power gradually increased in the area. She would have to show "leadership" by bringing France and Italy into agreement with this idea, but most importantly, the countries should be given a chance of making their own individual arrangements among themselves, under the beneficent neutrality of Britain, France, and Italy. "Thus we keep the countries busy, give them hope, and turn into other channels the formidable energies and bitterness of Germany". To Hadow it

was important to break Germany's "appalling sense of isolation" which he apparently felt had been brought on by the harshness of Versailles[1].

By 1934 Hadow was urging a British lead in economic conciliation of Germany and had no qualms in referring to the "catastrophic stupidity" of "uncomprehending Chancelleries" and "crass ignorance among the so-called Statesmen" of the Peace-Treaty years[2]. "There is no peace for Europe and no hope of a Central European settlement until and unless Germany is included", he wrote in April of that year, and put forward a plan of renunciation of most-favoured-nation rights by France and Britain in Hamburg, Rome, Warsaw, and Constantinople and formation of a sheltered area for trade in this area through the granting of tariff privileges[3]. To Hadow, the main source of "German restlessness" was injustice of the Peace Treaties[4], and his plan would have the effect of bringing peoples more closely together economically and "give us some hope that Nationalism in its present acute form would gradually subside, giving place to sounder economic relations"[5].

Hadow's concern for economic inclusion of Germany was probably linked to his interest in the economic situation in Austria. The proposed Customs Union, for example, was a project which, although not in support of, he still felt should be denied to Austria and Germany as carefully and diplomatically as

possible in order that there not spring up a resentment "which would be so deep-seated as to give extremists even in this country a chance they are never likely to get by any other means"[6]. To Hadow, the mistake in the handling of the proposed Customs Union was the assumption that it would mean *Anschluss* which, to Austria, represented "a forbidden cure for the ills of both countries, which cruel allies would not put within reach of the defeated sufferers from the Peace Treaties". He, therefore, in 1934, suggested negotiations with Germany concerning Central Europe with particular reference to Austria. Such negotiations would involve forcing Hitler to recognise the political independence of Austria, in return for which France, Italy, and Britain would give Germany economic relief. It was Hadow's belief that the action he recommended would not be ill-received by Hitler[7]. He had, meanwhile, in 1932, recommended immediate British loans to Austria, expressing the opinion that Britain should concentrate on obtaining the cooperation of Central European Powers "in an endeavour to restore the will for self-help which is gradually being extinguished in Austria and Hungary"[8].

As well as economic cooperation, Hadow's support for mutual disarmament also arose from a desire for inclusion of Germany. In the Fontainebleau Memorandum which preceded the Peace Conference of 1919, David Lloyd George had written, "To my mind it is idle to endeavour to impose a permanent limitation

of armaments upon Germany unless we are prepared similarly to impose a limitation upon ourselves"[9], and in the 1920s the League of Nations had attempted to link security with disarmament. Primarily French fears regarding security, however, helped provide a barrier to these attempts, and the dispute over disarmament carried on throughout the decade. The countries involved professed a desire for disarmament, but all on different terms: the Soviet Union wanted to put an end to all armies, navies and air forces, France stipulated security at the same time that Germany demanded equality, while Britain, as a sea-power, opposed large armies and disagreed with France's position on naval disarmament. Not much optimism surrounded the disarmament conference of 1932, although the Depression had prompted many policy-makers to believe that a cut in armaments was an economically sound idea.

To Hadow, German complaints that Britain and France had not abided by their commitment to disarmament were justified and needed redressing. In 1933 he put forward plans for the scaling-down of British and French armaments in respect of Germany's complaints. "What is the use", Hadow asked, "of telling Germany, or the world, that we have disarmed 'more than other nations'? The fact is that other nations have not disarmed, as they promised in 1919 to do; consequently - and to my mind very naturally if not exactly wisely - Germany, after the warnings

issued by Hitler in May and again before the present Conference met, is withdrawing from her undertakings not to rearm". Germany's argument, Hadow contended was that both sides must keep a contract or it is not worth keeping. "She is not quite right, but she is acting very naturally after waiting for 15 years"[10]. Hadow's remedy for the situation called for Britain together with France and Italy, to commence with immediate reduction in arms, bringing the level down to fixed limits, provided Germany would correspondingly agree not to rearm beyond the actual requirements of her internal security. A system of international inspection could then be established[11].

In 1934 Hadow urged "firm and unyielding" pressure on France to disarm "in accordance with our fifteen year old unfulfilled promise to Germany" in definite stages and to a definite level, and "unremitting" pressure on Germany to remain at her present level of armaments to be controlled by posting British officers with German units[12]. Economic cooperation, he felt, should replace security concerns in a post-war "enlightened" era: "By courageous facing of the facts of the politico-economic situation in Europe and judicious sacrifice of 'rights' which are today almost fictitious, Britain, and Britain alone, can thus, in conjunction with France, help itself by helping others substituting mutual cooperation for the present vain attempt to coerce potential adversaries by force"[13].

The "facts" which Hadow was calling on Britain and France to face had, however, become an illusion with the advent of Hitler to power. Hadow's belief in them was nonetheless understandable. Hitler was bent on rearmament from the moment he gained control of the German Government, but in the early stages of his foreign policy approach, through an exercising of caution in the international arena, the Nazi leader nourished the illusions that power would tame him and that the processes of Treaty Revision and disarmament need not be stopped in 1933.

Germany's negotiating position on the question of disarmament had been, at the 1932 Conference, that she should be allowed some rearmament unless the other powers were prepared to disarm to her level and this position was viewed with sympathy derived from a general disillusionment with war and the practical side of decreased spending on arms. Hitler's accession to power, however, alarmed many of those previously sympathetic. Alert to this feeling, Hitler muffled the eagerness among Nazis to withdraw from negotiations, and tried to extract what mileage he could out of the disarmament talks. The different proposals on disarmament were approached by Nazi Germany in terms which would be most beneficial to her private plans for rearmament. Hadow's plan would probably not have appealed, in this case, because it focussed on British and French reductions and called for Germany to remain at her present level of

armaments. Hitler wanted no control on the limits of his military budget, and he similarly wished to make no commitments at that point which he would be likely to break. He was simultaneously careful not to make Germany appear as if she was deliberately torpedoing negotiations on disarmament and his course was made easier by British and French disagreement over the terms of disarmament. Both were at the same time reluctant to take military action regarding increased German demands and Germany could thus aver her desire for peace while secretly rearming. Hitler finally withdrew from the conference in October 1933, but, although such an action was viewed in some areas with alarm, he was able to portray to those such as Hadow an attitude of frustration over injustice rather than deliberate belligerence.

The widespread guilt over Versailles and subsequent treatment of Germany had obviously affected Hadow and already blinkered his vision regarding that country as well as the possibility of cooperation which provided security. It was an attitude common to many British people. The journalist Shiela Grant Duff, who was at Oxford during this time, writes that in her final exams her special paper on International Relations centred entirely on the 1919 settlements and, above all, its consequences for Germany: "By the time I went down from Oxford I was not only filled with a sense of guilt for all the sufferings which so we were taught, were the direct consequences

of these terms - but even felt that consequently it was we and not the German people themselves who were responsible for the rise of Hitler"[14]. The exclusion of Germany from European decision-making had become a moral question and made it all the more necessary to curb her radical tendencies for which the post-war treaties were now held almost wholly responsible. More significantly, the stipulations of the Peace Treaties were feared to be detrimental to lasting peace, which, in Hadow's eyes, made their revision even more essential.

French Interference

While in Austria, Hadow's criticism of France seemed to follow naturally from his increased confidence over criticism of the post-war settlements and in recommendations for economic appeasement and general conciliation of Germany. Hadow had seemingly caught the early mood of appeasement and was keen to endorse its sentiments. In his exasperation with France he largely centred on that country's fear of German aggression which often found expression in her economic policy and her dealings with Austria. It seems, however, that Hadow also felt a more basic antipathy towards France which was common among many of his countrymen. French insistence on German impotence was inconsistent with the British perception of

fair-play and benevolence toward the defeated enemy as well as the growing belief among British policy-makers that an economically strong Germany would be an advantage to their own country. Throughout the post-war years Franco-British relations had become a matter of increasing irritation; anti-French sentiment developed in Britain through a lack of confidence in French stability, strength and value as a steadying force in Europe, and British officials mistrusted France and held French statesmen in low regard.

To Hadow, France, among other things, was alienating the sympathy of Austria through her demands on that country and her obvious determination to prevent an Austro-German Customs Union. Because of the growth of his affinity for Austria, the alienation Hadow observed could have been a projection of his own feelings. He may, for example, have been inclined to the rumours that the collapse of the Kredit-Anstalt was largely due to deliberate withdrawals of credit by French bankers, although there was no conclusive evidence to support this[15]. Paris was, however, certainly unhelpful towards Austria during the crisis as France herself drew a certain amount of strength from it: she was not yet economically affected by the collapse and could make what conditions she liked on any loans given out. Hadow was quick to spot this and in August 1931 wrote that as soon as Austria came to the League of Nations for money, Paris would "endeavour to

manoeuvre the League into making the political stipulations which France so eagerly and constantly desires of Austria"[16]. In September he wrote that the Austrian press was painting France in violent tones as "a heartless money-sucking vampire and a political tyrant" and he advocated British advice to France on her policy towards Austria and Germany. As Hadow saw the situation, France was driving Austria "willy-nilly" into the arms of Germany, "which we presumably do not want" and so hindering Central European independence and economic stability[17].

In his criticism of France's method of blockage of the Customs Union, it is apparent that Hadow was not as averse to the idea himself as he was officially claiming. In 1932 he reviewed France's attitude on the situation, and he noted that France in particular saw in the plan the beginning of *Anschluss* between Austria and Germany "which she so much dreads and, despite Austro-German protests that the plan was merely the nucleus of a scheme for hastening the formation of a Customs-Union of Europe (that is another and more practical way of carrying out French Pan-European proposals) she set her face resolutely against the entire idea"[18]. Hadow clearly disapproved of this attitude: "French fears of the 'Drang nach Osten' [pressure to the East] and of German domination of Central Europe may be right in the long run", he wrote, "but for the

moment it is useless to think of twenty years hence - whatever may be the consequences at that time - for Central Europe is on the brink of a general economic collapse"[19].

France's answer to Austria's need of assistance was the "Tardieu Plan" which proposed preferential tariffs among the countries in the Danube Basin on a basis of equality and was offered as a form of resistance to a plan put forward by Germany. This latter plan was based on the idea that Germany alone was capable of absorbing surplus agricultural products of the Danube states and she was prepared to afford unilateral preferences to Austria as long as the other Great Powers followed suit.

Hadow supported the latter plan and recommended that British loans should follow along these lines. He further recommended that Britain take from France "the leadership which she has enjoyed for some time past in Central European problems", acknowledging that a break in the Anglo-French policy of cooperation of recent years would be involved. "But it may be asked", Hadow wrote, "whether this substitution would not in the long run work for peace instead of forcing Austria into the arms of Germany as is seemingly being done at the present time by French ideas and methods of coercion"[20].

In 1933 Hadow reported growing bitterness in Austria towards France mainly in terms of her economic treatment. The feeling, Hadow wrote, was due to "French failure to fulfil

promises repeatedly made in respect of Austrian timber and against Czechoslovakia because of the grasping one-sided nature of that country's tariff-demands"[21]. In 1934 he urged British pressure on France to come to an understanding with Germany, which he believed the latter desired "if only for economic reasons"[22].

Hadow's reactions to France while in Austria, although they arose from a probable bias, were fairly straightforward in lieu of Anglo-French relations at the time. France, after the First World War, had adopted an intransigent attitude towards Germany, but she had not been blind to the danger of isolation brought about by alienation of former allies; and through the efforts of the French Foreign Minister from 1925 Aristide Briand she had recognised the need for international reconciliation, particularly with Germany. France was not, however, keen to relinquish her position of authority in Europe and was always awake to the dangers of an excessively revitalised Germany. These latter points contributed to friction between Britain and France, as did economic problems during the Depression.

When President Hoover proposed a moratorium on war reparations in 1931 in response to an impending financial collapse in Europe, France resisted, believing among other things, that the proposal had been purposely kept secret from her until the last minute. She eventually agreed to the moratorium,

but on the condition that the reparations system continue to operate in principle. The moratorium, it was hoped, would help German trade and industry to recover, create confidence in Germany's ability to meet commercial demands, and check the spread of world depression. Hadow certainly took this point of view and was, therefore likely to feel critical of what he saw as a lack of reason on the part of France.

On the question of the proposed Customs Union, Britain had attempted to adopt a neutral position due to the political considerations involved, but had not actually been averse to the idea; hence, Hadow's assurance in mentioning its advantages. Britain's hope that an alternative scheme could be devised which satisfied France, Germany and Austria, however, actually implied a bias towards France as Germany and Austria would then have to admit that their plan was at fault. Hadow had recognised this and the implications for Germanic sympathy in Austria and thus urged a conciliatory approach in denying the plan to Germany and Austria. France, however, had an advantageous position in this case because Austria needed her help and she could therefore safely sabotage the Customs Unions and deal with Austria on her own terms, a circumstance which caused Hadow to feel further exasperation with France and made others in Britain condemn French action towards Austria as blackmail. Even the Permanent Under-Secretary of State Sir

Robert Vansittart, who was generally felt to be pro-French, expressed the belief that the French attitude was comparable to "the stronger man making conditions with the weaker one while the house was on fire"[23].

The fact that France was still financially strong in the early 1930s further caused a certain amount of resentment. The Depression combined with political problems had left Britain too weak to put pressure on France or the United States to revise reparations and improve her financial position. The situation was also complicated by a leakage of a conversation in January 1932 in which the German chancellor reportedly told the British Ambassador that Germany could no longer pay any reparations. Interpreting this statement as an ultimatum in which it seemed the British were implicated, the French Government ordered a concentration of troops near the German frontier. Negotiations over reparations were disrupted and the proposed conference on them postponed. Tension decreased by June 1932, but Britain and German hopes that reparations might be ended were disappointed somewhat. Germany was to make a final payment of three thousand million Reichsmarks, and the United States, for political reasons, still could not relinquish war debts.

On the question of disarmament, Britain and France had initially drawn together in 1932 while Germany faced isolation through her ambitions, but the deadlock over war debts made

opposition weak when Hitler came to power in January 1933. Interpreting Britain's attempts at minimal agreements on disarmament and British expressions of sympathy towards the French position as ineffectual, France began to turn in 1933 to the East to create an alliance system involving the Soviet Union. Hadow probably sympathised with British discouragement of this course for ideological reasons as well as the fear that Europe might be divided into two armed camps. The move contradicted his calls for an economically united Central Europe and generally increased the strain in relations between Britain and France. In 1934 France rejected the British disarmament proposals, claiming that German rearmament "has rendered all negotiations useless. France will henceforward assure its security by its own means"[24]. Thus, to Hadow and many of his colleagues in London, it seemed that the disarmament conference had failed, not because of German ambitions, but because of French recalcitrance.

Hadow's recommendation that Britain take over France's leadership in European affairs arose not only from the friction caused by the latter's actions in the early 1930s but also from a general feeling in Britain that the Foreign Office was traditionally too pro-French in its policy. *The National Liberal* [M.P. for Bristol] Robert Bernays, for example, wrote to Hadow at this time that he was alarmed at the strength of London's pro-French policy: "Clearly it

is dominant in the Foreign Office now. No voice is lifted for an attempt at accommodation with Germany on Austria or any other question"[25]. Sir John Simon, who was Foreign Secretary while Hadow was in Austria, seemed determined to change this attitude and did not believe in the validity of French anxiety. He hoped that the French government could be persuaded that legalisation of Germany's treaty violations was "the inevitable outcome" of post-war circumstances, and reflected the views of his Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald by apparently contemplating isolation from the continent instead of Anglo-French solidarity. Like Hadow, he hinted at the desirability of being closer to Germany than France, and urged his colleagues to stop acquiescing in French policy[26].

Although he limited himself to particular criticism of French moves, it seems that Hadow shared in the deterioration among Britons in national empathy towards France. Nicholas Rostow writes in *Anglo-French Relations 1934-36* that, to the British, Frenchmen became "obsessive, legalistic, unreasonable, corrupt or flighty as the mood required"[27]. It seems likely that Hadow adopted these sentiments although how deep-seated they were is unclear.

The bias Hadow felt against France during his posting in Austria was thus evident but not at this time unreasonable. His objections were based on the idea that Europe should pull together

economically so that countries would be less susceptible to political unrest and oppression, and that the revitalisation of countries such as Austria and Germany was more important than what he saw as old war grudges. He recognised France's fears regarding a strengthened Germany but chose to deplore them as unrealistic in the face of European economic problems. The fact that he maintained this position after Hitler's accession to power demonstrates the point at which his bias caused him to ignore the implications of a now aggressive and potentially unreasonable Germany, and fail to recognise the rationality of French fears.

The Nazi Shadow

In addressing himself to the political and economic situation in Austria, Hadow's focus on Germany and her influence in Austria was a reflection of British foreign policy concerns as well as the concerns of Europe itself. When Hitler gained power in 1933 these concerns turned to consternation, and confusion arose over how to deal with Nazi Germany. Before 1933 the redressing of German grievances was a widely accepted approach to European problems, one reason being that such a course, it was hoped, would strengthen moderating influences in

Germany and quell the rise of national socialism. The increase in Nazi power represented a failure for these influences and its repercussions were felt not least in Austria. As Martin Kitchen points out in *The Coming of Austrian Fascism*, Hitler's triumph in Germany in 1933 awakened democratic forces in Austria to the growing danger of right-wing movements in their own country[28].

Hadow stressed the fundamentally Germanic nature of Austria but felt an initial aversion to Nazism which was only superseded by his aversion to communism and war. Some sort of major link between Austria and Germany, he felt, was crucial in calming radical elements in both countries, particularly before Hitler's accession to power, but he opposed a union of the two. Significantly, however, it becomes clear in his later despatches in Vienna that the principal danger he saw in the union of Austria and Germany was a weakening of Hitler in the face of a communist menace; that menace stemming from the elements in the German Chancellor's party which Hadow believed to be left-wing. Hadow, thus, along with many others, came to view Hitler as a moderating influence in Germany.

From 1931-32 Hadow concentrated on Germanic sympathies in Austria, the rise of Nazism being a subsidiary consideration. In July 1931 he was writing that the "underlying note of sympathy" for Germany in the Austrian press was

"unmistakable"[29], but in September of that year wrote of the lack of unanimity between the Royalist, Christian-Socialist, and Pan-German adherents of the Heimwehr movement; a movement led by Prince Stahremberg which originally took common cause with the German Nazis but later found greater profit in gaining the support of Mussolini. It was Hadow's opinion that an attempted putsch by the Heimwehr faction which had occurred at this time was only significant in its pathetic failure and lack of support: "It is to be hoped that those abroad who lay stress upon the danger of Austro-German solidarity in such movements will take note not of this quixotic 'putsch', but rather of the businesslike manner in which it was suppressed and of the apparent unanimity with which an attempt to seize the reins of Government by unconstitutional methods has been resisted and is now being condemned by Press and public alike, even though some of the condemnation must be accepted as lip-service"[30].

In August 1932 Hadow wrote a memorandum entitled "Austria and the *Anschluss*" which summarised recent events in Austria in the light of the movement for Austro-German union. According to Hadow, conservative, nationalist and particularly Christian-Social political opinion in Austria had, for some time to come, been estranged by recent German manoeuvres. "Of this there is evidence in the press, while Prince Starhemberg [who had now switched his loyalties to Italy] has, in his latest speeches,

seen fit to protest against 'attempts to dictate Austrian policy from Berlin". Hadow went on to say that he had it on good authority that "the rank and file of Austrian youths who are now joining the Nazi standard in considerable numbers have little or no enthusiasm for any ideas involving actual or potential Union with Germany and that so long as Prussia appears in this country to be the dominating and domineering partner of German confederation Austrians as a whole 'desired none but the theoretical side of the '*Zusammen-Schluss*' ['final merging' - see first letter in *Appendix*]". Hadow concluded that, while it was true that Germany worked hard to keep alive a Pan-German sentiment which, in Austria took the place of patriotism in other countries, the strength of this movement and its vitality lay "largely in the fascination exercised over Austrian sentimentality by a two-edged sword which, if left to themselves, Austrians would probably never grasp but which, kept tantalisingly out of reach by Treaties and Protocols, shines out of the economic morass of present-day Austria as a very Excalibur"[31].

In the same month he wrote that nothing short of invasion would persuade the political groups in Austria to surrender parochial advantages by handing themselves over to Germany, "and invasion I doubt whether Germany would risk even in a disguised or Hitlerian form"[32]. Hadow was apparently alert regarding Hitler and the Nazis in Germany, as were most of his

colleagues. If, however, Germany succumbed to Nazism, he did not believe *Anschluss* with Austria was inevitable not merely because it was not the wish of the Austrians, but also because even an aggressive Germany would not attempt to force it.

The rise of Nazism in Germany at this time was confusing British policy makers in their approach to that country. The German Government under Brüning had begun to adopt a seemingly revisionist policy under pressure from the Nazis, but refusing concessions to this Government would only strengthen the Nazi position. In 1931 Vansittart wrote that French reluctance to make concessions had weakened the democratic forces in Germany and played into the hands of Hitler. To Vansittart it was now important to base British policy not necessarily on sympathy for Germany's defeat but on "enlightened self-interest". By appeasing Germany the strength of her grievances would decrease and a war of revenge would be avoided[33]. This was Hadow's basic reasoning regarding revisionism and the attitude of France, but the potential dangers of Nazism he apparently viewed in a different light. Vansittart regarded Hitler as a "half-mad and ridiculously dangerous demagogue"[34], and warned that Germany's objectives included *Anschluss* as well as rearmament and the recovery of lost colonies[35]. Hadow had greater faith in the rationality of the German people and, like most in the Foreign Office, probably

regarded Vansittart's fears as too alarmist.

Bruning's Government, meanwhile, had fallen, to be replaced first by von Papen, then General Schleicher. Germany had begun to rearm - a circumstance which Britain was aware of and resigned to - and Hitler became louder in expressing his intentions to destroy the Versailles settlement. British attempts at concessions had come too late to stop the rise of Hitler and when he became Chancellor in January 1933, Britain's worst fears were realised. Still somewhat doubtful of the menace of an actual German takeover of Austria, however, Hadow now began to concentrate on Nazi influence in that country.

In the Spring of 1933 Hadow travelled through the provinces of upper Austria, Salzburg and Styria known as the Salzkammergut. Of the political conditions in this area he wrote that the mountain peasantry was traditionally Royalist but he noted the amount of Nazi posters on village notice-boards: "No village or cross-road, few barns or inns but showed in some the form the energy and systematic propaganda which are being showered upon this district by the new party". Hadow noticed a weakness in the Socialist attempts at retaliation and also took note of the German broadcasts which were played in the tap-rooms of most inns: "I was astonished not by the customary virulence of the speeches but by the pointed and frequent references to Austria and Austro-German solidarity which made it seem to the

listeners as if the speeches were being broadcast especially for Austrian consumption". The older listeners, according to Hadow, were curious about Hitler but little more, the middle-aged "perturbed and wavering", and the younger ones "violently Nazi".

Hadow concluded that he had no doubt of the thoroughness and direction of Nazi propaganda, but the Salzkammergut did not represent a large part of Austria and, lying close to the German border, was a good field for "showy agitation". The Austrian temperament, Hadow wrote, was paradoxically conservative and its instincts were cautious. "Yet the Nazi movement", he warned, "has in its favour growing economic distress and traditional dislike of Vienna by the remainder of Austria as well as an external driving-force which the Austrian Government might find difficult to withstand in a sudden emergency"[36].

Hadow's report on these areas and their political leanings in comparison to Vienna were fairly accurate. Provinces such as Styria held a tradition of nationalism as opposed to the Catholicism of Vienna and provided the main force behind the German Nationalist Party. Professions in these areas were overcrowded and Jewish competition increasingly prominent. *The Foreign Office Annual Report* for 1933 (to which Hadow most likely contributed) stated that "the twin Nazi doctrines of 'more work' and anti-Semitism find a fertile field in the inherently anti-Semitic and impoverished youth of Austria", and it

highlighted "the hopeless economic future which faces the majority of adolescents as they grow up into manhood"[37].

Nazi pressure was, in fact, dynamic throughout Austria at this time. While initially consolidating power, Hitler, as pointed out earlier, reassured Europe of his peaceful intentions. Only in the case of Austria was he seemingly unafraid to express his aggressive ambitions. Anticipating that Dollfuss's Government, being apparently weak, would be forced to compromise in favour of the Nazis he stepped up pressure in in Austria the form of propaganda[38].

Hadow perceived Dollfuss's position as precarious and wrote of the danger of his government being swallowed up by the German Nazis[39]. In May of that year Hitler ordered a tax of 1,000 marks to be imposed on all citizens travelling to Austria, an action which, according to Hadow's sources had the Austrian cabinet "wringing their hands". Hadow wrote that in answer to this German intimidation, the Italian legation was contemplating an approach to London for "quiet" representations in Berlin, their object being removal of the tourist ban and better Austro-German relations, as a necessity to the peace of Central Europe. "I vouchsafed no opinion but this more or less supports your [Minister to Vienna Walford Selby's] recent suggestions to the F.O. which I believe are now an urgent necessity if H.M.G. wish to avoid - or at all events put off a gradual but steady absorption of

Austria by Germany."[40].

In August Hadow noted the rise of Pan-Germanism in Austria and Dollfuss's growing loss of support. Leaving aside economic factors, he believed that the Austro-German "quarrel" hinged upon "the loyalty and ability of the army and policy to resist, and if necessary to fire, on Austrian soil, upon brother Austrians of some Austrian Legion, trained and equipped in Germany and stiffened, if necessary, by a backbone of incomparably efficient German non-commissioned officers"[41].

In the same month Hadow reported in a telegram that the Assistant Chief of the Intelligence War Office had stated to the Military Attache that after visiting Salzburg and other provincial centres and studying the latest reports he was convinced that Austria's days were numbered unless the allies could save her. Hadow wrote, "I discount this information to some extent for the disquieting reason that I consider he is wavering in his loyalty to this Government"; but he noted that Austrians in Germany were being trained to assist the Austrian Legions of Austrian Nazi exiles in making a putsch fairly soon: "A good deal of this talk is a result of nervousness deliberately fomented by Nazi agents but [the Austrian Government] is undoubtedly in difficulties[42].

In January 1934 Hadow took care to reaffirm his own objections to an *Anschluss* but held onto the opinion that such a union was not the true desire of either country. Although he

contended that over 40% of Austrians were sympathetic to Nazism, "6-12 months after any *Gleichschaltung* most Austrians would, I believe rue their decision to join Germany, and I further believe that Hitler - as an Austrian - realises that Germany would do likewise"[43].

Although Hadow may have been fairly perceptive regarding Austrian opinion, his optimism clouded his judgment over German intentions. The enthusiasm for union with Germany on the Austrian side decreased with the coming to power of Nazis, but it was just this occurrence in Germany which increased interest in *Anschluss* on the German side, purposely prompted by Hitler. In 1931, for example, Hitler had told Waldeman Pabst, who was instrumental in organising coups in Austria, that he would help finance the national socialist campaign as well as send his best speakers to Austria in order to achieve the success he had in Germany[44].

In June 1934 a meeting was held between Hitler and Mussolini which raised hopes for a negotiated solution over Austria. The results of this meeting were, however, negative and on his return to Rome Mussolini told the German ambassador that "in view of the acts of violence against the Austrian government he could not advise Dollfuss to start negotiations with the National Socialists"[45]. This outcome caused the Austrian Nazis to strengthen their belief in a solution by force. On the 25th

July a group of insurgents staged the abortive Nazi putsch in the Austrian chancellery where, amongst the confusion, Dollfuss was shot and killed[46]. Mainly through a lack of support the insurgents in Vienna surrendered on the same day after obtaining an assurance of free conduct, while fighting in the provinces continued for three days. When it became clear that the attempt had failed, Hitler disowned the S.S. gang involved, closed the frontier, dismissed Habicht, and sent a telegram of sympathy to Dollfuss' widow.

Hadow wrote several memoranda on the subject of the putsch which he appeared to view as mainly the action of young "hot-heads", and seemed particularly concerned over the treatment of the insurgents who were denied free conduct and arrested as soon as the death of Dollfuss was discovered. It was Hadow's belief that they had been cheated and that their ill-treatment by the police would lead to further chaos in Austria. With regard to Germany's responsibility, Hadow described the failed putsch as "an unparalleled opportunity" for Hitler to "kill two birds with one stone" by ridding himself of the German vice-chancellor von Papen's presence in Germany (of the pre-Nazi regime) and "showing the world how completely he dissociated himself from the insurgents in Austria". According to Hadow, the "Pan-German" elements in Austria had managed to "keep aloof" from the uprising but their sympathies, although shaken

regarding Nazi activity, were unchanged in their belief in the Pan-German ideal[47].

It is unclear to what extent Hitler was involved in the attempted putsch although it seems definite that he had foreknowledge of it[48]. He obviously, however, was less than happy with its consequences and, while separating himself from the insurgents, tried to extract what advantages he could out of it. Thus, as Hadow noted, Hitler used the putsch to send von Papen - who had become a hindrance to him through his lack of talent and openly professed Catholicism - to Austria as an envoy where he could intrigue with the Austrian Nazis while Germany built up enough strength to impose a more forceful solution on that country. In this he would be assisted by the Pan-German elements to which Hadow referred. Meanwhile, Hitler had to face the international repercussions of the attempted putsch and play down not only his involvement but his interest. From then on he revised his outward policy towards Austria, ordering the disbanding of the Austrian Legion (an order which was never enforced), dissolving the Austrian Party Bureau, and postponing plans for political union between Austria and Germany.

Though many outside Austria and Germany held Hitler personally responsible for the death of Dollfuss, Hadow's stress on Hitler's estrangement from the event demonstrates a growing sympathy he was feeling towards Germany regardless of the Nazi

regime. It was a sentiment which Sir Walford Selby, who became Minister in Vienna in 1933, recognised and disapproved of. In a personal note to Hadow he wrote that he had noticed that French and British contentions came in for strong criticism in Hadow's comments, while the German argument was accepted and supported. "I cannot help but feel", Selby wrote, "that your attitude arises from the ignoring of a good deal of 'background'. We should never have come to this pass but for the consistent policy of concession followed towards her[Germany] from 1914 onwards"[49].

Sir Godfrey Nicholson, Conservative M.P. for Morpeth, in corresponding with Hadow, also recognised Hadow's sympathies and warned against the danger of Germany's repressive regimes. "When you have public opinion absolutely under your thumb to mould in any way you like", Nicholson wrote, "and when you can suppress any news from abroad which you feel is contrary to your ideas, war is a certainty sooner or later". Probably in reference to Hadow's affinity with the German people Nicholson wrote, "We want to make friends with the man in the street, to see him prosperous and happy; but we must have free access to his mind. At the moment he is, intellectually, a slave and will do his master's bidding, wherever that may lead him - and Europe"[50].

Hadow, nonetheless, was gravitating towards the form of appeasement which tended to ignore the excesses of the Nazi

regime or explain them away. One reason for this was his antipathy towards communism. By 1934 it seemed that Hadow was more concerned over the possibility of a communist take-over in Germany than Nazi aggression. To Hadow, any appreciable weakening of Hitler meant one more step towards a communist Germany "led by utterly unreasonable men - which I do not consider Hitler to be". In Hadow's eyes, this possibility would mean such an upset of the political and economic structure of Europe "that I prefer to help Hitler rather than risk having a worse alternative in his place!"[51]. Hadow apparently perceived Germany as a threat to Austria and to European peace due to what he viewed as the leftist tendencies in the Hitler regime. The "left wing" of the Nazi party Hadow defined as Hermann Goering and Joseph Goebbels "whose doctrines reflect the influence of Moscow"; and the "right wing" was represented by Hitler and the South Germans whose views, Hadow wrote, "are modelled on the example of Fascist Rome"[52].

As unlikely as Hadow's assessment of Nazi politics may now sound, it did have some basis in the first years of post-war Germany and the early workings of the Nazi regime. Just after Hitler's rise to power, challenge arose within the Nazi party among the storm troopers. A large radical wing took the word "socialist" in the party title seriously and began calling for a second round of revolution that would curb the privileges and

powers of Junker landlords and industrial barons and officers. The principal character in this faction, however, was Ernst Roehm, and not, as Hadow believed at that time, Goering or Goebbels.

Roehm also hoped to absorb the German army into his storm troopers, but the army, as well as the conservative establishment which had long dominated Germany, had played a part in Hitler's accession to power, so the danger Hadow saw of this leader succumbing to anything approaching communism was fairly marginal. Hitler was also in greater control than Hadow perceived. When the challenge arose from Roehm Hitler speedily resolved the issue on June 30, 1934 in the "Night of the Long Knives" in which Roehm and other potential enemies were rounded up and shot.

The advent of Hitler to power marked the beginning of illusions among many, which Hadow shared. There was a certain amount of relief, for example, that political uncertainty had ended in Germany combined with the hope that Hitler would be calmed by his position of leadership. In Hadow's case, such illusions probably arose from the Germanic sympathy apparent in his despatches, and his anti-communism. Hitler had declared himself a guardian against communism and while Nazism was a new and possibly aggressive phenomenon, the spread of the Soviet experiment was an established threat and seemed to take

precedence in Hadow's mind as Europe's principal danger. His views were again taken note of by Selby who was dubious in his assessment, despite his basic respect for Hadow's work: "Mr. Hadow may be perfectly right about the communist menace in Germany if Herr Hitler is pressed too far but for myself I doubt whether we can take account of all these contingencies"[53]. Selby's objections were part of a reluctance in Britain to draw close to either Nazism or communism. One hope was that the two would destroy each other through their extremist methods.

The general instinct in the Foreign Office under Simon's direction, on the other hand, was to temporise, and Hadow reflected this instinct. In one of his last despatches from Austria he suggested that, through a face-saving approach from Italy, Germany would be willing to come to an agreement over Austria recognising her independence; a suggestion which was met with some scepticism from some factions in the Foreign Office but which illustrates a growing belief in the peaceful intentions of Hitler[54]. It was a belief that, despite the aversion to Nazism in Europe, many encompassed in the early years of Hitler. Anthony Eden, who had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary from 1931-33, wrote that, after visiting Hitler in 1934, the latter had declared that Germany had no interest in aggression. "The war had taught his country that it was easier to destroy than to build up, and this formerly militaristic people now saw that peace ought to

be the permanent state of mankind". Eden indicated that for all he then knew such sentiments might have been sincere[55].

Hadow certainly interpreted Hitler's assertions as sincere, possibly in reaction to a current running through Europe which feared the possibility of another war through an increasingly belligerent Germany. His concern for the fate of Austria and affinity with that country's people might have caused him to readily accept the peaceful claims of Hitler in the secret hope that they were true and that war was not imminent.

Will to Peace versus Communism

As pointed out earlier, Hadow's affinity with Germany, antipathy towards France, and anti-communism were underpinned by his abhorrence of war. Well aware of this fact himself, Hadow often used this sentiment to punctuate his letters and despatches in Austria. When urging that Britain bring Germany out of isolation in 1933 he wrote that, if such a course was not followed, "I must bring up my children for another 1914 which I refuse to do until all else has been tried [56]. In 1934 he wrote "I take no part in politics, but a very great interest in the future of Austria, which is, in my opinion, closely linked up with the peace of Europe...Having seen four years of war, not from the

comfortable angle of Headquarters, but from the very uncomfortable situation of the trenches on three fronts, I may perhaps be allowed to say to you only that I would do anything on earth to prevent my own boys having to do likewise"[57].

Hadow's feelings on war were genuine and personal, but were probably encouraged by a general mood in Britain and in the Foreign Office. By the 1930s war was held to be impractical and immoral and, therefore, unjustifiable. A Foreign Office memorandum written in 1926 stated, for example, "Our sole object is to keep what we have and live in peace...We keep our hands free in order to throw our weight into the scale and on behalf of peace"[58]. Richard Griffiths notes in *Fellow Travellers of the Right* that while 1933-35 marked the lack of coherent views towards Germany, there was a desire for appeasement which was based on general principles on the subject of peace[59]. William Rock writes in *British Appeasement in the 1930s* that, although all of Britain did not convert to pacifism in the 1930s, there was "a poignant realisation of the terrible destruction wrought by modern war", and a feeling that war was now a barbaric solution to foreign policy[60]. Hadow embraced these views wholeheartedly and further believed them to be the now rational desire of all European nations. He, therefore, felt safe in urging greater cooperation in Western Europe and criticising any ostracism of Germany.

Hadow reflected many of the opinions of his countrymen

during his posting in Vienna. The rise of Nazism had evoked a feeling of revulsion in Britain but did not warrant an aggressive challenge from that country which might risk another war. Apart from the fear of war, the idea of a challenge was also repressed by the sympathy many British felt for the Germans which arose from several factors including guilt over Versailles, the belief in the economic necessity of a revitalised Germany, and antipathy towards France, all of which Hadow encompassed. The further less definable factor of a racial and historical affinity and supposedly shared characteristics such as inner discipline and national strength also inhibited any form of challenge to Germany. It seems likely that Hadow, at least subconsciously, was drawn to this latter belief as well.

While lying beneath the surface in Persia, Turkey, and Canada, Hadow's Germanic sympathy found real expression in his personal sympathy for Austria and identification with the Austrian character. Throughout his time in Austria he became increasingly concerned over the political and economic fate of that country and conveyed his feelings to colleagues and friends in Britain. One example is an exchange of letters with M. Rodd of the Bank of England in which the latter displayed a decided lack of sympathy for the economic problems in Austria. Rodd wrote, "I am sure that the Austrians will seize upon any excuse they can find either to start a new hare or to try to make mischief by

misquoting everyone's opinions to everyone else". Rodd expressed the hope that Hadow would forgive him for appearing unsympathetic to the Austrians' "hard luck stories" but added, "We have...had some experience of dealing with the Austrians in the last two years"[61].

Hadow replied to Rodd almost immediately: "Do not place too much reliance on the traditional idea that Austrian hard-luck stories are merely to be treated with amused tolerance. If I were a banker I would come out here and SEE things for myself". He continued, "I suppose this will lead you to think more than ever that I swallow blindly anything that I hear in this country and that, like most officials, I have become "more royalist than the King". But you will remember that this has been said of most officials living abroad by their fellow-countrymen at home and that failure to see the cracks in an edifice have all too often brought the building about our ears without previous warning: witness Russia"[62].

Later despatches give clues to Hadow's affinity with the Austrian character. In 1933 he wrote in a letter to Phipps, "compromise is Austria's traditional way out of its difficulties"[63], and to Simon he wrote, "The Austrian likes peace at almost any price and seeks naturally for compromise as the end of any quarrel"[64]. Such characteristics could be equally applicable to Hadow although the question of whether Austria

rubbed off on him or whether that country merely brought these characteristics to the surface is uncertain.

While Hadow was in Austria appeasement was still a vague sentiment shared by many but certainly not all in Britain. As yet it had no clear definition in foreign policy and was more a series of general principles and personal bias. Hadow expressed these in Austria but with comparative caution and reason. In the early 1930s British concern was still focussed on recovery from the Depression and a general maintenance of the status quo in Europe, and Hadow's main concentration in these years was on Austrian and European economics. More extreme political views encouraging appeasement were nonetheless coming to the fore and probably influencing Hadow. In the summer of 1934 a copy of a letter written by a British subject in Austria was sent to the Foreign Office because it gave "an interesting picture of local conditions there". The letter included such statements as "I know quite a lot of people here and decidedly all educated clear-thinking people are Nazis; also it is noticeable that all the really nice people one likes to know are Nazis", and "there are a lot of Communists here and of course they do a lot and put the blame on the Nazis". E.H. Carr, historian and Counsellor in the Southern Department, sent a copy of the letter to Hadow with the observation, "There are many points of view about Austria, and this is evidently one"[65]. There was no comment from Hadow,

but he may well have found himself in partial sympathy with these sentiments.

The years 1931-33 reveal Hadow's initial leanings towards a policy of appeasement and it is possibly during these years that he began to feel a personal responsibility for foreign policy in its avoidance of war. References in his despatches to his own experience of war suggest this as do his increasing correspondence with influential figures in Britain outside the Foreign Office. Britain, meanwhile, was edging towards appeasement in a manner providing greater impetus to Hadow's future despatches. The British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards foreign policy which did little in the way of discouraging Hitler. In 1933 he stated that Britain was "entirely willing to continue to work closely even with a Germany under the new order"[66]. The path on which Hadow had launched in Austria posed seemingly few obstacles. Baldwin's attitude did not give Hitler the active encouragement which Neville Chamberlain's later did, but it certainly did not hinder the course of the German leader.

3 Czechoslovakia: Appeasement Applied

The Sudeten German Factor

Those who worked closely with Hadow or knew him well often recall his concern for those he saw as underprivileged; a concern which would be translated into action whenever possible. Lord Gladwyn described Hadow in his memoirs as "an enormous demon of energy" who "not only insisted in doing all the available chancery work himself, but, devout Christian as he was, spent hours and hours befriending 'lame dogs' - often obvious ne'er-do-wells"[1]. This characteristic stayed with Hadow and found its greatest expression in his attitude towards the German minority in Czechoslovakia. His sympathy for this group of people was almost immediate, and his exertions on their part along with his mistaken faith in the party which grew to represent them seemed limitless. His simultaneous impatience with the Czechs and Czechoslovak Government acted as a further catalyst to his behaviour, as did the increasing interest of Hitler in the treatment of the German population in Czechoslovakia, and Hadow came to believe this question was directly related to peace in Europe.

By the end of 1934, Hadow's affinity with Austria had penetrated his view of Europe. Possibly caught up with the romanticism of Austria, Hadow seemed to find the mixed heritage, socialist elements, and limited history of the

newly-formed state of Czechoslovakia less palatable. A product of the First World War, Czechoslovakia was made up of Poles and Magyars as well as Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, and Germans who had all been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and she derived her independence mainly from the Wilson programme of self-determination. Preserving her new status through reliance on France who had assisted her during the war, Czechoslovakia's foreign policy was oriented towards both the West and Slav considerations. These elements of Czechoslovakia were probably unfamiliar to Hadow and it may be that, in the early weeks of his arrival in Prague, Hadow searched, in his initial confusion, for a portion of this country with which he could identify. His interest landed on the German population in the border areas of Bohemia and Moravia known as the Sudetenland.

Despite the problem of integrating her national minorities, Czechoslovakia avoided succumbing to any form of dictatorship and incorporated these populations in a relatively democratic fashion throughout the 1920s. Resentment among her minorities, however, did not completely disappear, and was strongest among the Sudeten Germans. The area which they populated had once been a part of Austria-Hungary, and many of them held strong Pan-German sentiments and had a tradition of despising the Czechs. During the war this section of Czechoslovakia had supported the dependence of Austrian policy on Germany and Radomir Luza writes in *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans*

that the punishment of Czechs during this time who sympathised with the West and Russia exposed the difference between German-dominated Austria and the national aspirations of the Czechs. "Defeated, mourning their high war losses, they [the Sudeten-deutsch] saw behind the Czech victory and the peace settlement a vicious combination of Pan-Slavism and political greed, betrayal of promises of national self-determination, and a decline of courage, loyalty, and selflessness"[2]. Hadow soon began to sympathise with some of these sentiments.

The German population in Czechoslovakia had initially resisted the Czech forces at the start of the state's formation, and, although developments in the 1920s healed this breach somewhat, the preliminary clashes were never quite forgotten. In 1919, the Sudeten-deutsch gathered in various towns to protest their inclusion in the Czech state, and in Kaaden nervous Czech police opened fire on the crowd. This incident became known as "the massacre of Kaaden" and was later a symbol for many Sudeten-deutsch of the right to enmity with the Czechs. Such feelings were brought to the surface at the beginning of the 1930s when the Depression hit this German minority with particular force. The economic dislocation which they faced was largely a product of the great shrunken market after the destruction of the Habsburg Empire, but the temptation to attribute it to Czech repression was great, especially when Hitler's rise to power in Germany was being watched at the same time in these areas with

interest and some amount of adulation. Czech attempts to redress inequities were regarded as conscious efforts to undermine this minority who, consequently, felt their ethnic existence was being threatened. These factors combined with the fact that the Sudeten-deutsch were the largest German minority in Europe and the closest geographically to the Reich, made the growth of interest among this population in ethnic German politics (*Volkstumspolitik*) practically inevitable.

By 1931, the Czech authorities were banning Nazi and Nazi youth uniforms among this population, and in 1933, when the Czechs threatened to outlaw the Sudeten-Nazi party, it dissolved itself and went underground. The movement was replaced in 1934 by the German National Front led by Konrad Henlein which aimed at uniting all the German national forces in Czechoslovakia in a broad alliance. Later known as the Sudeten-deutsch party, (SdP) this movement achieved a major electoral success in May 1935, polling 1,249,530 votes. At the end of this year the Czech president Thomas Masaryk resigned and the former Foreign Minister Edvard Benes was elected to take his place.

It was in December 1935 that Hadow first referred to the SdP by suggesting that greater contact be established with it. He had been studying the literature of this party and tried to base conclusions on its evidence; but, as Henlein's headquarters were in North Bohemia as opposed to Prague, Hadow found it difficult

"to make even indirect contact with his movement without arousing undesirable and undeserved Czech suspicions". Hadow, thus, suggested the establishment of a British Vice Consulate in North Bohemia, claiming no idleness on the part of the legation, but a "real need" for such contact[3]. One might deduce from Hadow's subsequent behaviour that he felt a personal desire to establish closer contact with the SdP as well as believing it to be a diplomatic necessity. From the outset, his view of the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government was sceptical in comparison, and subject to the certainty that it was reluctant to make any real concessions to its German minority: "Any student of history knows that fear is the main motive underlying Czech repression of the German minority; and I for one cannot blame them if they are neither statesmen with a 'long-sighted' policy, nor able to resist the temptation to turn the tables upon those who, they believe, hate and despise them, are racially antagonistic to their ideals and belong to the traditional "oppressors" of their race. But, for the future peace of Europe, I could wish it were otherwise"[4].

The Czechs were suspicious of the SdP, but, by admitting it to the 1935 elections they had already made a significant concession. J.W. Bruegel in *Czechoslovakia Before Munich* contends that the Czechoslovak Government would have been wiser to dissolve Henlein's party and accompany this action with generous allowances to Germans professing democratic ideals,

but concedes that this was unlikely during a preelection period[5]. Luza in also argues that the Czechs should have begun making concessions to the Sudeten-deutsch just after they disbanded the Sudeten Nazis in 1933. They were reluctant, however, and Luza admits that, in retrospect, it was likely that this action still would not have drawn the Germans back into cooperation with the Republic because the issue, by that time, was too complex[6].

In any event, the SdP was highly successful in the 1935 Parliamentary elections and Hadow attached considerable significance to this occurrence. In a despatch which concentrated on the Sudeten-deutsch he wrote of "four milestones" lining the road trodden by Czechoslovakia's German minority. The first marked the period from 1920 to 1933 when different German parties had attempted to cooperate with the Czechoslovak Government, "while the majority of their racial brethren in Czechoslovakia looked on with increasing bitterness as historical feuds, racial discrimination, and economic distress each played their part in increasing the hardness of their lot". The second milestone was the "meteoric rise" of Henlein from 1934-35 and his success in the elections. The third was the hope of concessions and cooperation from the Czechoslovak Government: "But the latter had no liking for 'outsiders' who might, as they thought, provide Germany with an excuse for interfering, in traditional fashion, on behalf of this Cinderella of the Czechoslovak household". In Hadow's opinion, Henlein had repeatedly offered

an "olive-branch" to the Government, but had failed and was now embarking on "the fourth stage of his people's journey through the wilderness", which meant enlisting the sympathy of Britain[7].

The economic crisis having reached its peak in 1933, recovery in Czechoslovakia was, in fact, taking place. The industries in the Czech area, however, felt the effect of the recovery sooner than the German industries which produced mainly consumer goods. Unemployment was thus still much higher among Germans in Czechoslovakia than among the Czechs and Slovaks. But the Czechs were now realising the need for greater recognition and allowances for the German minorities. When Benes took on the Presidency he emphasised his policy of cooperation between Germans and Czechs and in a later speech he stated that no ethnic group's culture should be threatened, and, as head of state, he hoped to act as mediator and help both sides[8]. These were aims he repeated to Hadow in a private interview and the latter respected them, but with reservations. He reported, for example, that he had learned that Henlein had stressed the need of fairer apportionment of public contracts and relief-work; "a point to which Dr. Benes also alluded in his conversation with me and about which he maintained that the *Sudetendeutsche* had no genuine grievance". Hadow refrained from comment, but merely in deference to a despatch already sent by the Legation which apparently sided

with Henlein[9].

The inclination on Hadow's part to readily accept the contentions of Henlein's party and regard efforts on the part of the Czechoslovak Government with increased scepticism became standard to his recommendations while in Prague. In March 1936 he wrote that, so far, the Czechoslovak Government had not negotiated with the SdP, "whose downfall it is clearly bent upon encompassing". To this end, he wrote, the Government was doing all it could to bolster the German Activist Parties in the Sudeten area (which encompassed the German Social Democrats and desired concessions, but through cooperation with the Czechoslovak Government and on less radical terms than the SdP). These parties, Hadow claimed, comprised only one-third of the Sudeten German electorate. "To Czech chauvinists this method of destroying the *Sudetendeutsche Partei* commends itself as decreasing the danger of German domination at Prague. To the 'Activist' leaders it promises elimination of Herr Henlein and his unwelcome party which halved the 'Activist' vote in 1935. To the Czech Parties as a whole it would mean a 'splitting' of the German-speaking vote which would greatly decrease the latter's strength and danger to the Czechs as such"[10].

Hadow became even more certain that this was the case in May of that year: "The policy of President Benes and his supporters in the Government is now definitely to work for the disintegration of the Henlein Movement by encouragement of the

German Minority parties". He then added that the semblance of increased Czech-German cooperation thus created "in an endeavour to impress friendly foreign Governments" had neither meaning nor substance. The plan for splitting Henlein's party, Hadow believed, was unlikely to destroy its menace and more likely to drive the movement to extreme and underground Pan-Germanism[11].

In September 1936 Hadow reported a statement from "one of Prague's most prominent bankers" that no one in business circles believed that Benes' advisers intended to help any but their friends this winter; "I must regretfully conclude that the programme of winter-relief promised...will not appreciably alleviate the economic want of the industrial districts of North Bohemia". Hadow saw this situation as increasing the trend in the SdP towards radicalism, but believed Henlein himself was clinging to moderation.

"I can therefore only repeat my belief", Hadow wrote at this time, "that if the Czechoslovak Government could but bring itself to reverse its unwise policy of filling all available - and particularly minor - posts in *Sudetendeutsche* districts with Czechs a beginning would have been made - even at this eleventh hour - with the formidable task of healing the open sore in the body-politic of Czechoslovakia which today is the *Sudetendeutsche* question"[12].

Later he reiterated his view that Benes had not translated

words into deeds on a sufficient scale to relieve the "disproportionate misery" in the Sudeten areas[13], and in December wrote that a petition the SdP had made to the League of Nations had been smothered "by those who want NO action taken to redress genuine grievances". To Hadow it seemed that the Czechoslovak Government had managed to shelve "the most pressing question in Central Europe" and that democracy had ceased to exist in that country[14].

In his instinctive tendency to gravitate towards the SdP in a manner he believed to be open-minded and fair, Hadow took less note of the complicated forces affecting the decisions of the Czechoslovak Government at this time. The psychological effect on German minorities of Hitler's rise to power, for example, was threatening in the eyes of the Czechs. Professor Gerhard Ritter later wrote in *Deutsche Rundschau*, "the most dangerous element [of Nazism], its inflamed, antagonistic nationalism, came not from Potsdam, but rather from Bohemia-Moravia and the other Austrian-German borderlands with their [Austrian] Pan-German movement, unbridled anti-Semitism, and notions of *Raumpolitik*"[15]. Hadow recognised the nature of the Czechs' fear, but was less understanding of their justifiable wariness of Henlein's party whose claim to moderation did not impress them. With the increased power and popularity of the SdP in the Sudeten areas, Prague faced the dilemma of deciding whether this party constituted an internal problem to be solved within the rules of

democracy, or whether it was merely a form of German-Nazi expansionism in disguise. The latter came to be assumed and a subsequent programme was adopted which ran contrary to Hadow's view of the situation. The Czechoslovak Government began a rearmament programme and, in May 1936, passed a Law for the Defence of the State which placed restrictions on unreliable elements.

Such actions, as well as a lack of redressing economic grievances in the Sudetenland, Hadow believed, were detrimental to the situation, but Benes simultaneously attempted to gain confidence among the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In August 1936 he toured Northern Bohemia and expressed his sincere desire for cooperation. "The greatest difficulties arise in the questions of the State officials. A number of the German wishes are in this connection justified. Yet there is the question of confidence. A democratic State does not wish to entrust its administration to officials who profess Fascist, Totalitarian, or Communist principles"[16]. As Hadow noted in this year, Prague had therefore decided to back the German Activists representing the German Democratic camp in Czechoslovakia. Like the SdP, the Activists were calling for a larger share in the administration for the Germans, but not at the price of accepting too-nationalist or anti-democratic elements. Their aim being restoration of a German democratic majority, the German Activists showed a willingness to defer claims for territorial and even cultural

autonomy.

In February 1937, Benes began negotiations with these factions regarding demands they had presented in a memorandum to the Government. Most of the demands were accepted and concessions agreed upon. They included economic concessions, increased employment of Sudeten Germans, a greater measure of local control, linguistic concessions, and constitutional rights regarding tuition in schools. Hadow's assessment of the agreement was reserved: "It will be noticed that the phraseology of these concessions...is both involved and vague". Some of the concessions, he noted, would only benefit the German Activists, but Hadow admitted that "a beginning" had been made, the most concrete concession being that of economic relief. "There can be no doubt", he wrote, "that alleviation of the sufferings of the *Sudetendeutsche* population as a whole would, and perhaps will, mean a lessening of political bitterness which may be the forerunner of a more general reconciliation"[17].

The SdP press, however, ridiculed the agreement as inadequate, and Henlein made a recalcitrant speech just after, denouncing the negotiations and refusing to admit the concessions to be a basic solution of the Sudeten German problem. Despite Hadow's original feeling that a start had been made, he took pains to defend the SdP leader, stating that his speech was nonetheless conciliatory rather than provocative in tone because it asked that the Czech rulers accept the Sudeten Germans as a

reality instead of fighting against them by, for example, recognising the community of cultural interests between the Sudeten German and "other parts of the Germanic family"[18].

As matters grew increasingly complex in Czechoslovakia in 1937, the agreement did not meet with any great success. In May of that year Hadow wrote that he was not confident that the German-speaking Minority would receive substantial redress of their grievances. "The pessimism of the Activist German leaders lends support to this view and it must be noted that those of them who, after the declaration of the 18th of February, came regularly to report progress to this Legation have ceased so to do. This, I am told by one of their friends, is because they do not like to report 'no progress'"[19]. In July Hadow reported that in a conversation with one of the leaders of the German Activist party Wenzel Jaksch, the latter had confided to him that, while little had been done so far for the Activists on the part of the Czechoslovak Government, the Henlein party was gaining strength. Jaksch was apparently quite depressed about the situation and Hadow took the view that the February concessions had been "torpedoed" and were, in fact, dead with little hope of resurrection[20]. In August Hadow wrote that, for the minorities in that country, Czechoslovakia had ceased to be a democracy[21].

By December 1937 Hadow had decided that the balance of evidence pointed to the situation in Czechoslovakia being static, if not actually deteriorating. "Henlein is known to have endeavoured

once more to get some small concessions out of the Ministry of the Interior as a prelude to some form of cooperation between the Moderates of the *Sudetendeutsche* Partei and the Czechoslovak Government. His overture met, however, with little or no response"[22].

In his initial eagerness to sympathise with the German minority in Czechoslovakia, Hadow's assessment of the SdP was becoming progressively misguided. He placed as much confidence in Henlein's intentions as he placed doubt in the intentions of Prague and this distorted his view of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Through unsubstantiated claims and increasing demands, the SdP was, in fact, purposely pulling support away from German democratic forces in that country. In early 1936 Henlein publicly complained that in defiance of the existing Minority Treaty, Germans were not getting a fair apportionment of schools in the Republic. Hadow had supported this contention at the end of 1935 by claiming the Czechs were pursuing a plan of infiltration of German-speaking districts through Czech schools and subsequent pressure on Germans to send their children to these schools[23]. R.W. Seton-Watson points out in *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* , however, that it was shown in the previous school year that out of a total of 343,000 and 89,000 German children in primary and higher primary schools, all apart from 10,000 and 6,000 went to German-speaking ones. It was further shown that the Germans who were sent to Czech

schools were done so by parents who wished their children to learn the language of the Republic. The controversy was thus reduced to a small minority of about 3-5%, and the accusation of Czechisation discredited[24].

Hadow also took up the SdP's complaint against the Machnik Decree of January 1936 in which restrictions were placed on the type of clerk employed to work on national armaments and defence. This complaint was made to the League of Nations in April 1936 but rejected when the Czech Cabinet decided not to enforce the order. It was followed, however, by a new State Defence Law in which a militarised zone was created just inside the Bohemian frontiers. Such measures resulted in more dislocation among Germans than Czechs and helped to feed dissatisfaction and increase Henlein's campaign for German orientation. The demands of the SdP steadily increased in 1936 and 1937, and evidence of this can be elicited from Hadow's own despatches. In January 1936 he reported that Henlein and his lieutenants had independently indicated that the SdP had no desire for autonomy[25], but in September of that year autonomy was called for by that party. Hadow mentioned this himself, but merely in terms of Henlein's attempts to resist the "radical" trends in his party: "a proof of the latter's [Henlein's] tenacious clinging to moderation is again afforded by his public definition last week of autonomy for the *Sudetendeutsche* population as 'a right to administer our own INTERNAL affairs'"[26].

With the influence and financial backing of the Nazis in Germany, Henlein's true intentions were to work for the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Republic either through internal disruption or external pressure, or a combination of both. In April 1937 the SdP presented draft proposals to Parliament which implied rigid totalitarianism in each racial group. Nothing came of these proposals but they furthered helped the position of the SdP in downplaying the conciliatory nature of the February concessions. By the end of 1937 the SdP was representing the attitude of the Czechs as unflinching. Hadow again supported these claims, reporting that Germans were being denied jobs in the Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, that they were further being denied their constitutional rights through the Machnik Decree and laws which limited the actions of civilians branded as unreliable to the State, and that there had been a steady decrease in the number of German-speaking Czechs employed in Government service[27].

It is not clear from where Hadow was receiving his information, but Bruegel writes that Henlein's reports on conditions were usually accepted without question by the British legation in Prague[28].

Prime Minister Milan Hodza had actually reported in November of that year that out of the persons engaged in the first quarter from the February Agreement, 8.52% of the Germans were engaged as State employees and 14.83% as labourers. In the next quarter 12.6%

were engaged as State employees and 14.09% as labourers. He further stated that German firms supplied more than 40% of the requirements of State Railways, and at the end of 1937 German-speaking candidates had been admitted to the state police and gendarmerie, even though they did not know Czech[29].

Bruegel writes that from February 1937 there were undeniable improvements in the position of the Germans in Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1937 public investment in road and bridge building in the Czech area was 67%, and in the German area 32.4%. Expenditure on construction work was 58.5% for Czech territory and 41.5% for German territory. Orders had admittedly been frequently awarded to metropolitan firms bringing workers from Prague as these were generally more efficient and could submit lower tenders than local competitors. After February 1937, however, all the authorities issuing work contracts were freed from the requirement of selecting the cheapest tender and were encouraged to insist on using local labour. Also, by the beginning of 1938, the proportion of Germans employed in the medical and legal sector had risen to 23.32% which Bruegel points out was not far short of the percentage of Germans in the total population[30]. All these improvements, including the carrying through of the proposal that ethnic representation in public service be universally applicable were, however, insignificant by this time because the SdP, through the attitude of the British Legation in Prague and the influence of

Germany, had successfully worked the situation into an international problem.

German Interest

To do Hadow justice, although he came to accept the demands of the SdP as legitimate, it was his concern over German interest in the Sudeten Germans which caused him to promote outside pressure on the Czechoslovak Government to meet these demands. It was a reasonable concern, and one that was increasingly shared by the Foreign Office. Germany had begun to play a greater role in the minorities question as Hitler grew more assertive towards Czechoslovakia in 1936. Henlein, in this year, had come under fire from the radical elements in his party, and, in attempting to hold his movement together, not only exaggerated the interest of Britain, but began turning more and more to the Reich for assistance, thereby making himself progressively dependent on the German Nazis. Hadow kept a watchful eye on Germany in relation to the Sudeten German question and at the end of 1935 had already linked this question to Czech-German relations. He expressed the opinion to the Foreign Office that the situation, "if not of any great importance by comparison with the other problems you have to face just now, is

apt, like Sarajevo, suddenly to start a conflagration which we are here to endeavour, by accurate and timely warning, to help you to prevent"[31].

As internal tension heightened in Czechoslovakia in 1936 and 1937, Hadow expressed the solution as increasingly obvious: in order to thwart the German radicals, Prague should make all reasonable concessions to the Sudeten Germans, recognise the SdP, bolster Henlein as the "moderate" faction of this movement, and come to some agreement with Germany. This could be achieved through outside pressure from Britain. Otherwise, German interest in her brethren would increase, a legitimate reason for intervention would be created, and Czechoslovakia - with small chance of help from her allies - would be left defenseless, militarily and morally.

The Foreign Office was reluctant to follow Hadow's idea of British involvement, but accepted his basic arguments as events unfolded. When Hitler made one of the first of his series of bold moves on the European front by reoccupying the Rhineland in March 1936, British policy-makers had to reassess their responses to German aggression and speculate on possible targets in Hitler's plan of expansion. Czechoslovakia - along with Austria - came high on the agenda. While Henlein courted British sympathy for his cause through visits to London, the Foreign Office questioned Hadow on the SdP's sources of revenue and the real state of this party's relations with Germany[32].

In the summer of 1936 Hadow reported that Germany's role in the matter was one of passive interest, although the continuing pattern of the Czechoslovak Government's policy could drive her to action. "It does not suit Germany's book, at present, to foment an independence movement in North Bohemia; the main disadvantage being economic competition between North Bohemian and German industries which would react unfavourably upon the situation in Germany"[33]. His assumption appeared to be born out somewhat in the following month of that year when Germany reached an agreement with Austria in which she consented to recognise that country's independence if Austria followed Germany's lead in international affairs.

In following up his analysis of Germany's intentions at this time, Hadow wrote of a Hungarian theory regarding this matter. According to this theory, if events "demanded" intervention on behalf of the Sudeten Germans Germany would only occupy North Bohemia and would not advance on Prague. The German General-staff apparently believed that this could be done without fighting as the Czechoslovak army would retreat at once, not wanting to defend the territory (although, in fact, Czechoslovakia would then be surrendering a strategic frontier). A further point of this theory was that Berlin believed that France and Britain would not attack Germany to compel the return of "this purely Germanic" territory, especially taking into account British public

opinion. "Czechoslovakia would thus be left a 'rump'; the U.S.S.R. could, or would, not help her attack; and the only danger would be a Hungarian attempt to recover part of Slovakia or Ruthenia - thus upsetting the apple-cart by starting a war". Hadow saw no reason to dissent from these conclusions[34].

In December 1936 Charles Bentinck of the British Legation in Prague reported that Hadow had had a conversation with the First Secretary of the German legation at Prague in which he learned that the latter had been privately discussing the Sudeten German problem with the German Foreign Minister Baron von Neurath. Neurath had apparently reviewed the entire problem. The German Minister Von Halem stated that Neurath had informed him of the following policy decided on by Hitler regarding Czechoslovakia: "To make no concessions whatsoever to Czechoslovakia so long as the latter afforded no substantial measure of redress and relief to the *Sudetendeutsche*; but not to let the oppression of the latter become a cause for armed conflict in Central Europe"[35]. On the danger of the situation Hadow wrote that both Benes and Neurath were agreed on the necessity of avoiding war, "but neither of them is able without the intervention of an uninterested and powerful intermediary to take adequate or proper steps to put an end to this tense situation"[36].

Hitler's antagonism towards Czechoslovakia was, according to G.L. Weinberg, profound and long-standing, and the expulsion of the Czechs from Bohemia and Moravia was part of

his scheme for *lebensraum* [37]. The plans for carrying this off were, however, not to be considered too closely while Germany was still building up her strength. Hitler's attitude towards Czechoslovakia in 1936 was, therefore, enigmatic and gave Hadow to believe that the German leader had no definite plans regarding this country, the only danger being the mistreatment of German minorities sparking off an interest.

Hitler, however, was not such an opportunist, and was making gradual foreign policy moves with Czechoslovakia in mind. In an effort to break up the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia, he began engineering closer relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary in the hope of focussing the revisionist aims of the latter on Czechoslovakia. He was also keeping in mind antagonism between Poland and Czechoslovakia. The policy projected to Hadow from the German legation may have been a public relations exercise on the part of Hitler in order to convince the British Government, having taken note of his interest in the Sudeten Germans, that his concern for their plight was real, but his intentions were reasonable. It may also have been the policy Neurath himself sincerely intended to follow. For the past ten years the German legation in Prague had advocated a policy of democratic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Germany, and this pattern only changed a little when Ernst Eisenlohr took over the legation in 1936. Eisenlohr consistently defended the view

that concessions to the Sudeten Germans would be best arrived at in an atmosphere free from threats abroad[38].

The German Nazis, meanwhile, were already financially involved with the SdP, and were increasing their political involvement. Hadow was aware of active German influence at the end of 1935, but downplayed its importance: "That the more prominent supporters of the Henlein movement - landlords of the old regime in particular - derive indirect support, both moral and economic, from Germany is certain...But the majority of Henlein's lieutenants, so far as these are known in Prague, are of typical "*Sudetendeutsche*" stock - men of no great imagination and little culture...I greatly doubt if the leaders of the Henlein movement possess such cunning, or the rank and file of their followers such cohesion, that hope of German succour can be kept alive by word of mouth at the same time as it is noticeably absent from the *Sudetendeutsche* press"[39]. Henlein's main political decisions had been made dependent on the "approval and support" of Reich authorities as early as March 1935, however, and emissaries had been secretly moving between Berlin and Prague. While the SdP's relations with Nazi Germany grew, it began cooperating with the Reich Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Policy of the Nazi Party. In the autumn of 1936 Henlein became the head of an association(VDVE)* which united all German minorities and whose policy was made to fall in line with that of Nazi Germany[40].

* Verband Deutscher Volksgruppen of Europe

Much of the Nazi involvement in the SdP had originally arisen out of political necessity on the part of Henlein, which Hitler then turned to his advantage. In May 1936, the SdP faced an internal crisis through a rift between radicals and traditionalists. Finding it increasingly difficult to control his party, Henlein turned to the Reich, which now had a vested interest in holding this party together while keeping links with it discreet. This reliance on German support and mediation was becoming a habit with Henlein. When he met Reich leaders in August 1936 at the Olympic Games, he was told by Neurath that, for the moment the SdP must rely on themselves, although financial help would continue. R.M. Smelser observes in *The Sudeten Problem 1933-38* that, through the increasing use of the Reich for mediation in his party, Henlein was falling into a fateful dependency on it[41].

Hadow had taken note of the struggles within the SdP, and believed Henlein was doing his best to keep a moderating influence on its direction, but lack of conciliatory action from Prague was helping to increase the strength of the radicals in the SdP. "Internal dissensions, ably fomented by extremist Czechs", he wrote, "will for a time put Henlein into a serious position and may result in his overthrow". If this occurred, Hadow warned, the party would be taken over by extremists who would work underground and turn what Hadow still believed to be merely a Sudeten-German movement into a purely Pan-German one[42].

To a certain extent Hadow was correct; for example, Henlein felt it necessary to break with the radical Rudolf Kasper in the summer of 1936 and attempted to remove similar sources of dissension. He was, however, arguably more concerned with promoting merely a semblance of moderation in order to keep his party alive. If the SdP appeared too radical too soon, or close links with the Nazis were exposed, the party stood to lose outside interest or support and would be vulnerable to dissolution from the Czechoslovak Government. Through the still growing radical element in his party and reliance on the Reich, Henlein did grow more aggressive in his demands, calling for complete autonomy for the Sudeten Germans and warning the Czechs that they must make good all the wrong they had done this minority since 1918.

The Czechs, meanwhile, had not failed to read the significance of the reoccupation of the Rhineland. Hitler had gambled that France would not counter-act this move, and was now hoping to increase her reluctance to get involved in Central Europe. Benes saw this and increased attempts at negotiation with Germany in the winter months of 1936-37. In November 1936 he and the Foreign Minister Kamil Krofta met with two unofficial emissaries of the Reich, A. Haushofer and M. Trauttmansdorf. The idea of a Czech-German treaty had originated in Germany with Haushofer, and Trauttmansdorff had helped mediate in the SdP quarrels, and was concerned with the Sudeten Germans mainly in terms of peaceful expansion of German influence[43].

Both Germans were traditionalists who did not fully represent Hitler, and it seems clear that Hitler only allowed this experiment to occur in order to determine any possible advantages from an agreement. When it became clear that, without the commitment of a non-aggression pact from Germany, no advantages could be made, Hitler allowed the talks to fall through as he had no wish to tie his hands.

Hadow had no knowledge of this specific attempt at cooperation, but was aware that some sort of discussion had been going on between Prague and Berlin. He wrote in February that, from German as well as Czech sources, he had derived the impression that both countries were seeking agreement along economic lines, but the terms would include "a measure of political appeasement such as both, for the moment, feel to be preferable to the alternative of armed conflict"[44]. Near the end of February he reported a statement Benes had made privately to him in which the Czech President told him that Czechoslovakia and Germany would "sooner or later" come to terms; that after the Rhineland episode he had informed Germany that Czechoslovakia's prerequisites to negotiations were Germany's recognition of all Czechoslovak-German Treaties and his country's pacts with France and Russia - which Germany had accepted; that Germany did not wish and could not afford to attack Czechoslovakia; and that in a war between Germany and the Western Powers Czechoslovakia would be involved, but not in a

war between Germany and the Eastern Powers[45].

By this time, as has been shown, Hitler had no intention of concluding an agreement with Czechoslovakia, and was more concerned with preparing his forces for a potential attack, given the right circumstances. The Foreign Office was not aware of this, and Benes might have suspected it to be the case, but was putting on a show of conciliation - at least on the part of Czechoslovakia - in order to demonstrate his willingness to cooperate, and to downplay fears that Czech repression of the German minority was an active concern of the Reich. Germany remained outwardly vague as to whether an agreement with Czechoslovakia was possible, and in March 1937 Hadow was told by the German Minister in Prague that, on a recent visit to Berlin, he had been instructed to make clear to Benes that Germany was ready in all German-Czech "rubs" to be conciliatory; but that fair treatment of the Sudeten Germans was a definite condition of any settlement between the two nations[46].

Hadow held little or no suspicions towards German intentions, believing that the danger lay only in Czech repression strengthening radical elements among the Sudeten Germans, which would, in turn, excite the sympathy of Germany and leave that country with a highly legitimate excuse for attack. Hadow was justifiably afraid of these circumstances, but confused over the question of priorities and the inherently aggressive nature of the Reich. The subjection of Czechoslovakia was the chief

objective of Hitler, and the grievances of the Sudeten Germans were merely a means to achieve this end. Hadow, however, continued to believe in 1937 that Germany's aims were peaceful, that she felt a sincere interest in the fate of the Sudeten Germans, and that there was no connection between Henlein and the Nazis. In regard to the latter, he wrote in March 1937, "I can only answer that for two full years I have tried by every means to obtain proof - however slight - of this Henlein-Nazi connection; but in vain"[47]. Shiela Grant Duff, who was working as a correspondent in Prague at this time, asked the Activist leader W. Jaksch if Henlein was a Nazi. Jaksch replied that it did not really matter; with the Nazis in power in Germany, it was inevitable that a right-wing nationalist movement would collaborate with them[48]. Given his attitude by this time, Hadow was not inclined to foresee this.

In March Hadow drew attention to the British Charge D'Affaires Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes' statement that Germany hoped to realise her aims by peaceful methods and without a conflict. The danger, Hadow repeated, "lies chiefly in the deep-seated conviction in Germany that a real wrong is being done to a kindred and neighbouring Germanic people; the *Sudetendeutsche*. It is upon this belief that the [propaganda] campaign against Czechoslovakia is based; and the genuineness of the grievance makes it impossible of eradication except by negotiation"[49]. At the same time Hadow maintained that

Czechoslovakia's foreign policy had, since its creation, been based on fear of German aggression, and that, since the reoccupation of the Rhineland she had lost faith in France's ability to come to her rescue by attacking Germany if Germany attacked her. Through the Sudeten German problem and through German interest in it, Hadow wrote, Czechoslovakia was faced with threats to her independence which had increased chauvinism among the Czechs. "The danger of a general European war developing from these causes cannot entirely be overlooked", he concluded[50].

Later he "regretfully" stated his opinion that, should the Great Powers consent by their silence to the cancellation of the rights of minorities by Czechoslovakia, the Sudeten Germans would become an irredentist German minority looking to Germany "for salvation". If this minority's situation was worsened by continual "Czechisation" they could then create an incident which would play upon German feelings "as to sweep away such prudence and common sense as may yet remain among the rulers of the Reich"[51].

In the late summer of 1937 Hadow wrote that, for reasons of self-interest in both the economic and political sphere, it was doubtful whether Germany's set policy was to attempt an armed incursion into Czechoslovakia: "she believes that the latter can now probably hold up an attack in the frontier districts sufficiently long to embroil other powers and to lay waste the Sudeten-deutsch areas in which the first fighting would take place"[52]. Henlein,

meanwhile, was again turning to Hitler. The radicals in his party were once more coming to the fore and increasing the aggressive stance of the SdP. The Czechs were prepared for crackdowns if the party got out of hand, but, still uncertain of the extent of support from the Reich, Henlein did not feel confident of the outcome of a confrontation. Germany was carrying on a propaganda war with Czechoslovakia, but no direct action in support of the SdP appeared forthcoming. Under pressure from all sides, Henlein made the more radical proposal to Hitler: that he annex the whole Bohemian-Moravian-Silesian area to the Reich [5 3] .

Hitler, in fact, had already begun to make definite plans regarding Czechoslovakia, and although he took his time in replying to Henlein, his policy was decided by the end of 1937. His military planning specified Czechoslovakia as Germany's immediate target and exploitation of the Sudeten German grievances was to be his method of action. Where no grievances were apparent, hardships were to be invented and incidents provoked in the Sudeten German areas in order to create publicity[54]. Hitler's program of increased isolation of Czechoslovakia was at this point already well advanced: assistance from Poland was unlikely, as this country now looked forward to the prospects of territorial gains, no involvement in a European war, and the possibility of a common border with Hungary. Yugoslavia had only a mild diplomatic interest in

Czechoslovakia's fate, despite her ties through the Little Entente; Hungary, like Poland, saw the likelihood of territorial gains for herself, and Italy had acquiesced on the question of annexation. France had a formal commitment to Czechoslovakia in the event of aggression, but there was no staff agreement over how assistance would be provided and the reoccupation of the Rhineland had complicated matters. Her commitment was, therefore, by 1937 couched in the vaguest of terms, much doubt having arisen over the possibility of British support. Doubt also surrounded the possibility of assistance from the Soviet Union, whose military was weakened by recent purges and whose passage of troops to Czechoslovakia depended on the attitudes of Poland and Roumania.

In the evolution of his plans regarding Czechoslovakia, Hitler had not failed to take note of growing interest in the Sudeten Germans in Britain, and the consequential lessening of sympathy for the Czechs. He was gambling on a lack of British intervention on behalf of this country which would inhibit the actions of the French and leave the way clear for expansion. Hadow unwittingly encouraged the Nazi leader's course of action by encouraging British interest - particularly regarding Henlein and the SdP - and by urging pressure on Prague to redress Sudeten German grievances. It was a theme of his despatches which began with his interest in the SdP and grew consistent in 1937. Without the support of Britain for, specifically the SdP, Hadow believed from

the outset that this party would turn to Germany as her only ally in order to "avoid destruction"[55]. He warned that the outcome of the struggle between Prague and the SdP was definitely a British interest[56], and that only outside interest which would give the Czechoslovak Government an excuse for "bowing to the advice of its friends" would offer any hope of arresting the present trend of events[57].

Through the efforts of Hadow and the general slant of the British Legation in Prague combined with visits Henlein had made to Britain, London's interest in the Sudeten German question partially encompassed the bias the diplomats in Prague had created. In the summer of 1936 the Czech Minister in London Jan Masaryk sent the Foreign Office a series of press cuttings which, he wrote, corroborated his fear "that the opinion is being circulated in England and abroad that Great Britain is ready to fight Mr. Henlein's battle in Geneva, that our efforts to maintain a decent democratic government find very little favour in this country, that Czechoslovakia is being pictured as an outpost of Communism and Bolshevism in Europe, and that generally we are just a damn nuisance"[58]. Masaryk had apparently tried to describe the situation in Czechoslovakia as his government saw it, but Hadow wrote to the Head of the Southern Department Owen O'Malley that the letter was "patently full of half-truths". Hadow pointed out as an example Masaryk's claim that fair treatment of minorities had been the stern wish of Thomas Masaryk and

would be of his successors: "We know that President Masaryk WISHED for fair treatment", Hadow wrote, "but Jan Masaryk is wise enough not to say more or to commit Benes. And have we not said that the lot of the Sudeten-deutsch became noticeably worse as soon as Masaryk had resigned?"[59].

The Foreign Office was not as enthusiastic over British involvement in this matter as Hadow, but it was interested in the SdP question because it realised this was a weakness in Czechoslovakia which could invite German aggression. Anxious that such a situation not arise as it would bring in the question of British defence of Czechoslovakia, a certain amount of agreement that the Czechoslovak Government be at least informed of Britain's concern that its internal difficulties be resolved was shared. Hadow was therefore confident in suggesting, "in the interests of moderation if not of peace", that reminders of British interest in "impartial democratic rule" in Czechoslovakia in respect of minority rights be kept up especially through the British press[60]. When the February concessions of 1937 were agreed upon, Hadow attributed this action on the part of Benes to the influence of the British press and he further encouraged this campaign: "Impartial reminders at intervals, in the press of Great Britain, that deeds must follow words in the matter of concessions to the *Sudetendeutsche* Minority as a whole would, I am convinced, be of assistance to President Benes and of material help in decreasing tension by rendering it possible for him to

negotiate with Germany"[61].

Czechoslovakia was by this time beginning to gain prominence on the foreign policy agenda in London and at the end of February the question of whether the British Government should urge Benes to make terms with Germany was discussed. It was mentioned that certain diplomats in Prague felt agreement would be possible; however, the British Ambassador to Berlin Sir Eric Phipps was strongly opposed to their "butting in". Phipps did not feel that Germany had at that time any immediate designs on Czechoslovakia as "she was not ready". Oliver Harvey, who was Eden's private secretary and who recorded the discussion, wrote that there was some evidence that Benes was hinting that he was refusing to come to terms with Germany out of loyalty to Britain and France; "it was decided to let matters alone, but that if Benes should take this line with Newton, our new Minister [in Prague], he might indicate that we would like Czechoslovakia to be on good terms with all her neighbours"[62].

Hadow, nevertheless, felt more decisive action on the part of Britain was necessary. "Peace with honour", he wrote, could only be brought to fruition by application of British pressure on both Czechoslovakia and Germany[63]; and because Germany hoped to realise her aims by peaceful methods, Hadow believed this gave the British Government an opportunity to "negotiate and influence" Hitler. He suggested privately to Vansittart that the British Minister in Prague intimate to Benes that the British

Government felt the present tension in the Sudeten German areas to be fraught with danger and threatened the peace of Europe. "I am confident in asserting", Hadow wrote, "that Dr. Benes would accept and act upon this advice. For France...has promised no concrete help; and he knows that the moral influence of Great Britain is his only real hope in the long run"[64]. Hadow urged this action more forthrightly in May, and stated that if no action were taken on this matter, "the peace of Europe will inevitably be jeopardised, sooner or later, by an act which does violence to the very promises upon which Czechoslovakia was granted control over the various Minorities"[65].

In the late summer of 1937 Hadow was charging that the democracies of Western Europe were being asked by President Benes "to condone that of which they have but little knowledge, under a plea of resistance to German encroachment upon a democratic country"[66], and by December 1937 he was going beyond pressure and urging mediation: "the time has...now come for active intervention in the promotion of a settlement between Berlin and Prague if the peace of Central Europe is not to be endangered. Both Dr. Benes and...Dr. Neurath are agreed upon the necessity of avoiding war, but neither of them is able without the intervention of an uninterested and powerful intermediary to take adequate or proper steps to put an end to this tense situation...I venture to suggest that Great Britain should assume the task and encourage both sides to come to terms while yet there

is time"[67].

Hadow's persistence on the matter of British involvement in the Sudeten German question was met with mixed feelings from London. Not so convinced of Hitler's peaceful intentions towards Czechoslovakia, the Foreign Office nevertheless felt that the Sudeten Germans had a real grievance and the SdP was organised and close enough to Germany to create a threatening situation. The Foreign Office was not keen to mediate and did not want to push Czechoslovakia into the arms of Germany, but neither did it want to discourage any possible agreement between the two countries. The position of the SdP was, thus, of considerable importance, regardless of its sincerity, and the British Government took the line in the summer of 1937 of urging Benes and the SdP to establish greater contact, and attempting to convince a doubtful France that settlement between the two would strengthen Czechoslovakia and weaken the German case.

Henlein, as the leader of the SdP, became the focus of British attention, a situation he had helped to create through his visits to London and the generally favourable impression he had made there. R.W. Seton-Watson writes that on these visits, Henlein "cooed like any sucking dove" and found there a complete failure to grasp the implications of the situation, a circumstance which he turned to his advantage[68]. To many in the Foreign Office and the Prague Legation, Henlein was legitimate and sincere, and even those who were more sceptical tended to regard

him as the voice of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. This point is illustrated in Hadow's despatches and in the general tacit acceptance of Henlein's protestations. In the autumn of 1936 Hadow wrote to O'Malley that a rumour was circulating in Prague to the effect that Eden had been found during recent conversations with Krofta to be totally unfamiliar with the existence of the Activist German parties in Czechoslovakia, "that is those...who are not against the Government!". Hadow was told that this state of affairs reflected on the Foreign Office and that every effort was being made in London to make political circles see that the Activist Germans were numerous and important. "Actually", Hadow added, "as you know, they polled, between the three of them, roughly 32% of the total German vote as against Henlein's 68%"[69].

Compared to the much-feted visits of Henlein to London, the arrival of Wenzel Jaksch, prominent leader of the German Activists, was a low-key affair. Hadow sent a message to the Foreign Office concerning this visit in which he claimed that the Activists hoped to destroy Henlein and his party through the support of political allies, "especially among Liberals or the Labour Party in Great Britain", for what amounted to a political campaign against Germany. According to Hadow, this plan was to be furthered privately by the Czechoslovak Legation in London. Having given these warnings, Hadow wrote, "I have told Jaksch that when he comes to London he might ring you up and, if you

are out, ask that someone in the Southern Department should receive him. If you do not like the idea nothing is easier than an excuse".

The reaction from the Foreign Office was unenthusiastic. The Head of the Central Department Orme Sargent minuted, "I don't think we need do anything about seeing M. Jaksch. M. Masaryk will no doubt trot him round as living evidence of the friendly co-operation between the Czechs and the Germans". Vansittart commented, "If M. Jaksch asks to be seen he need not be refused; but we should make no advance toward him, and it would on the whole be better if he did not ask to be seen, in view of his possible intentions here".

Jaksch did manage to see O'Malley who wrote that the Activist leader had expressed the hope that the Foreign Office took a detached view of the merits of the Activists on the one hand and Henlein's party on the other. According to Jaksch, Henlein was "a rogue, a tool of the Nazi Party and if he had his way the Sudetic districts would be annexed bag and baggage to the Third Reich". Jaksch also informed O'Malley that the Activist Party was stronger than the last elections made out: they had only polled 30% of the German vote, but if not for the trade slump they would have easily polled 50%. "Herr Jaksch spent most of his time in lecturing me about the essentially democratic nature of Czechoslovakia and the impossibility of any deep or enduring agreement between such a democratic State and Herr Hitler's

Government", O'Malley wrote. "All I said was directed towards rubbing into him the necessity of making administrative practice conform to democratic theory if he wanted for his country the undivided sympathy of British public opinion". Vansittart minuted under this: "I am afraid Herr Jaksch does not amount to m u c h [7 0] .

That no great attention was paid in London or in the Prague Legation towards democratic German elements in Czechoslovakia is further born out by Bruegel who observes that the line taken by Henlein of regarding these elements as "splinter parties" was followed instead. Bruegel also notes that when the Foreign Office did receive information implying the culpability of Henlein, officials dismissed its importance[71]. In January 1936 Hadow himself reported that Benes had drawn his attention to facts about the secret financing of Henlein from Germany, but N.J. Cheetham of the Southern Department did not see anything objectionable in it: "The 'sin' even if it had been proved, is not very deadly". Cheetham carried on, "One wonders why Dr. Benes makes no attempt to take advantage of the moderation shown by Henlein himself before it is too late". Another official added, "If the facts [about treatment of the Sudeten Germans] were more fully known in England there might almost be a general feeling of hope that Hitler would march in to put the matter straight - I exaggerate purposely to make my point clear"[72]. These comments support the claim that the British Government was

fully aware that Henlein was being financed by the Nazis, but felt this was merely an aside to the issue[73].

Henlein against Benes

A characteristic which caught Hadow out in the 1930s, particularly with regard to the Sudeten Germans, was that his analysis of circumstances was often superficially correct, but not always thorough, a characteristic which may well have been a symptom of prejudice. He would miss signals and gloss over some facts while paying too close attention to others. Hadow was warned at this time that it was thought in the Foreign Office that he overemphasised the importance of rumours which could not be checked, and that he had a little too much conviction in the rightness of his recommendations[74], but he tended to dismiss such criticism as stemming from disagreement with his arguments. Given the economic and ideological confusion in Europe it was probably difficult to assess the underlying forces regarding German intentions; but Hadow's bias towards Henlein and against Benes while in Prague reveals an innate sympathy which ran counter to his claims of complete neutrality on the subject. The Sudeten Germans did have legitimate grievances which needed redressing and German interest in their situation was a problem, but these facts seemed to fuel an already existing

conviction in Hadow instead of being used to counterbalance the youth of Czechoslovakia, Benes' struggle to maintain a democracy between radical Czechs and Germans, and the Czechoslovak leader's concern for outside protection against Germany's increasingly aggressive nature. In Henlein Hadow saw the embodiment of one thing, and in Benes the threat of another, and this simplification of matters furthered his support for the policy of appeasement.

As early as 1935 Hadow was literally describing Henlein as the saviour of the Sudeten Germans. Henlein was leading his people on "a journey through the wilderness", while these "disciples" were being fed on the "barley loaves and small fishes" of concessions made to them by the Czechoslovak Government at the time. Visions of a "glorious German resurrection", however, they were willing to barter for "the safety of their hard-won daily bread"[75]. In the midst of this Biblical alliteration Hadow wrote of his impressions of Henlein: "To judge by his personality as well as by his speeches, he seems to be moderate and a man of his word. Nor have I been able, from careful perusal of the copious written word of his party, to find any deviation from these principles unless it be a declaration that the State is above the party and that the party system leads to such abuse that it should be abolished"[76].

Hadow also wrote at this time that Henlein, from the beginning, had protested his loyalty to Czechoslovakia, his belief

in democracy, and his desire to cooperate loyally in building up the Czechoslovak state[77]. Later, on the party aims of 1935, Henlein stated, "It would have been easier...to confess openly to National Socialism and go to prison, but it was doubtful whether by this method we should achieve the political task of smashing Czechoslovakia as the spearhead of the anti-Reich system of alliances...we knew that we could only win if we succeeded in making three and a half million Sudeten Germans into National Socialists, but if we were to avoid Czech interference, we had to pretend to deny our allegiance to National Socialism"[78]. Although Henlein's hidden motives in 1935 may not have been as clearly defined as he later claimed, he was obviously much less sincere than Hadow believed and an opportunist when it came to the possibility of Nazi assistance for his party.

Hadow's faith in this man, however, was unshakeable. He showed he was aware of radical signs from Henlein which came from increased confidence of the latter in Nazi support, but ascribed these to the fact that Henlein was too often a prisoner of the more extremist elements in his party. In June 1936 the observation that Henlein had refused to give in to these elements was, Hadow felt, proof of his own statements that the SdP leader was "a moderate and a 'Sudeten' not a '*Gross' Deutsche* "[79]. In September he wrote that although the situation in Czechoslovakia tended to increase the trend in the German minority towards radicalism, Henlein was tenaciously clinging to moderation[80].

Henlein's calls for autonomy in 1937 - which Hadow pointed out had a less radical meaning in German than in English - were, Hadow felt, not to be taken too seriously, "for like all Germans he asks for the moon in the hope of receiving a sixpence of which he stands in extreme need at the moment, as a counter to those in his ranks who tell him that the party is getting nowhere with his studied counsels of moderation"[81].

Hadow's view of Henlein was very much like his view of Hitler. Just as he saw Hitler attempting moderation among certain fanatics, so he saw Henlein maintaining as much control as possible of extremists in his party. That both desired a peaceful solution to either the European or Sudeten German problems, but would give in to extremism if they felt alienated Hadow felt assured, and these conclusions probably had as much to do with an underlying perception of the German as an underdog since World War I as with a certain amount of unfamiliarity with political opportunism, due to either naivete or merely a lack of experience with this type of phenomenon. This perception with regard to Henlein was most likely enhanced by Hadow's previous posting in Vienna, and the fact that the Sudeten Germans had once been part of Austria, not Germany, which would account even moreso for his immediate affinity with this minority. One of Hadow's relatives notes that, although Hadow had a reputation for helping people, it was usually those people to whom he felt attracted or appealed to him[82]. It may also be noted that, if

Hadow felt a sympathy for underdogs, *apart from the Kwos, it tended to be* the more vociferous or seemingly capable ones: Hitler with his swift rise to power and organisational qualities, Henlein with his surprising success in the 1935 elections. Given his background, he was therefore more inclined to sympathise with the Sudeten Germans than the Czechs, and, further, more inclined to the cause of Henlein and the SdP than the German Activists.

Hadow, of course, was not the only one deceived by Henlein. Through his visits to London in 1935 and 1937, the SdP leader had managed to convince most of the Foreign Office of his sincerity, including Vansittart. After Henlein's first visit, Christopher Bramwell of the Southern Department wrote, "Herr Henlein impressed me in a general way by his moderation and freedom from the fanaticism one generally associates with the leaders of big popular movements"[83]. Much was made of Henlein's assurance of no connection with the Nazis, and the Private Secretary to Vansittart Clifford Norton recommended that Benes be told "to give these fellows a straighter deal which, they say, is all that they want"[84]. Henlein played up this interest as much as possible, exaggerating Vansittart's concern and keeping in contact with London. In 1936 he (Henlein) wrote to an English correspondent, "The situation here is getting more critical and, so far as I am concerned, more hopeless. We are beginning to think that any understanding with the Czechs is impossible"[85]. When he visited London in October 1937 he specifically denied that his

demands were totalitarian or that there was any German influence behind his movement. The Foreign Office expressed the belief that German aggression against Czechoslovakia could be forestalled if Henlein was given a seat in the Czechoslovak Government[86].

The SdP leader was obviously skillful in courting public opinion, and the historian R.W. Seton-Watson further illustrates this. Seton-Watson was in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s and in contact with both Henlein and Benes. In 1936 he wrote, "I regret the criticism of Henlein on the part of some of my Czech friends. I consider it unjust and political". In 1943, however, he wrote, "The Sudeten German agitation, led by Konrad Henlein, was the Trojan Horse of the whole European tragedy. It was used with great skill to delude sentimental public opinion in the West"[87].

Hadow's attitude towards Benes, although he initially attempted to be fair, was one of increasing suspicion and eventually dislike. At the beginning he attributed the Czech president with a "certain breadth of vision" in facing the Sudeten German problem and placed hope in Benes' "farsightedness" and "inflexible resolution"[88]. At the same time, however, he was already approaching the Czech President on the subject of establishing contact with Henlein. Benes had no objection but, according to Hadow, warned the latter to use proper discretion towards Henlein and his followers, "for they are very sly"[89]. Hadow's opinion of Benes, even when favourable, was

nevertheless unequal to the faith he seemed to possess in Henlein. Benes was "cunning" as opposed to Henlein being "sincere"[90]. and Hadow was doubtful from the start of Benes' capabilities. For all the "clear-thinking and courageous leadership" of Benes, he was unable to see in 1936, "that the President's promises hold out much hope of appreciable relaxation of the political tension in Northern Bohemia"[91]. As the conviction grew in Hadow that Benes was failing to address the crucial part of Czechoslovakia's problem, the grievances of the Sudeten Germans, his favourable view of Benes decreased. In September 1936 he expressed the opinion that the lot of the Sudeten Germans had become considerably worse since Benes was elected president[92]. and wrote that the Czech President was having to counteract doubt in other countries over the democratic nature of his government[93].

By 1937 Hadow was perceiving Benes as a hindrance to any lasting solution regarding the Sudeten Germans. In March he wrote that the Czech President's attitude was the key to the situation: "Without his secret opposition (of which I am now convinced though long believed in the genuineness of his public professions) Dr. Hodza and Herr Henlein would gradually edge towards an understanding such as would greatly lessen the present tension"[94]. In August he spelled out his feeling that Benes' policy in regard to the Sudeten Germans and Europe was risky and unwise. Comparing this policy to a hand in poker, he wrote that the Czech President seemed to feel that he possessed a

sufficient hand through French, British, and Russian support for standing up to the threat of German aggression. "The one weakness in his hand that the President seems perforce to cover up is this country's treatment of the Sudeten-deutsch". The pressure Britain had been putting on Benes, according to Hadow, had not gone unheeded, but the President preferred to play his French and other cards "in the hope that His Majesty's Government can be persuaded - by its closest ally as well as by pressure of socialist and intellectual opinion in Great Britain - to change its present mind and abandon the *Sudetendeutsche*". Hadow wrote that there was no doubt of the ultimate unwisdom of these tactics[95]. He further held Benes responsible for a general "war neurosis" among the Czechs, believing that the Government was finding it necessary to convince its taxpayers of the need of extravagant expenditure in preparation for war[96].

Walter Koch, who was German Minister in Prague until 1935 believed Benes "was a cool realist whose only serious consideration was what was good for his country"[97]. Hadow perhaps saw this but subconsciously resented the fact that more recognition was not being given to the SdP. He, therefore, increasingly judged the Czech President in the extreme, interpreting Benes' actions as recalcitrant or unwise. Historians, however, absolve the Czech President of much of the blame for the situation in Czechoslovakia and Benes is seen merely as struggling as shrewdly as possible against forces which

threatened his country's existence. Luza describes Benes as hard-working and possessing an acute intellect: "With a rigid concept of public service, he had fought all his life for the principle that the public interest comes first"[98]. William V. Wallace writes in *Czechoslovakia* that the Czech President "was a passionate believer in the general atmosphere of security international agreements could bring and in the possibility of educating malcontents to acceptable norms of international behaviour"[99].

Critics of Benes, however, point to an optimism conspicuous in the Czech President as well as a certain ignorance of human nature. Although this criticism may be exaggerated, it is fairly applicable to his relations with Stalin - an area where Hadow was particularly censorious of Benes. As the latter himself admits, he erroneously believed that Stalin could be dealt with in the same manner as Western Democracies: "My greatest mistake was that I refused to believe to the very last that even Stalin had lied to me, coldbloodedly and cynically, both in 1935 and later, and that his assurances to me and to Masaryk were all international deceit"[100]. Benes' lack of personal warmth probably created a further bias in Hadow, especially in comparison to the charm of Henlein. According to Jaromir Smutny, chief of Benes' office during his exile in London, the Czech President often failed to arouse confidence: "People leave him persuaded but not truly converted"[101].

Benes' foreign policy objectives, however, were far-sighted and sincere, and hinged on the theory of balance of power and collective security: if, as Hadow believed, he was encouraging the fear of war, it was in order to screw up tension (as later in the case of the May Crisis) and extract firmer assurances from France, Russia, and Britain to support his country in the event of an attack, and to hold off German aggression. Even as Hadow himself admitted, it was not the moral weakness of the Czechs' handling of the Sudeten German question which caused a reluctance to assist this country so much as the fear of German strength and the risk of being embroiled in a conflict. Benes knew that the Sudeten German question was secondary to the nature of the problem, and he was much more concerned with building up his country's forces and convincing outsiders of the aggressiveness of Germany. Hadow seemed determined not to be convinced. When Wenzel Jaksch expressed his fear to Hadow that war was inevitable and imminent, and that German preparations on the border were "unending and for all to see", Hadow dismissed the activist leader as "unnerved" and "on the run"[102]. A German attack would be checked, he maintained, through cooperation with the demands of the SdP, and Benes must be pressured into accepting this.

Hadow's final statement on Czechoslovakia in 1937 was a reiteration of the contention that the Sudeten Germans were the key to the continued existence of Czechoslovakia, and, without

proper treatment of this minority, this country was destined to go under. "That she will do so only after lighting a bonfire which will at least singe Great Britain's beard is President Benes' firm resolve and a point we should, I suggest, remember. For it makes it the more important that we should guide and encourage the Government of this country along lines which will not imperil the peace of Europe and our future"[103]. Hadow had now accepted the possibility that Czechoslovakia might "go under" and seemed primarily concerned that, given this possibility, Britain should not be involved in defending her. His course for appeasement was therefore firmly set and the events of 1938 only served to strengthen this attitude. "Guide and encourage" Czechoslovakia meant, to Hadow, pressure this country and, because from the outset his sympathy for Czechoslovakia was nominal, the considerations of its territorial integrity were to come second to the "peace of Europe" and Britain's future.

Influences Intensified

While Hadow was posted in Prague and as Hitler began to challenge Europe there was a change in the mood and meaning of appeasement which was represented in Hadow's despatches. The growing fear of war among the British public was influencing foreign policy. The Spanish Civil War, for example, brought

home the destructive effect of bombs which, in the dread of such events occurring in Britain, made the desire for peace a little more desperate and a little less reasoned. While Hadow was in Austria, the search for peace had been optimistic and more strongly based on the belief in progress. In the mid-1930s it became pessimistic in its acceptance of the dictators, and belief in the necessity of dealing with them and extracting what good was perceived out of the situation.

Hadow's desire for peace matched this mood, and as he subconsciously detected events progressing away from his expectations, he began to follow the frame of mind which ignored or downplayed signs of aggression from Hitler in order to preserve some form of cooperation. Just after the reoccupation of the Rhineland he wrote that the future of Central Europe was a matter of negotiation with Germany "by such of the Great Powers as concede that surpassing even - in importance for the future peace of Europe - the question of reoccupation of the Rhineland, is the danger that the next German move may be in a Southerly direction...and that the present opportunity for securing terms may not recur"[104]. More apparent in his recommendations after 1935 are Hadow's references to the horrors of war and his own experience of it: "I would ask you to believe that nothing matters to me more than the prevention of war and the maintenance of true democracy. The former I saw for four years: that is enough for a lifetime, and I have children"[105]. In 1937 he

wrote that his most profound wish was to try to "stop the drift that is leading Central Europe towards the abyss of war: of which I tasted the full horrors for nearly three years"[106].

It was in 1937 that Hadow's pacifism became even more of a recurring justification concluding the more strongly worded of his letters and despatches, and with it, the belief that he was expressing the views of his countrymen. In March he wrote, "I have no axe to grind other than a desire to promote PEACE which is a result of my personal knowledge of war" and continued, "'We do not want war'" is the universal cry in our country...I want to go on fighting in Central Europe for 'Peace and Appeasement' such as I am convinced we can attain without for a moment sacrificing democracy of our own principles"[107]. In urging the head of the Press Department Reginald Leeper to curb anti-German articles he wrote, "the 'will to appeasement' is far more general than seems to be believed as yet in Britain and you can do an immense amount towards promoting it - without in the least sacrificing important principles"[108].

Hadow was mistaken, however, in believing that opinion was united in Britain on appeasement. The majority were in favour of peace but, with the strengthening of the Nazis, the nation became divided regarding the price of peace. Arguments over foreign policy became bitter and vociferous as most policy options appeared to involve negative consequences. Anthony Eden wrote at the end of 1936, "There is a spirit of violence abroad in

Europe today which bodes ill for the future unless all the restraining and responsible influences in humanity are brought to bear to check it"[109]. Hadow was not in favour of attempts to check aggression as he thought this would only be detrimental to European relations. Any semblance of a threatening attitude on the part of Britain was wrong: "at present we are confessedly PREPARING FOR WAR however much we may protest to the contrary; for people are ceasing to believe in our FAIRNESS and that, and that alone, gives our STRENGTH in Europe today"[110].

Pacifism had, in fact, been a long tradition in British politics, but played a relatively minor role before the First World War. The psychological scars of that war apparent in Hadow as well as the revulsion against conflict on a large scale had become widespread by the 1930s. Because Hadow encompassed this aspect of appeasement to a large degree, his belief in an enlightened Europe that could no longer contemplate dangerously aggressive policies involving war as a means to an end became earnest enough in the mid-1930s to consistently ignore or evade the issues of aggressive signs from Hitler. This attitude is illustrated in Hadow's increased irritation with the press during his time in Czechoslovakia. While it was the belief of many later on that the British press had failed to inform or prepare its public regarding the Nazi danger, Hadow was much more concerned over the effect of any warnings on Germany. He, therefore, made personal pleas to Leeper and others such as Lady Layton, wife of

the editor of *The News Chronicle*. To the latter, he wrote in 1936 objecting to inferences that Henlein and his party were known to be Nazi agents: "Such statements will have the inevitable result of taking away from us the immense moral power we have over Central Europe today by making both Henlein and Germany believe that we are not willing either to be fair-minded or to promote a better understanding between peoples". Hadow continued, "Do not think that I am pleading for tolerance or kindness towards Germany. I only ask for FAIRNESS in the removal of these little irritations of daily headlines and cutting words, and if you can help in this manner, believe me, England will have good cause to be grateful to you"[111]. To Leeper he wrote that many recent articles were accomplishing little apart from "rubbing salt into wounds" without doing much constructive good[110]. Such actions on the part of Hadow were prompted, as he constantly stated himself, by his pacifist sentiment.

It was mainly Hadow's fear of war which spurred the course of appeasement he had adopted in the mid-1930s, but his anti-communism and mistrust of the Soviet Union became a further catalyst to his actions, a facet of Hadow, of which more examples emerge in his despatches. Already fairly apparent while in Austria, Hadow's posting to a country allied with the Soviet Union evoked further expression of this sentiment.

The concept of communism was new to Hadow - as to most Westerners - and a particular threat to society circles where

wealth and property were important and class distinctions strictly adhered to. Communism, from this point of view, seemed much more destructive than Nazism, and the added confusion over how exactly such an alien system operated encouraged these fears. Elements in Hadow's despatches also suggest that his suspicion of communism was linked to a lack of sympathy for the Slav mentality. Like his pacifism, it was a reflection of British fears during the 1930s which, in this case, resulted in the wish to see the U.S.S.R. kept in diplomatic isolation. The terms in which Hadow couched this wish was avoidance of a policy of encirclement of Germany through any agreement with the Soviet Union.

Like his pacifism, Hadow's anti-communism remained beneath the surface of his recommendations while in Prague, but was often apparent in warnings of Bolshevik influence in Czechoslovakia and analyses of Czech-Soviet relations. Hadow was evidently alarmed over both these factors, and his veiled criticism was approached in two ways: strategic considerations concerning Czechoslovakia's reliance on the Soviet Union, and the general spread of communism in Europe as allegedly condoned in Czechoslovakia. The former involved speculation on Russian assistance in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia, while the latter invoked warnings of encouragement of bolshevism by Benes' Government. The interest of the Foreign Office in Czechoslovakia in 1936 mainly centred on this latter approach; not, however, due to general fears of the growth of

communism in Europe (which was Hadow's concern), but because of Germany's potential interest and involvement in Czechoslovakia to combat communist influence. As events progressed, however, it seemed that Germany's interest lay more with the Sudeten Germans, and this may explain why Hadow's despatches contain more references to the Soviet Union and bolshevik influence in 1936 than in 1937 when the minorities problem in Czechoslovakia became the focus of his attention.

In January 1936 Hadow wrote of friction between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia caused apparently by organisation of communist propaganda in Yugoslavia directed from Czechoslovakia which the Czech Minister was unwilling to eradicate "for fear of offending Russia"[113]. In June he described a debate in Prague on Czechoslovakia's foreign policy in which the Czech Communist Party gave the Government its "blessing" while the spokesman of the SdP emphasised the "ruin" to Czechoslovakia certain to be the result of the Government's friendliness to Russia[114]. In the same month he wrote that Benes was being accused by the Czech Agrarians of allowing communism a free hand in Czechoslovakia in the hope of Soviet military and air assistance so that the Czech army could hold out against an attack[115].

In October 1936 Hadow emphasised again that the middle classes in Czechoslovakia were becoming alarmed at the degree to which Communist activities and propaganda were being tolerated

by the Czech Government. "In common with the *Sudetendeutsche Partei*", Hadow wrote, "the Agrarian, Christian Social and Slovak Nationalist parties now openly declare that they are fighting communism in Czechoslovakia; but the Government professes to see no danger from this propaganda"[116]. In a memorandum on Czech foreign policy Hadow wrote that Benes had tried to reinforce his position in Europe by "introducing Soviet Russia in place of or in addition to France, as the patron and military protector of Czechoslovakia". This led, Hadow believed, to "persistent rumours of secret agreements, preparations for the establishment of Soviet air-bases in and the despatch of Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia in case of hostilities"[117].

The stories of Russia setting up advanced air-bases in Czechoslovakia from 1936-38 were, in fact, basically without foundation, although an airfield at Uzhorod was being enlarged to receive Soviet aircraft. Development of a new air-base at Vinnytsa had also begun as well as the process of fitting out a Slovak base with fuel dumps and greater technical facilities, but these were interrupted by German press denunciations[118]. Russian defence of Czechoslovakia in the event of a German attack was a difficult question as passage to Czechoslovakia was dependent on Roumania and Poland. Polish relations with Russia were beginning to deteriorate in 1936 and she eventually definitely refused Soviet passage through her territory. Roumania was consistent in refusing land passage but appeared to be willing to

close her eyes to the Soviets using her air-space. Hadow came to recognise these facts later on, and pointed to them with a certain measure of relief as further reason for Czechoslovakia being technically as well as morally indefensible against German aggression. In 1936, however, he was still worried over this aspect of Bolshevik infiltration of Europe.

In November Hadow wrote of concern he felt over remarks attributed to Major-General Wavell of the British General Staff after attending Red Army Manoeuvres with the British Delegation. *The International Press Correspondence* - a Soviet paper circulated in Britain and Central Europe - had reported Wavell remarking that he hoped in the near future to greet delegates of the Red Army in England. Hadow did not suppose that these were Wavell's exact words or assumed that, if they were, they had been taken out of context: "But my attention was drawn to them by a Czech friend who asked me whether they meant that the British as well as the French Army was now having to bow to the dictates of 'Red Politicians'. You can well imagine my answer!"[119].

At the beginning of 1937 Hadow demonstrated his fear of Pan-slavism by criticising a recent book on Eastern Europe by a Czech "Diplomat-publicisist" M. Seba. The book, Hadow felt, gave a clear picture of Seba's views: "Friendly to Russia, frankly anti-Polish; desirous of warning Yugoslavia against the danger of flirting with Germany; nervous of any Austro-German

Anschluss and above all seeing in Germany the traditional enemy of his race, M. Seba seems to be little more than a Slav politician with a leaning towards Pan-Slavism as the opponent of Pan-Germanism and the champion of Slav Czechoslovakia". Hadow wrote that Seba made no secret of his conviction that Russia should be kept in Europe "to oppose a Germany which seeks steadily to exclude her from participation in European affairs". Hadow added that Seba had President Benes' backing, so his career was unlikely to be cut short by his "blunt indiscretions"[120]. From this time on, as Germany's attention shifted from communism in Czechoslovakia to the Sudeten Germans, Hadow also shifted his attention more solely on this latter question and the spread of communism became an underlying factor in his attitude towards the Czech Government.

From 1936 to the beginning of 1937 Hadow was further perceiving an internal struggle in Czechoslovakia between National Socialism and Communism, and through the emphasis in his despatches, appeared increasingly more concerned over the possible victory of the latter. In September 1936 he wrote of this struggle and remarked that the middle classes in Czechoslovakia were "uncomfortably aware" that there was little room for an independent bourgeois Czechoslovakia should either national-socialism or communism prevail[121]. By 1937 he viewed the struggle in different terms; as one of a majority against the ruling Czech minority which was complicated now only by

communism (and not national-socialism) against which influential supporters of the Government were having to fight. According to Hadow the Conservative classes were claiming that Benes was having to pay Moscow's price for protection against German aggression by tolerating the preaching of Moscow's doctrines in the towns and villages of Czechoslovakia. Hadow offered proof of this claim through "ocular" evidence of police protection of communist meetings in Northern Bohemia furnished by "a reliable British Subject"; and compulsory visits by school children to Soviet propaganda films which were being shown in Prague. "The open sympathy", Hadow wrote, "for the 'Red' element in such films shown by local audiences and their vociferous hostility to any 'White' elements is often cited by Czech opponents of communism as proof of their contention that its virus is taking effect in Czechoslovakia"[122].

Hadow's antagonism towards Soviet Russia and communism in general was seemingly brought out during his posting in Czechoslovakia. Although mentioning fears of a "leftist" tendency in Nazi Germany in the early 1930s, his prejudice against the Soviet Union found more expression in a country friendly to Russia and possessing the added Slavic elements with which Hadow was unfamiliar and reluctant to trust. The Nazi regime was admittedly brutal, but it projected a comparative sense of order more likely to appeal to Hadow, and this is one reason why Pan-German tendencies were met with

greater understanding from him than Pan-Slavic ones. His anti-communism was, thus, perpetuated in Czechoslovakia and became an added incentive to his heightened sense of the need for appeasement in the late 1930s.

4 The Foreign Office: Appeasement Pursued

The Early Signs

It seems clear that Hadow gradually grew attuned to those in support of appeasement and that he drifted towards these figures in the mid to late 1930s as the policy gained momentum under Chamberlain. This meant an automatic shift away from many of his colleagues in the Foreign Office who continued to support a policy of containment of Germany and Italy. The shift was clear from the time of his posting in London but had begun developing as early as his time in Vienna. Officials in the Foreign Office grew aware of Hadow's divergence from their own views and expressed their differences largely in minutes on his despatches; his earliest and gradually most trenchant critic being Sir Orme Sargent. Sargent, who was head of the Central Department and became Assistant Under-Secretary of State, is described by Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott as the strongest opponent of appeasement in the Foreign Office: "He refused any compromise, however attractive superficially"[1]. Sargent advocated a "classical" policy for Britain in that she could not allow any one power to dominate Europe. Germany was therefore to be contained by alliances; preferably Franco-British, but the Soviet Union should be included if necessary.

Others in the Foreign Office who opposed conciliation of

right-wing states as the prime object of foreign policy included ~~Laurence~~ Collier, Phipps, Sir Reginald Leeper, Duncan Sandys, Sir Ralph Wigram, and Vansittart, the latter being well-known for his stringently-voiced criticism of any pro-German line. Vansittart grew to deplore the tendency in Britain to divorce German domestic brutality from possible aggression abroad, because he realised that Nazism was incapable of such a division[2]. That these officials supported containment is not to say, however, that they did not, at different times, recommend limited concessions to both Germany and Italy, but the basis of the majority of their recommendations rested on a strong defence and a curbing of these countries' aims. In this crucial sense they differed from Hadow.

That Hadow could deviate from the Foreign Office line is due to changes in its role and the workings within this institution, and a lack of agreement between certain factions which made a clear-cut policy difficult to define. Keith Middlemas writes in *Diplomacy of Illusion* that in the days when Eyre Crowe headed the Foreign Office it would have been inconceivable for Heads of Departments or Ambassadors to by-pass the normal channels of communication or directly communicate with members of the Cabinet[3]. But a quick succession of Foreign Secretaries after 1929 weakened this system and heads of departments acquired greater freedom. Arthur Henderson, the Marquess of Reading,

Sir Samuel Hoare, and Sir John Simon were all Foreign Secretaries during the years Hadow worked in Vienna. Henderson had been caught up in Geneva with the post-war settlements and the League of Nations, Reading was only Foreign Secretary for four months, Hoare had been forced to resign, and Simon served three years but showed a lack of initiative and was disliked and mistrusted in the Foreign Office. These circumstances combined with the general erosion of the dominance of the Foreign Office due partly to the formation of special ministerial committees probably helped to cloak any major differences of opinion between Hadow and his superiors during the early 1930s.

In the years he worked under Phipps in Austria Hadow grew to have little respect for the latter. Sharing the natural cynicism of many anti-appeasers, Phipps possessed many of the qualities of a good diplomat. This probably gave rise to impatience from Hadow who increasingly interpreted his job more loosely. The impression Hadow's sister-in-law received when she visited him in Vienna was that he "bullied" Phipps, and this impression is supported by a letter Sargent wrote at one point to Phipps: "Your letter of August 12, enclosing Hadow's brutal suggestion that you should break your leave to come up to London and join in the Austrian financial struggle. Hadow must be a hard hearted fellow and I shall be no party to his proposal"[4]. From Vienna

Phipps went on to become Ambassador to Berlin and, like the former Ambassador Sir Horace Rumbold, grew alarmed at the excesses of the Nazi regime, describing Hitler as "a fanatic who would be satisfied with nothing less than the dominance of Europe"[5]. Rumbold and Phipps were not heeded, however; Sir Neville Henderson, who became Ambassador to Berlin in 1937 believed in 1934 that the latter was too pro-French to understand Germany objectively[6].

Sir Walford Selby who replaced Phipps in Vienna in 1933 got on rather better with Hadow despite disagreement over German intentions, and he sent praise of Hadow's efforts on the financial aspects of his work. Selby later wrote of Hadow when describing the 1934 Vienna rebellion, "If I succeeded in any way in extricating myself from a well-nigh impossible situation I owe an immense debt to...Mr. Hadow...[who] was anxious to prevent the overthrow of Chancellor Dollfuss. He threw himself with ardour into the task of securing the distribution of funds collected by our Trade Unions in England"[7]. Selby later sharply criticised the Foreign Office of the 1930s, largely attributing "the disaster of 1939" to faulty organisation in Whitehall[8].

The line taken by the Foreign Office from 1931 to 1934 regarding Germany and European concerns was vague and erratic, being hampered by internal differences and a lack of guidance from Simon. The central principle appeared to be to avoid any disruption of the existing order, and the Foreign Office

aim was, at that time, to prevent shifts in balance among the great powers and to reconcile local difficulties and tensions. Middlemas writes, "from the earliest years following the war, it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be untenable and indefensible"[9]. Hadow apparently took this policy to heart.

In November 1931, when the British Government was preparing for the Disarmament Conference, Sargent began to argue within the Foreign Office that the Cabinet needed a new approach to foreign affairs. He contended in an analysis of European and world problems produced by war and depression that finances and economy, security and disarmament, territories and Treaty revision, were all linked. Sargent believed that French security against German imperialism was the commanding issue, implying that France had reason to fear the future and that the Locarno agreements were inadequate protection. If "real stability" was to be restored to Europe, the British Government should unequivocally guarantee territorial order[10]. Such recommendations were too strong for the Cabinet and did not fit in with Simon's view of the situation or his cautious approach. He was being criticised at this time for failure to take a stronger line over Japanese aggression in Manchuria, and his view that "we must keep out of trouble in Central Europe at all costs" was not calculated to deflect Hitler and Mussolini from their designs[11].

Even Neville Chamberlain, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer, said of Simon, "the fact is that his manner inspires no confidence and that he seems temperamentally unable to make up his mind to action when a difficult situation arises"[12].

By the late summer of 1933 the Foreign Office did begin to make stronger attempts to promote effective protection of Austria - a policy which Hadow adhered to in his defence of Austrian independence, and one which was mainly the result of the initiative of Vansittart. Unlike Hadow, however, Hitler's aggressive Austrian policy confirmed Vansittart in his anti-German attitude. The Permanent Under-Secretary of State warned the British Government that Austria confronted it with a "European crisis of the first magnitude", with Hitler's "first trial of strength". He further wrote, "The future of Europe turns largely on the fashion of our facing the German challenge over Austria, in which we are at present likely to lose. The seriousness of the challenge can only be realised if it is not seen as an isolated case...but as the first in a series of challenges, each one of which will carry with it a nearer threat to this country"[13].

Before 1933, Hadow's reports were fairly consistent with general views in the Foreign Office and even, at times, received praise. Near the end of 1931 Sargent wrote Hadow to thank him for his letters on the International Socialist Conference, "which Vansittart and I have read with much interest"[14]. By the end of

1933, however, criticism of many of Hadow's observations and recommendations became apparent in the Foreign Office, most notably from Sargent. In commenting on a memorandum by Hadow on Austro-German relations in August 1933, Sargent minuted that Hadow's suggestion that Italian policy at this time was not averse to accepting *Anschluss* within the framework of a Central European Union lead by Germany and Italy was "worth reading but hardly credible". Vansittart added his agreement to this observation[15]. When, in September of that year, Hadow suggested British mediation in Austro-German relations, Vansittart wrote, "I do not think it our business to mediate - especially on such slender grounds as these...If the Germans do really desire to sober down while saving their faces - I doubt whether Hitler does want to sober down over Austria - somebody like Herr V. Neurath will make an approach to the S[ecretary] of S[tate] at Geneva"[16]. Vansittart was voicing an objection to Hadow's recommendations which was soon to become the major one of anti-appeasers in the Foreign Office in response to his despatches: that Britain should not involve herself in any attempts at mediation in Europe; especially that which concerned Germany.

In 1934, just before the attempted Nazi putsch in Vienna, Hadow sent Sargent a despatch on the effect of the SA revolt in Germany on Austrian public opinion. "If a German collapse

would deliver Austria from the political menace of Nazidom", Hadow wrote, "it is also expected by Austrians to produce economic suffering, and possibly a form of communism hardly less dangerous to the life of this country, than a Nazi victory". R.A. Gallop of the Southern Department commented, "I cannot resist the feeling that Vienna is getting on Mr. Hadow's nerves and that his view of the situation is unnecessarily gloomy. Perhaps this is not unnatural while he remains the 'cook and captain bold' (this despatch is self-typed) with Mr. Pollard as the 'crew of the Nancy brig'"[17]. Sargent appeared to be in agreement with this view. In his comments on a letter from Hadow containing notes which expressed despair over Austria's economic situation leading to a loss of all that German visitors meant to the country, concern over the lack of discipline and corruption in Austria, and the suggestion that Austro-German relations had practically ceased to exist, Sargent wrote, "I am getting a little tired of Mr. Hadow's oft-repeated conclusion to the effect that Austria is bound to collapse unless succour reaches her speedily from Great Britain. What does Hadow really wish to imply when he says this? I rather suspect that he has repeated this phrase so often that it has ceased to have any real meaning for him"[18].

By 1934 Hadow was irritating Sargent to the extent that the latter sent a complaint to Vienna over the state of Hadow's

typewriter which he wished had a larger script and a blacker ribbon. "Even if the first of these deficiencies is beyond remedy surely the second might be rectified by the purchase of a new ribbon"[19]. Vansittart, however, was not so critical and in August wrote to the Minister in Vienna Walford Selby congratulating Hadow on the "detailed and illuminating" memorandum recently sent. "It is full of information and shows how much of the Austrian background he has acquired during his service in Vienna. He deserves the greatest credit for it"[20].

Hadow also received criticism from Duncan Sandys of the Central Department, who, at one stage, minuted that he doubted the accuracy of Hadow's reports of an approaching German compromise with Austria. Sandys had joined the Foreign Office in 1930, and worked as Third Secretary in Berlin under Sir Horace Rumbold who was Ambassador there from 1928 to 1933. Both Sandys and Rumbold had become aware of the implications of the Nazi regime and Rumbold sent London warnings of its brutality and potential aggression abroad, while Sandys returned to London convinced of the need for a positive British policy. Sandys was too junior, however, for his opinions to carry weight, and when in 1933 he expressed his fears and views on British policy in the event of German occupation of the Rhineland, Simon merely commented, "we cannot consider hypothetical issues"[21]. Sandys resigned from the Foreign Office in 1933 in protest against

the Government's German policy and became a Conservative M.P. in 1935, later joining the anti-appeasement groups of Eden and Churchill. Gilbert and Gott write that Sandys was "a realist, not a visionary"[22]. His understanding of the situation was not likely to coincide with Hadow's inspired conclusions.

While in Austria, Hadow had expressed his own opinions often, but his early adoption of appeasement had yet to meet with any great disagreement in London. Knowledge of the implications of Nazi Germany was still unclear despite warnings from Rumbold, and avoidance of confrontation in Europe was an implicit concern. Hadow's drift towards appeasement was at this time slow and vague enough that he could correspond privately and amicably with another anti-appeaser Sir Ralph Wigram. Wigram, was head of the Central Department, close to Churchill and Vansittart, and "a great friend of France". When Sandys resigned from the Foreign Office Wigram believed he was right to go: "I wish I'd done it long ago. I left it too long". Just after the German occupation of the Rhineland, Wigram made the famous statement, "War is now inevitable...I have failed to make the people here realise what is at stake"[23]. Hadow often addressed Wigram as "Wigs" and had no qualms over making observations to him on the despatches from Vienna which he saw as a "reflection of my departing chief" (Phipps)[24].

The divergence in the Foreign Office, however, was

growing and was represented by the still fairly strong Eyre Crowe tradition kept up by Vansittart and the beginnings of appeasement in Simon's cautious approach. The Foreign Office shared Hadow's pessimistic view of Austria and was sympathetic regarding Nazi attacks on her Government, but apart from initiatives taken by Vansittart in the late summer of 1933 (while Simon was away on holiday), in which effective protection of Austria was promoted more energetically, this moral support did not actually express itself in stronger political action. Hadow, already, was arguing for approaches to Germany, whereas Vansittart and Sargent saw strong alliances with France and Italy as the key to the prevention of *Anschluss*.

At this time Hadow received a personal letter from the Liberal M.P. Bernays which gave a fairly clear indication of the difference in views between Hadow and a large part of the Foreign Office. Bernays had had a talk with Anthony Eden, who became Foreign Secretary in 1935, and put forward Hadow's case for a "real attempt" at getting a settlement with Germany on the basis of unequivocal acceptance by Hitler of Austria's independence. Bernays wrote, "I do not think I made much impression. The Foreign Office is wedded to 'the Ring of Steel' conception of policy. When I talked of the industrial plight of Austria I was met immediately with Phipps' report, which appears to take a very roseate view of Austria's economic future. Bernays spoke

"strongly and sincerely" about Hadow and his "non-government" sources, and Eden reportedly said, "I don't know Hadow personally but he is doing very well. Everybody tells me that"[25].

Growing Divergence

When Hadow was transferred to Czechoslovakia at the end of 1935, the Foreign Office and British government were in the midst of struggling for a definable foreign policy to meet the expansionist policies of Germany and Italy. The dilemma confronting Britain was that her interests were world-wide, but she lacked the armed strength to protect them. Faced with the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, Foreign Office officials such as Vansittart shared the concern of France over the possibility of alienating Italy through sanctions in answer to this action, while the more formidable threat of Germany hovered in the background. Others, like Hadow, were more intent on coming to terms with Germany in the hope of curbing her belligerence. Britain's insecurity in military strength and her uncertainty over German intentions created an environment ripe for those who advocated conciliation of Hitler, and Ian Colvin in his biography of Vansittart notes that while 1934 was the year of endeavouring for European alliances, 1935 was the year in which appeasement of

Germany gained ground[26]. Appeasement, at this time, took more than one form as there were those who felt it preferable to get a general settlement in company with France, being mindful of Central and Eastern Europe, while others wanted to embark on a two-power policy with Germany to the exclusion of France; a suggestion which brought with it the idea of letting Germany "go east".

As borne out in contradictory minutes, at a time when Hadow's involvement in British policy prior to the war was probably at its most significant through the recommendations in his despatches from Prague, the Foreign Office was divided in opinion, unsure in its direction, and weakening in its influence over Government decisions. The overall picture of the Foreign Office from 1936-1937 is one of increasing confusion, conflict, and a certain amount of frustration, and can be read from the despatches from Prague and subsequent reactions, and in general assessments in the Foreign Office of the European situation. At the end of 1935, for example, Wigram and Sargent wrote a joint memorandum following the first form of appeasement, declaring it to be the continuance of Britain's foreign policy, and rejecting the policies of drift and encirclement of Germany. The only constructive policy open to Europe, they felt, was to come to terms with Germany in order to moderate her aims in Central and Eastern Europe. The way to go about this, it was concluded, was

through a colonial or air agreement[27]. The memorandum aroused debate in the Foreign Office and Lawrence Collier who was head of the Northern Department and a Russian specialist opposed it, stating that it was not a continuance but a reversal of Britain's previous policy. In Collier's view the only way to moderate Germany's aims would be to make her drop them altogether. General discussion with Germany, he felt, would only damage relations with that country and render Britain subject to suspicion from other countries[28]. Vansittart agreed with Collier that German expansion could not be modified, but did not dismiss discussions over territory in Africa as he believed Germany was bound to expand somewhere[29].

The Prague Legation, meanwhile, despite Hadow's insistence on the neutrality or reliability of his sources, became noticeably biased towards the Sudeten Germans and against the Czechs. Through the influence of the Minister from 1931-1936 Sir Joseph Addison, it distanced itself to a certain degree from the Czechs, generally accepting the claims of the Sudeten German Party at face-value, and regarded the statements of Benes and the Czech Minister in London Jan Masaryk with more scepticism. This, in turn, influenced opinion in London.

While Hadow fell in readily with the bias in the Prague Legation which Addison helped create, the latter tended towards a cynicism that separated him from his colleagues and brought

condemnation from the Foreign Office. Addison apparently had little time for the Czechs, "exploding" the claim that Czechoslovakia was the only new state treating its minorities in a liberal fashion. Shiela Grant Duff, who met Addison several times while in Czechoslovakia, noted, "The Czechs did not like him very much, knowing how much he disliked them". When she asked him what British policy was in Eastern Europe he answered, "British policy! You flatter them". His associates in Prague tended to be mostly Bohemian noblemen who, according to Grant Duff, viewed the Czechs with the same snobbishness as the British Minister[30].

Addison also, however, had little time for the Sudeten Germans, the great majority of whom he believed to be Nazis desiring union with Germany. To Addison, it was only a matter of time before Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by Germany and it was useless for Britain to take any action with regard to this eventuality. By 1936 he was recommending little more than general observance of Czechoslovakia on the part of Britain, and it was this laissez-faire attitude which brought censure and eventual replacement of Addison from the Foreign Office. Hadow defended Addison throughout, writing as early as December 1935, "I am confident we can prove that there is no underlying bias, prejudice or preference; but only a sad necessity to show you...the present stage of a historical '*Bruder-Zwist*' which is once more

not without danger to the future of Central Europe"[31]. Despite Hadow's defence, the Foreign Office began in December 1935 to review Addison's despatches as they were held to be one-sided. Eden commented that Addison was entertaining, "But offers no constructive advice even on the immediate issue of the petitions at Geneva. Nor do I recollect that Sir J. had given us such frequent warnings about the *Sudetendeutsche*. His continual theme has been the disintegration of Czechoslovakia as a whole, and had he concentrated on this problem at an earlier date we might have been helped in a very difficult task". He added, "Nor do I believe that Sir J. Addison properly appreciates the European dangers of this problem"[32]. Addison retired at the end of 1936 and was replaced by Sir Basil Newton in 1937. O'Malley wrote to Hadow that he had met Addison shortly after his resignation and found him in a "sulphurous" frame of mind, beyond consolation. "His whole career is a tragedy for which partly we and partly he himself are to blame"[33].

The Prague Legation thus with the influence of Addison and the opinions of Hadow painted a bleak picture of Czechoslovakia which was basically accepted in London as was, to begin with, the Prague Legation's assessment of the conflict between Benes and the SdP. When Shiela Grant Duff approached these diplomats on the subject of Czechoslovakia she was told, "The Czechs know they are doomed..and will be fools if they resist.

The French will not help them and neither will we". Grant Duff wrote, "I found myself terribly depressed by the cynical and uncaring attitude of my fellow countrymen and felt lonelier in their company than I did when alone. The implications that we were the English and they were the Czechs was so apparent in every word and gesture that one felt totally isolated"[34].

Apart from the fact that, at the beginning of 1936, those such as Wigram, Sargent, and Vansittart were still exploring the possibilities of some agreement with Germany, the Foreign Office was also taken in by the sincerity of Konrad Henlein; two factors which have possible bearing on the views and suggestions in Hadow's despatches. When Christopher Bramwell of the Southern Department was sent by the Foreign Office to report on a speech Henlein gave at Chatham in December 1935 he found nothing suspicious about Henlein, and was, in fact, impressed by the SdP leader[35].

Henlein was also taken to meet Sargent and Clifford Norton, Vansittart's Private Secretary. In Norton's notes on the visit, prominence was given to Henlein's assurance of no connection with the Nazis, and the visit led to this Foreign Office official recommending to the Secretary of State (then Sir Samuel Hoare) that Benes should be told "to give these fellows a straighter deal which, they say, is all that they want"[36]. Sargent, before their meeting, had written that Henlein was not a Nazi, and after

the meeting believed that the SdP leader was definitely on an anti-Nazi platform. Owen St. Claire O'Malley, Head of the Southern Department wrote that the Foreign Office was convinced that Henlein was moderate, and two officials (Christopher Lambert and R.A. Gallop) went so far as to suggest seeing if a nonaggression pact offer to Czechoslovakia from Germany was still open and recommended a "standstill" agreement on the Polish model. As well as Hadow, the British Legation itself in Prague was keen on this idea, although the Foreign Office did not pursue it[37].

Despite Vansittart's caution in regard to Germany and his belief in the policy of strength, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State was also deceived by Henlein. It is one element in Vansittart's otherwise fairly shrewd reading of European concerns where he was completely misled. A record of an arranged interview between Vansittart and Henlein was sent to Hadow in July 1936 and Vansittart's comments must have gratified the First Secretary to a certain extent. Vansittart wrote that Henlein made a most favourable impression and seemed moderate, honest, and clear-sighted. "He speaks with a frankness and decision that inspire confidence". Throughout the interview, Vansittart felt, Henlein spoke "with great earnestness". Vansittart believed the SdP leader was, if not actually speaking the truth, speaking what he believed to be the

truth[38]. While Henlein exaggerated Vansittart's interest in the Sudeten Germans, it is true that this interest existed, and J.W. Bruegel writes that there is enough evidence the Foreign Office files to show that Vansittart helped Henlein "behind the scenes"[39].

Hadow also described Henlein as "moderate" as well as being a "man of his word"[40]. What Hadow termed as Vansittart's "statesmanlike interest" in the Sudeten Germans increased throughout 1936 and encouraged Hadow to send to Vansittart's secretary C.J. Norton in 1937 a memorandum for Vansittart to read in the hope that it would be useful to him as a summary of the problem. "If I have endeavoured to indicate a way out of the present impasse", Hadow wrote, "it is because of the hopefulness that has been instilled into us by this constructive recognition of Great Britain's essential part in bringing the opponents [Czechoslovakia and Germany] together which comes from Sir Robert's 'drive'"[41]. Hadow received a message of thanks for the memorandum from Vansittart who apparently read it "with great interest" and found the information "of much use"[42].

The enthusiasm Hadow expressed for British involvement in the Sudeten German question represents a crucial point of contention in the Foreign Office which developed by 1937. British policy in early 1936, however, was mainly dealing with the

question of how to pursue an orthodox League of Nations policy of sanctions against the aggressor Italy without making it easy for Germany to unbalance the status quo in Europe, plus how to seek renewed friendship with Italy without seeming to condone aggression. The Foreign Office, under the guidance of Vansittart, followed the belief in concessions to Italy, although Anthony Eden, who had replaced Hoare as Secretary of State, was doubtful of this course. Vansittart wrote at this time, "We cannot make a stand for Abyssinia and connive at the spoilation of Lithuania, or Czechoslovakia, or Austria". He also wrote, "We should do all we can to secure better treatment of German minorities"[43]. Hadow was undoubtedly aware of this mood in his immediate attempt to establish contact with the SdP, and officials such as Sargent were initially enthusiastic about the idea: "This activity on the part of the Prague Legation is both unusual and refreshing"[44].

The German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 was met with confusion and exasperation in the Foreign Office with Vansittart noting that Hitler had deprived them of the possibility of making concessions to him. Many sectors of the British public, however, had convinced themselves that Germany's action was not such an unjustified crime. The Cabinet, also, was guarded in its response. Lord Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, argued in a foreign policy speech that it was not hard to understand Germany's claim to full sovereignty over German soil. "We want no encirclement of Germany", he

stated. "We want no exclusive alliances. We want to build a partnership in European society in which Germany can freely join with us...[45]. Thus, the Foreign Office and the British Government were confused between themselves over what their European policy should be, and the question of Czechoslovakia was one grey area which demonstrates this uncertainty. The criticism mingled with praise which accompanied Hadow's despatches during this time are an illustration of diversity of opinion within the Foreign Office.

The situation in the Foreign Office was partly due to the intrusion of the Cabinet in Foreign Office matters, a circumstance which became even more apparent once Chamberlain took over from Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister in the following year. In the opinion of John Connell who was working in the Foreign Office at that time, the position of that establishment was, from 1936, "ironic and humiliating". Connell writes that "the high status and great authority which it had achieved in the previous thirty years were taken away from it, not openly and abruptly, but by a gradual process of unacknowledged transference of power". According to Connell, the control Baldwin exerted over foreign policy tended to be occasional and capricious and subject to the influence of unofficial advisors and a small clique of Ministers and officials unconnected with foreign policy[46]. In May 1936 Eden had a talk with Baldwin on foreign policy, but recorded in

his diary that he got little out of it except that the Prime Minister wanted better relations with Hitler than Mussolini. When Eden asked how this should be achieved, Baldwin replied, "I have no idea, that is your job"[47].

Although an explicit British policy towards the dictators in Europe did not exist in 1936, Baldwin's remarks demonstrate the emergence from certain conservative circles of a definable policy goal which argued that, rather than face another Abyssinian fiasco, the British government should settle for an official line of appeasement of the demands of dictators. After the reoccupation of the Rhineland, however, those such as Vansittart and Sargent were fast becoming disillusioned with the idea of coming to terms with Hitler. By the beginning of 1937, the policy the Foreign Office was attempting to pursue was that of bringing Italy and Germany into a general European settlement; its main preoccupation being the Spanish Civil War.

In the pursuit of this policy, Foreign Office officials carried on a search for agreement with Germany on the basis of a revised "Locarno" treaty, and Hadow took this line to heart in his continued promotion of a Czech-German settlement over the Sudeten German grievances. The argument for British rapprochement with Germany from a position of strength, however, was becoming stronger in the Foreign Office and in Parliament, while Vansittart had begun to arouse doubts over his

effectiveness in his adamant and somewhat vociferous support of such a policy.

The reaction to Hadow's despatches in the Central and Southern Departments during this time was again mixed and often as vague as British policy. Officials such as Bramwell and O'Malley were ready to accept Hadow's assessments of the situation, while those such as Sargent and Vansittart had increasing reservations; for example, when Hadow sent a summary of a report on the Sudeten Germans in June 1936, Bramwell minuted, "I think Mr. Hadow is quite right in urging, as he does almost weekly, that we should keep up the pressure on the Czech Government". He added, "it is held now in some quarters that German policy will concentrate increasingly on Czechoslovakia in the immediate future and less upon Austria and that is another reason why the Czech Government should be stirred out of their complacency without delay". Sargent was more cautious in his agreement. He wrote that the News Department could work up pressure in the Press, "But it must be done very carefully so as not to furnish ammunition to Dr. Goebbels, who might easily try to twist what appears in the British press into evidence to show that the position of the Sudetendeutsche is a quite impossible one, and one that clearly cannot be remedied by League enquiries or British lecturings but only by the threat of German intervention". Vansittart was also

cautious, merely suggesting that a little pressure which dwelt on the "imprudence" of the Czechs without emphasising the sufferings of the Sudeten Germans might have some effect[48].

In that same month Bramwell also wrote, "These are very useful bulletins that Mr. Hadow sends us. I do not suspect him of bias"[49]; and later, in 1937, when doubts were growing in the Foreign Office over the sources of Hadow's information and the strength of his arguments, Bramwell was still inclined to trust his despatches: "Mr. Hadow prefers the more pessimistic view of anything. There is anyhow no reason for complacency, and to that extent he is perhaps justified"[50]. Lewis Collier, however, made no bones about his doubts, writing in January 1937, "The Prague Legation ["Mr. Hadow" was written here and crossed out] seems to be very much in the German pocket! (Some of Mr. Hadow's reports quite alarm me on that score)"[51]. Charles Brakencourt of the Central Department wrote in the following month that he wished that Hadow was more readable and objected to the latter's use of inverted commas and parentheses which were "irritating" and sometimes misleading. "If I might venture another small criticism", continued Brakencourt, "it is the tendency of Mr. Hadow to err on the side of subjectivity, especially when he is writing on pet themes of his, such as the Sudetendeutsche question"[52].

Hadow's closest ally in the Foreign Office at this time was

O'Malley and the two kept up a private correspondence during Hadow's time in Prague. O'Malley was a more cautious appeaser than Hadow but defended the majority of Hadow's despatches as well as Addison's, and supported conciliation of Germany. In February 1936 he submitted a memorandum he had written at the end of 1935 but withheld because he believed at that time it was too unorthodox. He remarked on submission, "Since then the idea of general negotiation with Germany has become fashionable". The memorandum defended the practicality of making concessions to Germany and expressed the belief in the eventual moderation of the Nazi party. Vansittart's comments on the memorandum in May 1936 demonstrate his disillusionment after the Rhineland occupation. "While neither of us would wish to treat Germany narrowly, I think the era of grievances is pretty nearly played out now since March 7, 1936. If more is to be done, it should be done at our own expense in Africa. But you would like to do it at other people's expense in Europe...I'm afraid I look upon yours as immoral, even if events prove it to be inevitable, which I do not yet admit[53].

When Addison came under question in the Foreign Office, O'Malley had collected extracts from this minister's despatches going back to 1931. Regarding the criticism of a lack of sufficient warning from him over problems in Czechoslovakia, he argued that these extracts showed that the "two interconnected themes"

of the possible break-up of Czechoslovakia and quarrels between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs had been fairly and consistently mentioned in Prague despatches which were supplemented by conversations with Addison and Hadow which left the Southern Department "under no illusions". O'Malley continued, "When Mr. Hadow was in London in the middle of the summer he said that he and Sir Joseph were much disturbed because they felt that it was the Foreign Office which did not sufficiently appreciate the gravity of the position. Mr. Hadow wrote a memorandum here in my room on the subject and begged urgently on Sir Joseph's behalf as well as his own that we would do everything in our power to press a moderate policy on the Czechoslovak Government". Despite this defence, Vansittart merely minuted, "Sir Joseph Addison has certainly been a keen and prescient critic, but not much of a constructive one"[54].

While O'Malley was in agreement with Hadow on foreign policy, he did feel compelled to warn the latter of the negative effects of some of his behaviour. In March 1936 Hadow had apparently received an official letter of approval of his work from E.H. Carr of the Southern Department. O'Malley assured Hadow that the letter was an expression of the general feeling there, but went on to sound "a very small note of warning" that his telegrams were sometimes criticised for a lack of clarity, and that it had been suggested that he sometimes lent too ready an ear to

rumours. O'Malley wrote that Hadow should not make heavy weather of these criticisms, but to bear them in mind[55]. Hadow thanked O'Malley warmly for the warning and, in response to the second criticism, stated that his facts were carefully controlled and time would prove him right. He felt this to be particularly true about his despatches on the Sudeten Germans[56].

The doubts Hadow's despatches began to raise from Sargent during the former's time in Austria increased to such an extent in 1936-37, that this official became Hadow's strongest critic, a fact which Hadow soon recognised and came to resent. Sargent, like other anti-appeasers in the Foreign Office, was cautious in his outlook regarding Germany and Eastern Europe, and in his minutes on despatches, tended to tone down or question Hadow's recommendations as well as the acceptance or enthusiasm with which they were met in the Foreign Office. To Sargent it was always important to think through the consequences of any initiative taken by Britain; for example, the idea of putting public pressure on the Czech Government regarding their treatment of minorities and agreement with Germany. His objections in this respect usually took the form of the question, "How do we know we are right?"; a question which Hadow, by nature, was not inclined to consider. Like many of his colleagues, Sargent appeared increasingly aware of a possible German onslaught on Czechoslovakia, but he wanted to better anticipate Hitler instead of

rushing blindly into concessions.

Like most of the Foreign Office, Sargent, to begin with, was taken in by Henlein and less impressed with Benes. While Hadow, however, was anxious to establish contact with the Sudeten Germans as soon as possible, Sargent (although approving this action) was wary of too intimate a relationship with Henlein. The SdP leader had tried, in December 1935, to begin a direct correspondence with Sargent, but the latter tactfully declined this opening, writing to Addison that such an exchange would be embarrassing. To Henlein he wrote, "All of us in the Foreign Office have to be exceedingly careful to give no grounds whatever for letting it be supposed...that we had ever gone behind the backs of the foreign governments with whom we are on special relations"[57]. Sargent, also, while often believing the policy followed by Benes was short-sighted, was, unlike Hadow, less critical of the motives behind Benes' actions, whom he grew to feel was understandably afraid. This was why he deprecated the constant calls for British advice to the Czech Government from both Hadow and Sir Charles Bentinck who was also working in Prague. In the spring of 1937, for example, Sargent wrote that he suspected that when Benes had, in the past, told Hadow he was not concerned over German intentions, he had really meant that he did not want to be urged to come to an agreement with Germany at all costs as he still hoped to put up a fight. "In this I

think Dr. Benes was right", wrote Sargent, "and as it turned out we never did give him, and did not intend to give him, any such advice (although you will recollect that it was recommended that we should do so by Sir Charles Bentinck and Mr. Hadow)"[58].

In March 1936 when Hadow wrote that the Slav-German struggle in Czechoslovakia was entering a new and dangerous phase and recommended that firm and private pressure should be put on this country in the form of joint counsel from Britain and France, he received support from Bramwell and O'Malley. Sargent, however, minuted that an approach to France on this matter would most likely be met with a snub, as the French would hold that Britain was playing the German game: "that we were the dupes of an agitation which has been worked up by German propaganda and that the Czech Government are fully justified in taking measures to counteract it". Vansittart agreed with Sargent, but wrote that the Czechs were asking for trouble[59].

In July 1936 Hadow put forward the suggestion of an investigation of the Sudeten German petition to the League of Nations and the adoption of a definite attitude by Britain in regard to this petition. O'Malley, again, expressed his agreement that Britain "should take the bull by the horns" and get the Sudeten German grievances thoroughly gone into, warning the Czech Government, at the same time, that that was their intention. Sargent, however, made clear his complete disagreement with

such measures. Such a public statement by the British Government would, he felt, "severely shake" the Czech Government and arouse "unwarranted hopes and assumptions" among the Sudeten Germans. Sargent continued, "worst of all, it would give the German Government and Nazi propaganda a heaven-sent argument to show how justified they were in intervening on behalf of their oppressed German brethren across the frontier". Sargent further objected that the Czech Government had, "rightly or wrongly", made its decision in regard to the SdP, and could accuse Britain of speaking without full knowledge of the situation. If the Czech Government followed Britain's advice this could merely lead to the establishment in Czechoslovakia of a fully organised Nazi party, undermining the state. If this occurred, asked Sargent, could Czechoslovakia count on British support? "I am afraid there is a good deal to be said for the dictum that if we assume no commitments we must equally give no advice"[60].

Sargent's criticism of Hadow grew stronger and more direct in 1937. At the end of January, Hadow sent a telegram to the Foreign Office which stated "Controversy has been given a fresh fillip by a most unfortunate article headed 'Czechs and Germans' from *The Times* of January 29. The article claimed that, despite German propaganda, there were few signs of "Bolshevisation" in Czechoslovakia and that a democratic system

was being maintained "against all odds" in this country. Few people in Czechoslovakia looked confidently toward peace, but most were confident that a German attack would bring help from her allies. Given peace, the article stated, this country would sort out her domestic problems; and, referring to the German minorities it claimed concerning the SdP: "The best observers are convinced that it stands under Nazi moral and material influence". Distress in the Sudetenland, the article continued, however, was diminishing[61].

Sargent wrote that he was at a loss to understand Hadow's objection to the article. "Why is *The Times* article most unfortunate? It seems to me to be a very clear and objective statement of the position which the British public were fully entitled to be given". He added, "I have the impression that Mr. Hadow...does not understand the line we are following in regard to Czechoslovakia"; and thought that the First Secretary should be enlightened. He therefore, sent Hadow a letter which stated that the reason Britain was calling attention to the unwisdom of their attitude to its German minority was because Hitler might exploit these grievances to his own ends, "but that is an entirely different matter from the propaganda which the Germans are now running about the Bolshevisation of Czechoslovakia". Sargent wrote that the Foreign Office did not wish to encourage press polemics between the Czechs and Germans, "but we also do not

wish our own public to be deceived, as they can be very easily, by the German propaganda against Czechoslovakia"[62].

Hadow took the liberty of replying to Sargent's letter, apologising for this breach but appealing to his reputation for "great fairness in giving full consideration to the other side of any case". Hadow defended his objection to *The Times* article and stated that he had tried in his reports to give "objective and incontrovertible" proof of the actual state of affairs in Czechoslovakia. He "laid bare" his motives for promoting British arbitration between Czechoslovakia and Germany, these being his characteristic horror of war and the possession of a son; "my ever-present recollection of this fact makes me strive never to send you a word that is not carefully sifted and...a constructive effort in the cause of peace, rather than a contribution towards war in the shape of destructive criticism only"[63].

Sargent's criticism of Hadow is indicative of a general trend of their growing differences over the Czechoslovakian question and British policy towards Germany; a trend which was becoming apparent in 1936, and was obvious in 1937. In February Hadow sent the Foreign Office a telegram which summarised a statement Benes had made to him for the confidential information of the British Government. Hadow wrote that he had derived the impression that Germany and Czechoslovakia were nearing a point of negotiation but a private statement from Britain would

lead to fair compromise between the Czechs and Germans. He felt the statement from Benes was a result of the Czech President's nervousness over a recent article in the *Daily Telegraph* [64].

Sargent minuted that he personally deplored the newspaper article; "It is one thing for us to lecture M. Benes privately on the necessity of getting rid of his *Sudetendeutsche* problem, but it is quite another matter to criticise him in the public press: that has merely the effect of strengthening the hands of German propagandists". Sargent continued that it was no use following Hadow's suggestion of a British statement unless Britain was prepared to advise Czechoslovakia to abandon her treaties with France, the Little Entente, and Russia, or was ready to advise Germany to give up her anti-Communist campaign against Czechoslovakia[65].

This criticism of Sargent's was the main objection he had to Hadow's view: like Phipps, he felt that Britain should not get involved in the problem of Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans or Czech-German relations. Sargent's mistrust of Germany's intentions was greater than Hadow's as was his caution regarding Anglo-German rapprochement, and his respect for Hadow's judgment on these matters was decreasing. By February 1937, his concern over it was such that he wrote a letter to Phipps regarding Hadow's suggestions. Sargent noted

that Hadow was very keen that Britain should take a leading part in reconciling Germany and Czechoslovakia, "and he goes so far as to suggest that both the German and Czechoslovak Governments are anxious for us to assume this difficult and ungrateful role". The position "as we see it", Sargent wrote, was that Germany had suddenly picked a quarrel with Czechoslovakia on the grounds that the latter was becoming bolshevized. The Foreign Office considered such a quarrel unjustified and the grievances of the Sudeten Germans was an unclear but subsidiary factor. On the subject of the desirability of an agreement between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Sargent felt it would mean one of two things: either that Czechoslovakia would recognise that Germany was justified in picking this quarrel and make concessions to regain Germany's goodwill, or Germany would call off the quarrel. The former would be a definite German success and might have demoralising effects throughout Central Europe; the latter would be a welcome settlement even if it were nothing more than a temporary truce.

Sargent also wrote in this letter that the Foreign Office had been informed that some sort of negotiations were proceeding between Prague and Berlin, but they were unsure of their basis. He added, "But if these negotiations are proceeding - and even if they are not - our instinct is that we should be well advised not to butt in with advice or assistance". To advise Czechoslovakia to

make a settlement would encourage the Germans to raise their price to more dangerous concessions; to advise Germany would label Britain as meddlesome and, to show her independence, Germany might decide to intensify the quarrel. Sargent also questioned the sincerity of the German Government's interest in the Sudeten German question and whether a settlement on these lines would really imply a durable detente between these two countries. He ended by requesting Phipps' diagnosis of the situation[66].

Phipps began his reply by redefining the "quarrel Germany suddenly picked with Czechoslovakia" as "the permanent squabble between Germany and Czechoslovakia" which had flickered up momentarily only to die down again as it is in the habit of doing". Phipps did not feel that the grievances of the Sudeten Germans entered this quarrel. He believed that Hitler was anxious to detach Czechoslovakia from France and that Goering wanted to sever the connection between Russia and the Czechs for reasons involving German air defence. The Nazi party, Phipps felt, was deeply interested in the Sudeten question, "because it is damaging to Hitler's prestige whenever the *Sudetendeutsche* raise a howl". He, nevertheless, agreed that Britain should not interfere with assistance or advice because she lacked a motive for doing so and her prospects for success were small: "Hitler is the slave of his own logical mind, and if that

mind grinds out the essential truth that it is not in Paris, or in Moscow, that the obstacle to German policy is to be found, he will not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion"[67].

Sargent, meanwhile, had written a personal letter to Hadow concerning their difference of opinion, pointing out that it was merely on the question of tactics that they disagreed; that they both would welcome a Czechoslovak-German detente in the cause of peace. "At the same time I am sure we would both agree that a detente must be honourable and durable if it is to serve the cause of peace - otherwise it will only be a snare and a delusion and fail to produce any real sense of security and confidence in Europe generally". Sargent pointed out that they disagreed on Britain's role in this problem. "The task of honest broker is at best a very thankless one and may well do more harm than good if conditions are not altogether ripe and favourable". He told Hadow that he was correct in making Benes realise the importance of a settlement of the Sudeten German problem, but that the main grievance - communist influence in Czechoslovakia (here Hadow had put an x and written in the margin, "no, main grievance is S-D) - presented a more ticklish problem. "We feel that the German campaign is insincere and unscrupulous, and we ought not to play up to it. If therefore at any time we can do anything to prevent this pernicious propaganda from spreading to this country it is all to the good". Sargent then repeated his view on

the press problem regarding Czechoslovakia. He concluded, "I hope this letter will help to clear up any divergencies of view which there may have been between us"[68].

Hadow sent Sargent a cordial letter of thanks for his "fair-mindedness" in dealing with a junior. A note of resentment, however, can be detected in the First Secretary's defence of himself. He felt sure Sargent would believe that, in reporting in the manner that he had, he had merely tried to put the point of view of "man-on-the-spot" before the Directors. "I think I can therefore claim that you have not had many false rumours served up from this post?"[69].

The clash between Hadow and Sargent was one illustration of general differences in the Foreign Office over policy regarding Czechoslovakia, and particularly press polemics involving Germany. Not long after Hadow's objection to the article in *The Times*, an editorial written by Lord Rothermere came out in *The Daily Mail* which attacked Czech policy as well as criticising Czechoslovakia as a whole, referring to it as a "spurious country"[70]. When Phipps wrote that the article was being reprinted prominently in Germany, Bramwell minuted that no great harm may have been done by it, although Rothermere might be dropped a hint from the Foreign Office. O'Malley wrote that he had no doubt that it was prompted by *The Times* article which Hadow had objected to, "and I cannot help feeling that appearance

of Lord Rothermere's article and the fillip which it has given to polemics on the Continent goes a good way to justify the apprehensions expressed by Mr. Hadow in his telegram No.9 Saving, for which he was rather heavily rebuked". Sargent minuted, however, "my view is that it is not the article in *The Times* but the German propaganda against Czechoslovakia which has made Lord Rothermere hoist the white flag and advocate surrender. He always reacts to threats in this way" (Vansittart wrote in the margin, "Yes, I am afraid he is remarkably yellow"). Sargent continued, "I still consider the 'Times' article to be useful and timely as a counterpoise to German propaganda, and in view of Lord Rothermere's article, I am not at all sure that the process ought not be repeated"[71].

Vansittart, during this time, was usually in agreement with Sargent, but, like Hadow, more inclined to get involved in the question of the Sudeten Germans. Although he was not impressed with Addison, he felt it was important to continually impress on Benes and the Czech Minister in London Jan Masaryk the danger of their policy, and, as shown earlier, he respected the integrity of Henlein. When Hadow suggested an approach to France to put joint pressure on the Czech Government in 1936, Vansittart agreed with Sargent that the French would resent such a proposal, but he wrote that the Czechs were "asking for trouble". While he felt it best to leave the French out of the matter, he did

write, "Let us go at it ourselves and, as Mr. O'Malley suggests, stick to it"[72]. But Vansittart, despite his concern for the Sudeten Germans, was averse to any arrangement with Germany. Towards the end of 1937 he even grew a little disillusioned with Henlein whom he basically still believed was sincere, but felt the SdP Leader's arguments were growing out of focus.

Vansittart's disillusionment reflected a general feeling in the Foreign Office of wariness regarding the form of appeasement the British Government had begun to pursue, accompanied by doubt regarding previous assessments of the Sudeten German case in Czechoslovakia. Bramwell expressed growing doubts over Henlein in October 1937 mentioning proof of funds for his party coming from Germany. "Henlein, moreover," he wrote, "on the former occasion had, so he claimed, never set eyes on Hitler; they have since appeared side by side on the same platform"[73]. Hadow, meanwhile, began to sense the increasingly critical manner in which his despatches were read. In February 1937 he had sent the Foreign Office a telegram which stated that the Duchess of Atholl, having made a tour of the Balkans and Central European countries, had "revealed an overwhelming consensus of opinion" that Germany did not want to attack Czechoslovakia. Hadow wrote that Benes had emphasised to him recently that Czechoslovakia's friends were doing that country a disservice by "constantly crying wolf". Bramwell minuted, "How except by

crying wolf does Benes expect to keep his friends together?" Vansittart commented that it was not Czechoslovakia's friends but Goering who was crying wolf and that Benes ought to be told of Foreign Office information that the Germans were going to mobilise at Munich the following week[74].

Eden had taken note of criticism of Hadow and wrote to him that his telegram suffered from overemphasis, submitting points for him to use as guidance in his despatches which had been drafted by Vansittart. The first point was that, while the Foreign Office was prepared to believe that Germany did not wish to attack Czechoslovakia if this meant starting a war, their information showed that the German Government's policy was directed towards disintegration and domination of Czechoslovakia as the first step into penetration of the Danube Basin and this would be achieved, if not by peaceful means, than by force. The second point was that Benes' own lack of confidence in the situation was demonstrated by that leader's recent attempts to organise an alliance with France and the other members of the Little Entente. Hadow should thus not be surprised if the foreign press studied and discussed with anxiety the strained relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany so long as the present German campaign of abuse continued[75].

As if to soften the blow of this official censure, Hadow also received a note from Vansittart's secretary thanking him for a

memorandum on the Sudeten Germans which Vansittart had read with interest. Hadow described this note to O'Malley as "a small crumb of comfort" after the criticism he had received and complained of the difficulty of serving abroad "without much guidance from the top and very little idea of 'policy' other than Heads of Department can send out" - again, a reflection of the confusion in the Foreign Office. Hadow expressed the fear that all he had written had been ignored because of his association with Addison and he requested that O'Malley send him a note on the extent which his arguments had been listened to or rejected[76].

O'Malley replied that Hadow's letter was difficult to answer within the limits of discipline of the Office but he would try. The official view of Hadow, according to this counsellor, was that he had much ability and energy but perhaps a little too much conviction in the rightness of his recommendations and a tendency to overestimate the importance of rumours and impressions. "The word which I think would be used to describe this is 'too highly strung' or excitable, perhaps even in moments of irritation, neurotic". O'Malley continued by saying that there was a feeling that Hadow moved about the china shop, "not perhaps like a bull, but at any rate like a sheep-dog". He advised Hadow to follow the lead of the new Minister in Prague Sir Basil Newton who had "the cat touch well-developed". Of the official view regarding Czechoslovakia, he wrote Hadow that, although

he himself felt their resources for exercising a conciliatory influence were not exhausted, there was no prospect of the Foreign Office attitude being changed in any material respect unless an unexpected local event occurred or Newton indicated otherwise. Meanwhile, O'Malley advised Hadow, "be patient and keep the soft pedal down"[77].

By the autumn of 1937 when Hadow was transferred to the Foreign Office, the feeling in London, as has been shown, was that he was beginning to exceed himself in his despatches. This criticism, however, did not appear to damp his ardour in pursuing better relations between Britain and Germany. This may be due to his detection of a conflict in the Foreign Office over policy heightened by the direction adopted by the new Government in Britain. A few changes had, also, occurred in the Foreign Office. William Strang had replaced Sir Ralph Wigram as head of the Central Department when the latter died in December 1936, while Sir Alexander Cadogan became a Deputy Under-Secretary of State and would eventually replace Vansittart as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1938. If Hadow was raising doubts over his recommendations, Vansittart was making himself even more unpopular with his increasingly voiced strong opinions; and Vansittart had the disadvantage of being in disagreement with the line taken by the Government. He was also losing allies in the Foreign Office. Although unclear over what policy should be,

many found the arguments of Vansittart too forceful and direct and, perhaps, "undiplomatic". Strang later admitted his own confusion at the time: "Too many people were talking too glibly about standing up to Hitler even at the risk of war,...and when the United Kingdom went to war, she, unlike some other countries, put her whole fortune to the touch. In what causes was a government justified in running that hazard?"[78].

Hadow came up against criticism from Sargent, Vansittart, and even Eden; but Vansittart was soon to be muffled by the creation of a new less influential post, Eden would resign in 1938, and Sargent's opinions lessened in effect with the growth of appeasement. Just after Hadow's transfer to London in September 1937 an article appeared in the newspaper *The Week* which reported "Even more troublesome to the Czechs have been the activities of a certain British diplomatic official who they knew to be an enthusiastic advocate of Herr Henlein. Their relief at his recent removal from Prague has been scarcely disguised. It remains to be seen however, whether the removal of this undiplomatic diplomat will make any difference in the attitude of the Legation"[79]. Hadow's removal, in fact, made small difference. Despite a greater sympathy towards Benes, the "cat-like" Newton already had a reputation as a former counsellor in Berlin for "explaining" German behaviour as opposed to condemning it[80], and in November 1937 was asking Sargent if it

would not be in the Czechs' better interest to get on better terms with Germany "even at some cost to their independence"[81]. Hadow, on his return to London, found encouragement in the attitude of the Government, and, despite the conflicting opinion of his new boss Collier in the Northern Department, pursued appeasement with even greater fervour and less discretion.

Advantageous Confusion

By the time Hadow was transferred to London, the system within the Foreign Office had become complicated. Lord Gladwyn, who was then private secretary to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1938, describes the system in his memoirs, noting that all papers of importance were meant to come up to the Secretary of State through the Permanent Under-Secretary and Private Secretaries. The two Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State had the right of direct access to the Secretary of State, and the latter could send for heads of departments and discuss matters with them, but the result would normally come down through the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. "This system not unnaturally resulted in a terrible bottle-neck, Gladwyn writes. As the war approached in 1938 and the work became more feverish, the congestion grave". It requires little imagination to see how Hadow, with his strong views on the European situation and belief in the danger towards which Britain was heading, failed to resist

the temptation to avoid official channels in his efforts to promote quicker and more decisive action. Gladwyn describes the "mountains" of red-labelled red boxes piled up on the P.U.S.'s desk as frequently depressing to his boss (from the beginning of 1938) Sir Alexander Cadogan, and admits that he often, in helping out, used a special stamp marked "seen by Sir A. Cadogan" which Gladwyn initialled himself and later explained to Cadogan[82].

The promotion of Cadogan to Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1938 came as the result of the creation of a new post for Vansittart. In 1937 Chamberlain offered him the post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser and many believe it was an attempt to silence Vansittart. Oliver Harvey wrote at the time, "No one so much as hints at the truth, which is that he has been sidetracked. In fact, the suggestion is so much the other way - that he is now permanently and exclusively to advise the Secretary of State that I think something must be done through Press to restore the balance and show that Alec [Cadogan] will be what the P.U.S. has always been, and Van a supernumerary adviser en mange of the machine who will advise and function *only if and when asked*" [83].

1938 also brought the resignation of Eden due to a growing rift between the Foreign Secretary and Chamberlain on foreign policy and Italy. Eden had not approved of the sending of Halifax to meet Hitler in November 1937 and was particularly

disappointed at Chamberlain's rebuff of an offer from President Roosevelt in January 1938 for an arrangement of a collective discussion on the underlying causes of discontent in Europe. These differences were contributing irritants to Eden's profound disapproval of Chamberlain's intention to conciliate Mussolini. Chamberlain was of the opinion that a renewal of the Stresa Front through increased Anglo-Italian cooperation was desirable in the face of possible German expansion, while Eden disliked the idea of making any approaches to Mussolini, feeling instead that the dictators should be faced up to. As early as November 1937 Chamberlain had expressed his dissatisfaction to Eden that the Foreign Office never made a genuine effort to get together with the dictators[84] and Eden often complained that his colleagues were "dictator-minded"[85]. The rift between Eden and Chamberlain on this subject was so deep by February 1938 that, with the recommendation of the Prime Minister, Eden handed in his resignation on February 20. Eden had, in fact, increasingly minuted agreement with Sargent's opinions on the Prague despatches from 1936 to 1937 and his resignation speech illustrates a growing disillusionment with the policy of appeasement: "Of late the conviction has steadily grown upon me that there has been too keen a desire on our part to make terms with others, rather than that others should make terms with us...I do not believe that we can make progress in European

appeasement...if we allow the impression to gain currency abroad that we yield to constant pressure"[86]. Eden was replaced by Halifax.

During the first half of 1938 Hadow appeared to be towing the line in the Foreign Office and putting his views through the official channels. This is not to say that he had abandoned outside contacts - these, in fact, increased during this year - but he carried on with routine expression of his ideas to those immediately in charge. In April he again received criticism from Sargent when he wrote a memorandum which attempted to answer questions put to him by Strang about Czechoslovakia. Hadow wrote that he was convinced that Germany's main object was still accurately summarised in a statement attributed to the German Ambassador in Angora: "No territorial questions exist for Germany in respect of Czechoslovakia, but Germany cannot view with indifference a state of affairs in which a German Minority is held in subjection by Czechs", and went on to explain the need for a negotiated settlement on this matter with the promptings or actual involvement of Britain and to analyse possible foreign assistance to Czechoslovakia if that country were attacked. Sargent minuted that the memorandum was a very useful statement of the problem, "although I am not personally prepared to agree entirely with Mr. Hadow's analysis or conclusions".

Sargent, in fact, made several marginal comments on the memorandum. On the question of defence of Czechoslovakia Hadow reiterated his view that there was no possibility of direct help from France, "whose army will moreover not face the appalling casualties that would result from an attack on the 'German Maginot Line', in support of a distant Slav people", and Sargent commented, "But the German 'Maginot' line is not ready yet". He then went on to query Hadow's assertion that the Czech Government had kept local representatives of the minorities out of office, and, where Hadow had listed the concessions he felt the Czech Government should make out of necessity, Sargent questioned the results Hadow foresaw from them as well as their desirability. One was that, as the outcome of granting full democratic rights, Czech domination in Czechoslovakia would be at an end, and "M. Benes and his Czech National-Socialist Party would go down before their bitter enemies the Agrarians who, for some time past have demanded a truce with Germany and been fought tooth and nail by the President, who hates Germany with 'historical' Slav hatred". Sargent wrote next to this, "Isn't this a bit overstated?", and further on, when Hadow wrote that Czechoslovakia would be left a "rump" state, powerless to defy German arrogance and "compelled at all times to do as Germany bids in destroying more especially Communist Propaganda such as we know emanates from Prague today", Sargent commented,

"Do we wish to see such a rump state?". Finally, when Hadow concluded that he had tried to show how tempted Benes was "to pursue the policy that would be as fatal to his country, and to Europe as a whole, as was the 30 Years War which started in 1618 in Prague", Sargent remarked, "If I have not forgotten my history, the 30 Years War was fatal to Germany and highly beneficial to France"[87].

Although Sargent remained more influential in the Foreign Office than Vansittart in 1938, his criticism by this time had little effect in discouraging Hadow's promotion of appeasement. This is partly due to Sargent's nature which was philosophical as opposed to Vansittart's crusading attitude. Although he fervently upheld his theory of foreign policy, he tended to shrug his shoulders if it did not penetrate the higher echelons of the decision-making process. According to Vansittart, Sargent was "a philosopher strayed into Whitehall. He knew all the answers; when politicians did not want them he went out to lunch"[88]. Although this cleared the path somewhat for Hadow, it was an approach that he would have found totally alien to his own character. Rather like Vansittart, Hadow railroaded his opinions onto all he felt would or should listen, pretty much regardless of who they were or what their views might be.

If strong anti-appeasers within the Foreign Office such as

Sargent and Vansittart felt isolated in 1938, Hadow was no less alone in this institution in his vigorous promotion of appeasement. O'Malley had been transferred to Mexico, and if some in the Foreign Office were in agreement with Hadow, it was likely to be only partial agreement and too deliberative for his impulsive nature. Appeals to figures outside the Foreign Office, therefore, increased during this year and that Hadow relied heavily on the tact and discretion of his unofficial associates is apparent. Such were the problems in the Foreign Office that Hadow was not caught out and reprimanded until October of that year when Cadogan wrote a personal note of rebuke to him. "I much regret to note your lack of confidence in me", began the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, going on to state that he had several times asked Hadow to put any ideas or suggestions to him, preferably through the relevant Department. "I suppose you think that this is sheer bureaucracy and that I should sit on your communications", wrote Cadogan, "But I am sorry to say that I must insist. It will really be quite impossible to conduct this Office if everyone who has ideas - possible very good ones - fires them off at [R.A.]Butler or [Lord]Hutchison without reference to the proper quarters. Believe me that won't lead to efficiency in the end". Cadogan added, "Anyhow, I won't have it: so don't do it again"[89]. That same day the Permanent Under-Secretary recorded in his diary, "Got through some work and cursed J[ohn]

Balfour and Hadow for airing their views promiscuously on conduct of foreign policy"[90].

Cadogan had obviously discovered that Hadow was corresponding with Lord Hutchison* and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State R.A. Butler. After Cadogan's reprimand Butler returned an enclosure that Hadow had sent him and wrote, "Thank you for your letter and enclosure which I return. I am sure that if you have any suggestions to put forward they will receive every consideration if they go through the proper channels, since the work of the Office must be conducted in this way". As Butler had been receiving information from Hadow since at least May of that year he must have been aware of the hypocritical tone of this typed note and added in writing underneath, "I return Alec's letter and thank you very much personally for all your help and care"[91].

That Hadow managed to escape censure during most of 1938 is a reflection on the workings of the Foreign Office by this time and the inherent difficulties it was facing which were complicated by the advent of Chamberlain. The Foreign Office's loss of power during the 1930s was partly due to an increasing mistrust of "secret diplomacy" which caused the British Government to try and adapt itself more fully to the demands of public opinion, and less to the personal analyses of permanent officials. When Chamberlain assumed power, the official lines of

* Paymaster General

communication were increasingly by-passed. "Uncooperative" people such as Eden and Vansittart were circumvented or excluded from private consultation, while unofficial channels were created in order that Chamberlain might successfully carry out his policies with little or no obstruction. John Connell writes in *The 'Office'* that, although the Foreign Office continued to carry out its numerous duties, "from the beginning of 1938 until Chamberlain's fall, it had no say in the handling of the all-important issue of Anglo-German relations"[92].

Hadow was at least subconsciously aware of this development and took full advantage of it, basing his motives on patriotism. He also adopted the impatience, characteristic of politicians during this time, of opposing forces in the Foreign Office; the pro-Germanism versus anti-Germanism and pro-French versus anti-French. Such a dichotomy of opinion hindered any action taken by the Foreign Office, and Hadow had grown single-minded in calling for definite moves by Britain. His behaviour in London, as a result, had become more fanatical and less discreet.

5 London: Mood of Desperation

With the increasing tension regarding German ambitions and the uncertain state of Europe in the late 1930s, the threat of war loomed large over the policy makers in Britain, and their actions became more frantic and less reasoned. Hadow's reports and correspondence after he was transferred to London in October 1937 reflected this characteristic to a large degree, and his strictures became more adamant, almost as if he needed to convince himself as much as his colleagues. There was, perhaps, a subconscious awareness in Hadow that his recommendations for Britain were undergoing a subtle but definite change; the actions taken by Britain had become increasingly dependent on reaction from Germany and policy steadily began to hinge on guesses as to that country's next move. Hadow's recommendations, although active in the sense that this country should initiate cooperation in various ways, were, on the other hand, passive in their reliance on Germany's acquiescence. If he was aware of this change, Hadow gave no indication in his reports; however, the fact that he had become so vociferous indicates that he was attempting to drown out the increased misgivings over dealing with Hitler so subserviently. His outward reason for this would have been that such criticism was dangerous in its pessimism and more likely to bring on war. Any

misgivings over the policy of appeasement which he himself might have felt are never apparent in his papers during this crucial time, and it seems that he remained absolutely unshaken in support of it right up to and even after the outbreak of war in September 1939.

Anschluss to May Crisis

By the time he was transferred to London in October 1937, Hadow was convinced that Germany desired cooperation and the preservation of peace. Evidence to the contrary was ignored or dismissed, while any indication of peaceful intentions on the part of Germany were highlighted. Hadow, thus, drew attention to the statement by Ogilvie-Forbes, in Berlin, that Germany hoped to realise her aims by peaceful means and without conflict. Hadow noted, "This surely denotes a very considerable change in her attitude and gives H.M.G. [the] opportunity to negotiate and to influence Hitler"[1]. A meeting recorded by Hitler's military Adjutant Friedrich Hossbach on November 5, 1937, however, indicated otherwise. In this meeting between Hitler, his Minister of War, Foreign Minister, and Chiefs of three branches of the armed forces, there was, in fact, no more talk of wanting to cooperate with Britain or pressure her into an alliance. It was decided instead that Britain and France would always oppose Germany and would yield no colonies until faced with the threat

of superior force. Both, however, were momentarily weak; thus, force alone could solve the problem. Britain was still not regarded as an enemy but this possibility had increased, and she was to be pushed into remaining in a position of neutrality[2].

Hadow, meanwhile, remained oblivious and in February 1938 reiterated his opinion that Germany was seeking friendship with Britain. He wrote that he had received a clear indication from a high German official of exasperation on the part of Hitler at the unwillingness of British policy-makers to see nothing good in anything that Germany did. This official, according to Hadow, was "bitterly vehement" and asked, "more in despair than in anger" when Britain would deal with Germany "as a willing partner in the concert of Europe, but one no longer willing to be treated as a fraudulent bankrupt, a pariah, or an office-boy". Hadow had received the impression from this conversation that, unless advances towards cooperation were begun without delay, war was imminent[3].

Efforts towards this end had, in fact, already been begun by Chamberlain in November 1937 (ironically just after Hitler's Conference of November 5) in the arrangements of talks between Edward Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, and Hitler. Halifax stressed the cooperation of Britain and Germany as a common front against Bolshevism and gave his assurance that Britain would not object to German claims in Central and Eastern Europe if these were

realised peacefully. But Hitler was not to be won round to the idea of peaceful, political, and economic supremacy over Central and Eastern Europe as he hoped to subjugate these areas in the shadow of British neutrality. The British call for Germany to cooperate in creating world peace, thus, met with little enthusiasm from the Fuhrer as it contradicted the latter's programme and policy towards Britain[4]. He had now turned his attention to Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Apart from Chamberlain's belief in the prime importance of British cooperation with Germany, other considerations were having their influence on British policy and encouraging Hadow to continue his consistently less diplomatic pursuit of such a course. In December 1937 the British Cabinet reviewed its foreign and defence policies, having studied a memorandum prepared by the Minister for Coordination of Defence. The memorandum stated that British Naval, Military and Air Forces were still far from sufficient to meet defensive commitments and the Chiefs of Staff could not foresee the time when British defence forces would be strong enough to fight Germany, Italy, and Japan simultaneously. A strong appeal was made for foreign policy to be governed by the consideration of Britain's weakness in defence. Although attempts had been made or were being made to conciliate Japan and Italy, it was generally felt that Germany was the real key to the question[5].

Hadow had either reached these same conclusions on his own or been aware of them as a reinforcement of his views on the European situation. He, at any rate, felt confident enough to put forward a plan for the formation of an Anglo-Franco-German Triangle of which Britain would be the base. On terms of absolute equality between the three with Britain taking the role of fair mediator, Germany, Hadow felt, was ready " - while pandering as hitherto to Signor Mussolini's vanity - to put the Rome-Berlin axis back into its proper place (that of an important but subsidiary ideological agreement between two Fascist states)"[6]. At the end of 1937, however, Italy had joined Japan and Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact and Italo-German cooperation was of greater strength and significance than Hadow realised. As shown before, Hitler had now decided to face away from London and the implications of this policy were not lost on Italy. After Mussolini joined the Anti-Comintern Pact, Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister proclaimed, "Three nations are embarking together on a path which may perhaps lead them to war. A war necessary in order to break through the crust which is stifling the energy and the aspirations of the younger nations"[7]. The cooperation of Italy with Germany also gave Hitler a freer hand with Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Hadow's error of judgment on the Italo-German alliance may be seen as a reflection of his (and the British Government's)

basic error in regard to Germany. Hitler had set his course of expansion taking into account the strong possibility of war, and the more Britain and France attempted to conciliate this leader the more encouraged he felt to take risks in the face of such obvious desires for peace. Hadow's belief in the German desire for peace being equal to that of Britain and France was becoming increasingly contradictory to the evidence of Hitler's actions which were governed more by the intention of intimidating these countries into noninterference.

There were still, however, a few outwards signs that Germany could be mollified. Hadow may well have attached too much importance to the fact that the head of the German Foreign Office von Weizsacker was still, at the end of 1937 and beginning of 1938, defining German wishes in traditional Great Power terms. Acquiescence to German demands on the colonies and her Eastern policy, for example, were to be extorted from Britain in return for a compromise on arms agreement - a compromise to which Chamberlain was inclined. Goering had announced these demands in a talk with the U.S. Ambassador to Berlin William Bullitt, and it was only after Ribbentrop failed to get the sort of alliance with Britain Hitler was hoping for in January 1938 that a sign of his real policy appeared in his replacement of the more moderate Neurath with the anti-British Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister.

The Austrian *Anschluss* of March 1938 was the first clear-cut indication of Hitler's progressive plan of aggression which confronted Hadow in that year. Schuschnigg had in 1936 concluded an agreement with Hitler in which the latter publicly recognised the independence and integrity of Austria in return for which the Austrian Chancellor conceded that Austria was a German state and would guide its future foreign policy on this basis. The takeover of Austria, however, had become a factor high on Hitler's agenda by the end of 1937.

In January 1938 the Austrian police uncovered plans to provoke government repression on a scale that would bring in the German army, including the convenient murder of the German ambassador von Papen. Finding himself in a difficult position, Schuschnigg tried to seek further compromises with Germany and agreed to meet Hitler in Berchtesgaden. The Austrian leader was met with a barrage of threats and an ultimatum involving the signing of a prepared agreement on Austro-German relations. On March 9 Schuschnigg, in a gesture of desperation and defiance, arranged a plebiscite for March 13, calling on his countrymen to vote for "a free and German independent and social, Christian and united Austria", and arranged the conditions of the plebiscite in a way likely to give him an overwhelming vote of confidence[8]. On March 11 Germany closed the frontier and massed troops. Schuschnigg resigned and was replaced by the Nazi agent

Seyss-Inquart. Schuschnigg announced that his country was yielding to force. The following day Hitler invaded and on March 13 Austria was declared to be a province of the German Reich.

During this crisis Schuschnigg had asked the British Government for advice. He received the answer, "His Majesty's Government cannot take responsibility of advising the Chancellor to take any course of action which might expose his country to dangers against which [they] are unable to guarantee protection"[9]. Many in the British Foreign Office and Government, in fact, felt an Austro-German union was inevitable and the wish of the majority of Austria. Chamberlain had remarked to a guest at a luncheon held in Ribbentrop's honour on March 11, "Once we have all got past this unpleasant affair and a reasonable solution has been found, it is to be hoped that we can begin working in earnest towards a German-British understanding"[10].

The takeover of Austria confirmed Chamberlain in his belief that he must try harder to get on good terms with Italy. German action, he told the Cabinet, made international appeasement harder; "In spite of it all, however, he felt that this thing had to come. Nothing short of an overwhelming display of force would have stopped it"[11]. Hadow, meanwhile, made his opinion clear even before the *Anschluss* : "As an essentially Germanic country, with a traditional contempt for Italy...Austria

was bound, ever since 1934, gradually to come to terms with Germany"[12].

Hadow's attitude was echoed fairly substantially in Britain as illustrated in a letter from Thomas Moore to *The Times* which stated that Hitler was only doing what the people affected wanted: "If the Austrian people had not welcomed this union, physical opposition and bloodshed must have occurred...[this] proves, I submit, the inherent desire of the two nations to secure the *Anschluss* of which they have been so long deprived...Let us therefore consider and assess the benefits with which Austria and Europe are confronted before allotting blame for a development which in the end may prove a decisive factor in European appeasement"[13].

Hadow wrote a similar letter to *The Times* addressing those "who persistently attack Germany for her 'rape' of Austria". He pointed out the example of the manifesto issued by the Roman Catholic Bishops in Austria which "joyfully" recognised that the National Socialist movement was doing great things for all classes of the German people. The Bishops, Hadow wrote, could not have signed this document unless their consciences were clear: "Surely then they are better fitted to represent to the World the feelings of the majority of their fellow-countrymen than the foreigners who continue to maintain that freedom, self-determination and independence were all

ruthlessly trampled under foot by Germany...?". Hadow felt that these "foreigners" would do better to wait "until deeds have shown whether or no the union of the two lands is for the greater good of the greater number, in Austria as well as in Germany? I leave the answer to fair-minded Britons in the hope that, by their needs and by propagating their views they will strike a blow for the cause of peace"[14].

Not all in Britain, however, took Hadow's view. Vansittart, had warned during the crisis, "we are incurring an enormous responsibility in not speaking to Hitler a great deal more firmly and explicitly than we have yet done in this matter...If he is not checked by being brought up against hard reality, he may carry himself and everyone else into disaster. I urge that we should take the proper step to obviate this before it is too late"[15]. *The Spectator* was of the opinion that the *Anschluss* was "a violation of repeated pledges and it makes every future undertaking by Germany worthless and irrelevant"[16], while the First Lord of the Admiralty Alfred Duff Cooper urged Chamberlain to respond by increasing Britain's naval construction programme and making a statement to the effect that if France fought Germany over Czechoslovakia, Britain would fight also[17].

If Hadow had been aware of the dictators' view of Britain and the *Anschluss* his complacency over this matter might have been a little disrupted. On March 12 Ciano had noted in his diary,

"I am convinced that Great Britain will accept what has happened with indignant resignation"[18]. After the invasion when Hitler was asked how Europe would react he replied, "England has sent me a protest. I would have understood a declaration of war; to a protest I shall not even reply"[19].

The argument that the British appeasers saw only what they wished to see is not least applicable in Hadow's case. The First Secretary had convinced himself by 1938 first, that the claims of Henlein and the SdP were genuine; second, that immediate concessions to this minority were vital; third, that Hitler's intentions were primarily peaceful but he could not ignore the plight of the Sudeten Germans; fourth, that any association with the Soviet Union was dangerous; and fifth, the peace of Europe could only be maintained through the virtual sacrifice of Czechoslovakia.

Not unpredictably, Hadow wrote that he regarded Prague as the principal danger spot of Europe and one on which every amount of pressure should be exerted "in order to prevent a still-possible internal settlement between Czechs and Germans....from being superseded by a German ultimatum which might plunge Europe into a war of direct concern to Great Britain". In Hadow's opinion, in the event of a conflict, Czechoslovakia was without allies to afford her military help, "for the Little Entente and Great Britain definitely cannot come to her

help and remilitarisation of the Rhineland means German fortifications at least equal to the Maginot Line with the result that the French peasant is recognised in France...to be unwilling to sacrifice himself by an attack on Germany 'on behalf of Czechoslovakia'"[20]. Hadow still believed that the SdP and Germany were keen on a settlement and it was Czech recalcitrance that was hindering this opportunity.

The German plan for Czechoslovakia, however, was far more premeditated than Hadow realised. Hitler's antagonism towards the Czechs was profound and longstanding and the lack of defensive strength from the Little Entente was partly due to Nazi diplomatic machinations. Hitler had already begun a lengthy and persistent effort to persuade the Hungarians to reach an accommodation with Yugoslavia in the hope of focussing Hungary's revisionist aspirations against Czechoslovakia and disrupting the Little Entente. Meanwhile, he hoped to improve relations with Yugoslavia and take advantage of Czech-Polish antagonism. As shown earlier, when the Czechs had attempted negotiations with Hitler, the latter had no interest in tying his own hands and allowed the discussions to peter out.

The building up of Germany's military forces was the main element in Hitler's policy toward Czechoslovakia in 1937 and German military planning specified Czechoslovakia as its immediate target. By the beginning of 1938 Hitler was explicit in

stating that the major issue in German foreign policy was the destruction of Czechoslovakia and, contrary to Hadow's belief in the sincere concern of Germany for her cousins in the Sudetenland, the Sudeten Germans were to serve as the tool for broader goals. Hadow echoed the belief of the British Government that all steps to conciliate the Sudeten Germans were necessary in order to remove the German pretext to Czechoslovakia and to gain time.

Just after the *Anschluss* in March 1938, Oliver Harvey, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, recorded in his diary, "Moley [Sargent] has put up a paper urging that we should announce that if France is attacked by Germany as a result of her going to the support of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked German aggression, Great Britain would support France...I do not believe a direct guarantee of Czechoslovakia is possible - but this is also the least we should do if we are to stop the rot"[21]. A policy of firmness in this respect, however, was not the desire of the British Government despite the *Anschluss*; any alienation of Germany was still considered a bad idea. Nevertheless, the events of March 1938 made the question of Czechoslovakia more acute and Britain was confronted with a crude dilemma in her foreign policy: if Germany was not deterred by a warning from Britain could she be challenged? Chamberlain and Halifax, unwilling to accept the inevitability of war, regarded such a

possibility as too dangerous as they were reluctant to give up hope of agreement with Germany and failed to perceive that Germany might expand into non-Germanic territory. Chamberlain wrote to his sister on the impracticality of firm assurance given collectively to Czechoslovakia: "You have only to look at the map to see that nothing that France or we could do could possibly save Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the Germans, if they wanted to do it"[22].

As yet unaware of the Prime Minister's decision not to make any promises in defence of Czechoslovakia, Hadow, during the rumours of a possible British guarantee to Czechoslovakia, frantically and constantly warned against such a step. On March 18 he wrote that, without British promises, France was helpless in defence of Czechoslovakia because her air force was far inferior to that of Germany and therefore could not fly across German territory to assist in defending Czechoslovakia, nor could she get her troops to Czech territory through Yugoslavia or Roumania as neither were willing to risk war with Italy or Germany "in order to help an ally of Moscow whom, above all other countries, their Governments hate and fear"[23]. On March 22 Hadow wrote to the Minister for Air, Kingsley Wood, that, as the Cabinet appeared to be considering a guarantee to Czechoslovakia, he felt justified in enclosing telegrams which showed that "Yugoslavia would do nothing to antagonise Germany, that Hungary is watching her opportunity,

as we also know that Bulgaria is doing; while Roumania is apathetic so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned"[24].

On the question of Little Entente assistance as well as help from Hungary and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia was isolated to a certain degree. As regards Russia and Germany, Yugoslavia, for example, preferred the latter connection and from 1936 secret negotiations had begun between the two, while an agreement was reached between Italy and Yugoslavia in March 1936. The Yugoslavian Foreign Minister had decided that the Rome-Berlin axis would guard Yugoslavia against communism, while her treaty with Italy would guard her against Germany, and he seemed to have already written off Czechoslovakia. From 1935 Bulgaria had established good relations with Germany and in January 1937 signed a treaty with Yugoslavia promising that "inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship" would reign between these two countries[25].

Hungary felt herself to have claims over Slovakia and Ruthenia in Czechoslovakia and Hitler had told Hungary that Germany recognised these claims, as it was in his interest to get this country to come in at the appropriate moment and complete the elimination of the Czech state while demonstrating its artificial and unnatural character. At the same time Hungary was engaged in 1938 in private exchanges with the Poles over the division of Czechoslovakia, although these were not always

cordial. Roumania was probably the safest of Czechoslovakia's allies but even this country was admittedly uncertain in its relations with her neighbour. Germany had run across difficulties in trying to persuade Roumania to join her camp, but defence by this country of Czechoslovakia did not seem anywhere near a certainty and Roumania's reluctance in this respect is underlined by her refusal to allow Russian troops to cross her land. By May 1938 the Roumanians had promised not to intervene in a localised German-Czech encounter but also declined to commit themselves any further.

Any Russian assistance, in the meantime, was dependent on France honouring her obligations towards Czechoslovakia first, and the latter occurrence had become increasingly doubtful after March 1938. There was also the further possibility that, after Stalin's purges, which greatly reduced his military staff, the Soviet Union would remain reluctant to become embroiled in any conflict, regardless of France's actions. Hadow was, thus, partially correct in his assessment of Czechoslovakia's situation in the event of aggression, but arguably wrong in the conclusions he, in turn, drew.

On March 24 an article appeared in *The Daily Telegraph* which stated the Prime Minister would declare that day in the House of Commons that, though Britain's commitment to help Czechoslovakia would not be automatic, she would help France in

case of German action if Berlin did not come to terms with Prague. Hadow, upon reading this, immediately sent a note to Lord Hutchison urging him to point out to Chamberlain that, as of that day, "virtually the ENTIRE GERMAN MINORITY of Czechoslovakia is demanding its rights as Czechoslovak citizens" to which the Czech reply was apparently to form a purely Czech Cabinet. "The result is a foregone conclusion: unless Britain forces Prague by its sage advice to grant these rights Germany will sooner or later demand them on behalf of her fellow-Germans, the Czechs will appeal to France for help or start hostilities to engage France, and Great Britain will be drawn into an European war on the side of a Government which is denying their rights to a large percentage of its citizens"[26].

Chamberlain's statement, in fact, turned out to include not as firm a commitment as Hadow feared. The Prime Minister enumerated the British obligations which might lead to the use of force and included the case of Czechoslovakia, but British obligations in this question were not automatic. The Government had actually decided against it on the grounds that it would deprive them of control over the important question of foreign policy in relation to the area where vital interests were not concerned to the same degree as France and Belgium. Chamberlain did add, however, that the "inexorable pressure of facts might well prove more powerful than formal

pronouncements", and admitted that other countries not party to the dispute could become involved[27].

Hadow described Chamberlain's speech as "admirable" and felt that the "mass of moderate opinion" in Britain had, no doubt, interpreted it as a "statesmanlike warning to Europe that Britain would not participate in any European war unless this country were satisfied of the justice of the cause which it was being asked to champion and of its vital interest to Great Britain and its ally France alike". He warned, however, of the "unwarrantable" interpretation of this speech which had been taken by "certain sections of French, Belgian and Government-controlled Czech Press, whose articles seek to read into Mr. Chamberlain's words an implied pledge 'more efficacious and binding' than even the unwise guarantee which interventionists had sought to wring from Great Britain". To Hadow, the implications of this contention had been brought out by "information from well informed political circles in Paris" to the effect that the French Foreign Minister Monsieur Paul-Boncour had recently assured some of his deputies of his intention "not only to go to the assistance of Czechoslovakia whether or not France were herself the victim of aggression, but also to use Great Britain's Locarno and League obligations as a means of ensuring that France would be certain, in such [a] case, of automatic British support". To Hadow, this was tantamount to

giving a blank cheque to Benes signed by France and endorsed by Britain[28].

Early in April Chamberlain, as if sharing Hadow's fears of misinterpretation of Britain's policy, made clearer his intentions in regard to Czechoslovakia in a speech he made in Birmingham. Chamberlain stated that a warning to Germany was a gamble, not with money, but with lives, and he would not give the world to face "the stern necessity for war" unless he was "absolutely convinced that in no other way could we preserve our liberty"[29]. To Chamberlain, it was of primary importance first to urge more concessions to the Sudeten Germans on Prague. He had already written to his sister that he was prepared to approach Hitler and say "The best thing you can do is tell us exactly what you want for your Sudeten Germans. If it is reasonable we will urge the Czechs to accept and if they do, you must give assurances that you will let them alone in the future"[30]. The Foreign Office was, meanwhile, discussing what concessions Prague should be encouraged to make. Harvey wrote at this time, "geographically they [the Sudeten Germans] are hardly suitably placed for autonomy unless perhaps through a cantonal system like Switzerland, though here again any cohesive element such as common patriotism or common fear is lacking"[31].

To Hadow, immediate concessions to the SdP, however damaging to the Czech state, were vital, and he communicated

this to Sir Robert Kingsley Wood, Minister of Air, just as the British Government was on the verge of discussions with France on foreign policy. Hadow wrote that British advice to France and Czechoslovakia should be: "In your own interests we can do no more, and nor should Paris, than advise M. Benes to negotiate with the Minorities without further delay and on a basis of complete neutralisation of Czechoslovakia"[32]. The Anglo-French discussions took place on April 28 and 29, and the British goal in these had been decided as securing the support of the French in urging Prague in accommodation of the Sudeten Germans while at the same time informing Berlin of this in order to make Germany more patient over the question. This, of course, fit right in with Hitler's plan of gradual pressure and propaganda leading to a crisis of which he could take full advantage.

It may be that Hadow's convictions made him particularly blind to signals the Foreign Office had been receiving from Germany, for example, the German writer Ernst Jackh had been bringing reports to the Foreign Office from Germany since the mid-1930s. Jackh was a member of the Nazi Party but apparently not a complete follower of Hitler. Ernst Woermann, the German Charge d'Affairs in London had told Jackh in confidence in January 1937: "in a few years time Germany would have to attack Czechoslovakia in order to penetrate into the Danube basin. She would not, however, do this until she had assured herself of

Britain's friendship. She would be prepared to risk French and Russian intervention as long as we [Britain] stood aloof". Jackh had passed this information on to the Foreign Office but it was either ignored or accepted with equanimity. In March 1938 the word came again from Woermann that slices of Czechoslovakia would go to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, while the rest would be partitioned; "Such a policy might lead to a world war, but that depended on Great Britain. Hitler's task was to prepare the situation and choose his time so that Great Britain could be kept out"[33].

A further example is information the Foreign Office received early in May 1938 regarding a conversation between a British official and the former German monarchist Kleist-Schmenzin. The German had stated just after the *Anschluss* : "Hitler has his plans against France, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Russia, against England and the new world. He wants to annex Canada and Siberia". Czechoslovakia was the next step: "One thing I know for certain. If England says no, if only through diplomatic channels, the adventure must be put off. Hitler has admitted this, and what he fears like the plague is that England will caution him...The army has few reservists and no reserves of material...The people are against war...The Nazis bluff...The British Government alone can throw it[a sheet anchor] to them [the General Staff] by a firmly spoken word". The sense of

this conversation was forwarded to London but nowhere is it produced in public documents[34]. Hadow must have been exposed to at least some of this information; however, his own opinions seemed to remain unshaken: that German intentions were mainly based upon fear of Soviet expansion, and in the case of Czechoslovakia, Germany wished to leave the Sudeten Germans as Czechoslovak citizens for "economic reasons"[35].

After the Anglo-French meeting on April 28-29, the opinion had been gaining ground that Henlein could be used to get a settlement with the Czechs on the basis of autonomy. Henlein had come to London as a result of an "indirect feeler" via Hadow indicating that he (Henlein) wanted to see Vansittart, and Hadow been convinced that the SdP leader could be used in this way[36]. Henlein reassured Vansittart of his sincerity and moderate intentions and the report went back to the Cabinet that Henlein had no instructions from Berlin and Benes could get an agreement of a useful character if he would only act quickly[37]. (Henlein, in fact, stopped off in Berlin on his way back from this trip to further solidify Hitler's plans regarding Czechoslovakia)[38].

After this visit, Hadow began to express the opinion that the best solution to the problem was neutralisation of Czechoslovakia on the basis of Belgium or Switzerland; federation of that country along Swiss lines; equal treatment of all citizens of

Czechoslovakia; and the right of appeal for all Czechoslovakia's minorities to the Hague Court[39]. Others, however, were more doubtful over such a solution. According to Sargent, the examples of Belgium and Switzerland were misleading because in both cases the neutral state acted as an indispensable buffer to three jealous Great Powers who were its neighbours. "Czechoslovakia can never be in this happy position because she is absolutely alone with one single Great Power. In fact, she is not a buffer State, she is merely a barrier between Germany and her ambitions". Britain should, therefore, not persuade France and Russia to renounce their treaties with Czechoslovakia as this would mean a humiliation to both which would merely propitiate Germany. Vansittart agreed with Sargent and added, "I disagree with Mr. Newton that we can afford to lose any more prestige. We have practically none left anywhere as it is"[40].

On May 19, 1938 the British Acting Consul in Dresden reported there was reason to believe that German troops were concentrating in Southern Silesia and Northern Austria. The British Consul-General in Vienna reported a convoy of German lorries moving towards the Czech border. On May 20 the Czech Ministry for Foreign Affairs reported concentrations of German troops in Saxony. The Czechs responded with partial mobilisation on their borders, and tension was heightened in the frontier regions when two Sudeten Germans on motorcycles were shot by

Czech policemen after refusing to stop. Henlein had, at the same time, broken off negotiations with the Czech Government which made the situation look ominous. The French panicked as they had no wish to interfere, and Bonnet urged the Czechs not to mobilise. He further told the British Ambassador that "if Czechoslovakia were really unreasonable the French Government might well declare that France considered herself released from her bond"[41].

The British Government, however, acted with surprising firmness and on May 21 decided to warn Germany. The French were to honour their obligation under the alliance treaty with Czechoslovakia and under these circumstances Britain would probably become involved. Ribbentrop was warned personally by Halifax that if, "from any precipitate action" general conflict arose, Britain would not stand aside[42]. The German Secretary of State received the warnings angrily and refused to urge Henlein to resume negotiations, professing his indifference to the possibility of war[43]. The danger of future German action seemed imminent but the Germans were not ready at this point and did not move, and by May 23 the heat had gone out of the crisis.

The reactions to this crisis in the Foreign Office were mixed. On May 20 Hadow received a copy of a telegram from Newton in Prague that stated that the Czech press was urging its

Government to take sterner measures regarding the SdP, and noted the Germans could use the argument that they were only intervening to maintain order in Czechoslovakia: "In fact if the Germans are out for trouble they can have it easily in either way. If Czechs maintain order and bloodshed results Hitler will 'act like lightning'. If they do not, they are not fit to govern and must give play to those who can. Before these gloomy alternatives I feel the Czechs are right in their decision..."[44].

On May 24 Harvey wrote, "Our sources tend to show that Hitler had really intended to go for Czechoslovakia but that he has shied off in face of our warnings"[45], but on the same day Neville Henderson sent a telegram to the Foreign Office on German press reactions to the crisis which protested against the assumption that peace had been saved by a determined front against Germany. "The German Government has never entertained the idea of invading Czechoslovakia and no troops have been moved. Such danger to peace as exists is due to the behaviour of the Czechs and in a lesser degree to the blind support given to Prague by London and Paris". (Hadow had underlined "Czechs" in this telegram and "blind support given to Prague by London and Paris") [46]. Harvey took note of this reaction on May 26: "German press is now violently attacking us for interfering in Central Europe and for claiming the credit for stopping a German offensive which had never existed"[47].

Hadow's reaction to the crisis was, not surprisingly, on the side of the Germans; he felt the incident was largely, if not wholly, the fault of the Czech Government. "No better means of torpedoing the Hodza-Henlein negotiations could...have been devised than this mobilisation...". Hadow wrote that he "reluctantly" endorsed the suspicion that Benes was behind the military moves, intending to wreck Hodza's negotiations for a compromise, and was certain that the Czech president had instigated the Czech Press's demand for sterner measures. According to Hadow, a Secretary of the Czechoslovak Legation in London had told "a sympathizer with the Czech cause whom I happen to know" a few weeks before that "once he was assured of British backing M. Benes would know how to torpedo Dr. Hodza's negotiations with Henlein in such a manner as to put the latter in the wrong before public opinion in other countries".

Because of British and French reactions to the German troops movements, Hadow thought Benes would "fritter away" concessions; "in this case I most earnestly endorse Sir N. Henderson's estimate of Germany's absolute determination to secure justice for the *Sudetendeutsche*; by peaceful persuasion if possible, but, if not, by early use of force...Germany is sullenly resentful at what is now being dressed up by certain sections of the Press as a diplomatic defeat for Germany". If given time, and the chance to achieve justice for the Sudeten Germans, Germany,

Hadow felt, would hold back because her Government "knows well enough that incorporation of the *Sudetendeutsche* in the Reich means assuming an economic liability without hope of corresponding assets"[48]. Hadow, meanwhile, minuted to R.A. Butler that he was struck by the unjustified note of optimism in the British Press and in French statements in Official telegrams at the "success" attending Anglo-French intervention in Berlin on May 22-24. He wrote that the truth of the matter was "(a) Last week German pressure was only meant as a rejoinder to Czech military pressure upon the Sud.-D. districts. (b) It served its purpose in showing the Sud-D. that Germany was behind them unwilling...to look on indefinitely at the 'incidents' which are one of the most dangerous features of the present situation". It was Hadow's belief that the rumours of German troops movements were used as a pretext by the Czech Government for mobilising and adopting more suppressive measures in the Sudeten German areas. He later in this lengthy minute described the rumours of German troop movements as baseless (although they mainly came from British observers[49]) and stated, "at the present time it cannot be denied that sections of the British Press and of the Opposition - if not also such Intellectuals as the Czechoslovak Committee and the Archbishop of Canterbury - are encouraging Benes to believe he can resist...fundamental concessions"[50].

Opinion differs as to how the May crisis actually originated.

Ian Colvin, who was in the Foreign Office at the time, noted what Hadow was quick to pounce on, "there was an embarrassing strain of jubilation in the British and French press comments, it being asserted that 'Hitler had climbed down'"[51]. But it is believed that Hitler's intentions were not definite enough for a move such as was imagined against Czechoslovakia at this time and Weinberg states, "at a time of great international tension, reports of really routine German troops movements were mistaken as presaging an immediate attack on Czechoslovakia. When the times are appropriate for them, many omens or flying saucers will be seen"[52]. Hadow's suspicion that Czechoslovakia had deliberately heightened the tension by mobilising is also felt to be without foundation. According W.V. Wallace, it was "clear...that before the May crisis nothing had been further from the Czechoslovak Government's mind than a military demonstration. In so far as it considered military matters at all, it had been in terms of Hitler's possible intentions...The May Crisis was of Hitler's making"[53].

Henderson Braddick, on the other hand, exposes evidence in an essay on the Crisis that strongly supports Hadow's notion that the reports of German troop movements were initially false. But Braddick points out, that, although it seems unlikely that they originated in Prague, they were, nonetheless passed on with the knowledge that that they were in inaccurate. Whether or not the

Germans could be held culpable, the central fact of the crisis is that Benes, by mobilising against German troops, did initiate a provocative move against Germany which required a reaction from Britain and France[54]. What Benes had demonstrated, and what Hadow failed to realise, was that the threat of imminent war could be diminished if the Western Powers stood confident in such a crisis and put pressure on Germany. Hitler would then be less certain of the success of any *fait accompli* initiated such as the Austrian *Anschluss*. Prague, in fact, had sufficient reason to precipitate the event.

In any case, the crisis left its mark on both Britain and Germany. In Germany it spurred on the process leading to "Operation Green" - the take-over of Czechoslovakia. Hitler met Henlein again and told the latter to hold to his program of demands but not to let developments in Czechoslovakia get out of hand; Germany first had to fill the gaps in her fortifications on the Western border. By the end of the summer or in the autumn France would not be able to help Czechoslovakia and Hitler could proceed as he wished. The German leader's military timetable was now set for the operation starting on October 1 with a complete breakthrough to be completed by October 4[55].

The British Foreign Office and Government, meanwhile, merely became a little more frantic in their approaches to Germany. Cadogan wrote on May 29: "We must clear the air; we

can't let Germany go on keeping the initiative, and we must call her into the open, as I urged upon A. [Eden] on May 13, 1936!"[56]. To Chamberlain the episode was proof of how untrustworthy Hitler was, but at the same time, it made him more anxious to achieve a speedy accommodation between the Czechs and Germans. Hadow himself wrote with disapproval of the "facile assumption" in Press and other circles in Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia that the "corner was turned" in the crisis by firm Anglo-French support of a resolute democratic Czech Government. Germany's vexation over supposed British "partiality towards Prague", in Hadow's opinion, made the situation more dangerous[57]. Christopher Thorne writes of this period, "It is difficult...to avoid the word servility when describing British dealings with Berlin"[58].

Prelude to Munich

In the summer months leading up to the Munich Agreement, the question of British involvement in the Czech-German problem became Hadow's primary concern, as indeed it became the concern of the British Government. The May Crisis, instead of illustrating to Chamberlain the advantages of making a firm stand in Europe, had the reverse effect on the Prime Minister. As Hitler and Henlein increasingly edged the

Czech Government into a corner, the British quickened the process by applying pressure on Benes and continually offering solutions advantageous to Germany. Hadow, in his enthusiasm for Chamberlain and growing zeal in the general avoidance of war, adapted himself to each plan even when his instincts were initially against them, and he lay increasing stress on Britain taking the initiative, particularly in pushing the Czechs into agreement to whatever solution was amenable to Hitler.

Neutralisation was now high on the agenda of suggested solutions for Czechoslovakia and in July Hadow wrote to R.A. Butler that he felt disaster would be impossible to avoid unless the "Four Great Powers" (he excluded Russia) agreed to this: "Only if WE are prepared to FORCE Benes to do so by telling him plainly that otherwise we shall withdraw all support can we hope that he will...come to terms with the Sudeten-Germans"[59]. At the same time Hadow wrote to Sir Kingsley Wood, now Secretary of State for Air, asking the latter to use his influence to further the plan for agreement on neutralisation of Czechoslovakia. "You will see how closely Sir N. Henderson and the French Ambassador M. Francois Poncet agree upon the desperately urgent need of immediate and firm action on the part of Great Britain if the Peace of Europe is to be saved"[60].

Hadow further outlined this plan to Sir Arnold Wilson, Conservative M.P. for Hutchin, Hertfordshire, who supported

appeasement[61]. A four-power guarantee of a neutralised Czechoslovakia by Britain was, according to Hadow, of primary importance and would simultaneously be a diplomatic victory for Britain "since the countries which now believe that Germany can, by biding her time, take what she wants, would one and all be shown that peace and the guarantee of the sovereignty of a small state can still be achieved by NEGOTIATION and that it is therefore to their advantage to resist unjustified German pressure instead of surrendering to it." Hadow's suggestion to Sir Arnold was to "warn" Benes by raising two questions in Parliament. The first was whether the British Government was aware that the proposed nationalities statute of the Czechoslovak Government had not been shown to the Sudeten-German delegates, and that consequently the latter were persuaded that the Czechs did not intend to grant them their rights. The second was whether the British Government would take action to ensure that it was not drawn in support of denial of the right to self-determination of the Sudeten Germans. "I would beg you", Hadow wrote, "to think the matter over and, if you possibly can, to help in the manner indicated to arouse Parliament and the country to the immediate nature of the danger that threatens them"[62].

Wilson did, in fact, raise both questions in Parliament just a few days after receiving Hadow's letter. He first asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the fact that Britain supported

the 1918 claim for self-determination of Czechs and Slovaks would she now give the assurance that she would not lend moral or other support to the denial of the claim for self-determination by plebiscite between the Sudeten representatives and the Czechoslovak Government. Chamberlain replied that conversations between the two parties were proceeding. Wilson then put the questions to the Prime Minister of whether he had yet received a copy of the text of the proposed Czech Nationalities Statute, whether he was aware that its non-publication strengthened the Sudeten desire for a plebiscite under international supervision, and what steps he proposed to take before the matter was brought before the League of Nations under the Minorities clauses. Chamberlain answered no to the first question, stating that the texts of the statute were still in the process of elaboration, but added that His Majesty's Government was closely watching the situation[63].

In these attempts to increase pressure on Benes to make greater concessions to the Sudeten Germans Hadow and Wilson were simplifying the matter, particularly on the point of the Nationalities Statute, in order to achieve their end. The Nationalities Statute was a code which, under pressure from Britain in the Spring of 1938, the Czechoslovak Government announced it would adopt with the aim of improving regulations regarding the National Minorities. The term Nationalities Statute

implied the end of the conception of a national state, and the conception instead of a multinational State[64]. In the eyes of Hadow and Wilson, Benes had announced the formation of this code in order to keep control of the situation and not lose face, but was now stalling in its actual fulfilment. In Prague, however, as Newton himself was beginning to realise, the situation was not a clear cut one of uncooperativeness on the part of the Czechoslovak Government. The British Minister wrote to Halifax in June, "My impression is that one of [Czech Premier] Dr. Hodza's chief objects in refraining from showing the text of the draft Nationalities Statute to the Sudeten German party has been precisely to avoid the danger...of making an initial offer which, however far-reaching it might have seemed to the Czechs, would almost inevitably have been characterised as inadequate by the Sudeten German party"[65]. Hadow's idea of a Four Power arrangement was, furthermore, unwelcome in Berlin: "an official of the Chancery recently volunteered to a member of my staff", Henderson wrote in June, "that Herr Hitler would not even agree to a conference of Four Powers summoned to devise and impose an agreed solution on Czechoslovakia"[66].

In mid-August Hadow wrote that he could see no appreciable bridging of the gap between the Czechs and Germans, and blamed the Czech Government; Benes in particular. Hadow even suggested that the Czech President was toying with the idea

of a military dictatorship[67]. It was about this time, however, that Benes agreed to meet with SdP representatives and presented them with a draft for agreement which included immediate acceptance of the German language as equal status to Czechoslovak, and increased intake of Germans into the administration of the state. His only request in return was a two month armistice. The proposals were declared to be inadequate[68].

Despite his lack of confidence in Benes' sincerity in attempting to come to terms with the Sudeten Germans, Hadow believed agreement was not impossible - if only Benes would cooperate. He wrote at the end of July, "I believe that there is a hope of achieving, by exercise of moderation and fair play in this land, the beginning of a settlement not only of the Sudeten question but...an independent but neutral Czechoslovakia strong for self-defence as is Switzerland..."[69]. Hadow further wrote that it was of the utmost importance that an approach be made "without further delay" to Berlin, with the object of laying before mid-September "the foundation-stone of an International Guarantee of the territorial integrity of a Neutralised Czechoslovakia in return for prior grant of concessions satisfactory to the Sudeten and, subsequently, renunciation by Czechoslovakia of her Soviet Pact". To Hadow, the primary results of such action would be reestablishment of waning

Anglo-French prestige and a halt called to German absorption by ultimatum. Hadow concluded, "further delay - even for a month - or failure to deal simultaneously with both aspects of the Czechoslovak problem may well mean failure of the Chamberlain policy of 'Peace by negotiation'"[70].

September 5 marked Benes' formulation of the Fourth Plan which included equality for all languages, the creation of a "state within a state", and the right of the Sudeten Germans to air all their grievances. Hadow was not impressed with the Fourth Plan and wrote to Kingsley Wood and Halifax that the offer was neither genuine nor did it give to the Sudeten Germans any hope of equality as Czechoslovak citizens[71]. To Strang he wrote that the offer could not be regarded as the "fair and indeed handsome basis for a negotiated solution" as stated by *The Daily Telegraph* on September 13. Hadow expressed his concern that the impression given was that this was the accepted view of the British Cabinet. "As it stands I venture, most respectfully, to say that the Protocol represents no real abandonment of the Czech hegemony which - as Professor Toynbee rightly pointed out - has made of Czechoslovakia a 'Spartan Democracy'; and therefore no lasting contribution to the peace of Europe"[72].

Belief in the further necessity of British involvement in the Czech-German dispute, apart from pressure, was not limited to Hadow and was strong enough to result in the Runciman Mission

carried out from August to September. Hadow himself had in July urged Lord Noel-Buxton to impress on the Prime Minister the importance of sending an emissary to Prague[73]. From the beginning of June the idea of going even further and sending an independent mediator to Czechoslovakia had been brought into consideration by the British Foreign Office. Hadow was doubtful over this idea to begin with. Expressing his opinion on the subject to Strang, Hadow wrote that the Czechoslovak Government would be likely to exert repressive measures on anyone giving information to a foreign observer, and believed that only a man on the spot could unobtrusively provide accurate information "without endangering the liberty of those with whom he came into contact"[74]. He had apparently come round to the idea by July, and on July 18 it was decided that the past President of the Board of Trade Lord Runciman would be sent to Prague as "investigator and mediator"[75], while Prague was forced to accept the untrue statement that it had asked for Runciman.

On July 25 Hadow wrote a memorandum entitled "Lord Runciman" in which he stressed the importance of making sure of this observer's impartiality in order for his reports to "carry weight with the Sudeten". From this standpoint Hadow felt that it was unfortunate that Benes had stated that Runciman was to be standing adviser to the Czech Government. "This will not only cause suspicious or recalcitrant minority elements to throw doubt

on his impartiality, but will make it awkward for Lord Runciman to establish and maintain free contact with the Sudeten, the Slovak, the Ruthene, Hungarian, and Polish Minority leaders""[76]. The mission was ostensibly meant to arrive at a just solution of the Czech-German problem satisfactory to both sides, but Hadow seemed to take the view that some sort of solution should have been arrived at already; Runciman was merely a means of conveying it. He, therefore, expressed his fear in August that Germany's demands that the Sudeten Germans obtain equality of status and Czechoslovakia be neutralised did not appear to Germany as likely to be fulfilled by any award from Runciman. He was already suggesting other means of arriving at a settlement, in particular, self-determination along the lines of confederation of Czechoslovakia.

Runciman, it turned out, had very little knowledge of Central Europe and had been pressed by London for quick results. He accepted the SdP on the same footing as the Czech Government, and was treated by the former to weekend trips to the estates of German aristocrats. Although accompanied by Ashton-Gwatkin, head of the Western and League of Nations Department in the Foreign Office and an expert on trade negotiations, he received no advice on procedure from London, and by September it seemed that the Mission was accomplishing little. On September 14 it had tracked down an elusive Henlein

who stated that the SdP's previous demands were out of date; the question was no longer one of self-administration, but self-determination and a plebiscite. The SdP leader issued a communique stating this was the only basis for negotiation[77].

The question of a plebiscite now began to be earnestly discussed in the British Cabinet, where Runciman's growing pessimism was making its influence felt. Taking its cue from the Cabinet, the Central Department requested a memorandum from Hadow on the subject. In this memorandum he answered questions on possible population figures, voting procedure, and territorial boundaries which he felt could be achieved by a compromise on exchange of populations[78]. The problem for Britain was getting the Czechs to agree to a plan which could amount to political suicide for Benes and which the Foreign Office itself - including Hadow - had been against to begin with.

Hadow personally had little confidence in the latest idea: "a plebiscite is, from knowledge as I have both of the populations and of the leading personalities on both sides, a virtual impossibility in practice. Feelings have been so exacerbated by twenty years of hatred and animosity that one side or other - perhaps even both - would begin serious bloodshed and so civil war or international war". Hadow presented as an alternative the idea of reconstituting Czechoslovakia as a confederation of nationalities, each nationality possessing autonomous State rights - similar to

those in the United States. In return for Germany recognising this new Czechoslovakia without demanding surrender of the Sudeten territory, Prague would introduce proscription of Communism throughout Czechoslovakia and denounce her pact with the Soviet Union[79].

Chamberlain, however, had already decided that the only solution was some form of self-determination. Thus, two days after his suggestion for a confederation Hadow had reconciled himself to the idea of a plebiscite and spelled out his own methods for achieving this plan, which were contrary to the generally accepted pattern of holding plebiscites. In regard to supervision he recommended exclusion of French and Little Entente contingents for fear of bloodshed, and preferred a specially recruited British force. To Hadow it was a matter of course that German terms be accepted which, in addition to those mentioned previously, included transfer of the Sudeten areas to Germany "by plebiscite or otherwise - in a very short time", a similar transfer of Polish and Hungarian territories, and federation of the remaining Czechoslovak Republic. In Hadow's opinion, the main obstacle to peace was the transfer of Sudeten or other territory to Germany, Hungary, or Poland[80].

On September 17 Runciman had reported to the British Cabinet that he was unable to suggest any plan or policy. Four days later he produced a report recommending the solution

Chamberlain (as well as Hadow) had in mind, that Czechoslovakia "be required to abolish political liberties, suppress free speech...relinquish her tie with France and Soviet Russia, give up her responsibilities as a 'grown up' member of the League...accept a guarantee by 'the principal Powers', and enter the German economic system"[81]. Hadow was most likely quite pleased with the report, although it seems that it was actually tailored to fit the policy already decided upon by Chamberlain[82].

Hadow's bias over the Czech-German question can be seen to have increased considerably in 1938. It was fairly clear by this time that he had little regard for the Czechs and held Benes largely if not wholly responsible for the continuing deadlock in negotiations. In June 1938 he wrote that Benes was deliberately provoking Germany by making out that Britain was joining "what Germany hates most": the Franco-Soviet treaties against Germany. Hadow continued, "I think it is very necessary that public opinion and the House should wake up to what this little schemer is doing; for he has every intention of getting us into a position from which we cannot withdraw..."[83].

In July Hadow wrote in a memorandum on the Czechoslovak crisis that in Britain, and still more in France, there was too much inclination to accept the claim of Benes that the Sudeten Germans had no case and that Czechoslovakia would be ruined by granting autonomy[84]. Hadow, as usual, was

suspicious of all claims or efforts made by Benes but simultaneously accepted all stories which emanated from SdP sources. In the same month he warned that Sudeten information was to the effect that a military putsch was to be staged by Benes' Military Machine. "With such advice it is hardly surprising that Dr. Benes is sure of himself and will no longer negotiate with the Sudeten Germans"[85]. By August Hadow was pointing out evidence that Benes was appealing to Chamberlain's opponents and that the Czech president had virtually accused Chamberlain of being Berlin's agent[86]. He wrote to W.I. Mallet, Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, that Benes was the main obstacle to a compromise between Czechoslovakia and Germany on the Sudeten issue[87].

To Hadow, Chamberlain, and others in the Foreign Office and Cabinet, agreement between the Czechs and Germans was the only method of avoiding war, and the breakdown of negotiations a barrier to peace. With this direct view of the situation in Central Europe, their fervour for agreement blinded them to the enormity of some of their proposals. That the international neutrality of Czechoslovakia was not comparable to Switzerland had already been pointed out by Sargent, and the danger of such a situation to Britain herself in terms of German expansion were not taken into account or ignored. The transfer of the Sudeten territory would mean a German economic

stranglehold over Czechoslovakia and the latter would become politically dependent on the former. A partition also would not unravel the danger of a general war as believed by Hadow - not with Germany in possession of an Austrian frontier and the proximity of Poland and Hungary looking for the return of their minority territory (which Hadow was all too willing to hand over). By the beginning of September Harvey was expressing his concern over the limited view of the Cabinet: "I cannot help feeling myself that in their anxiety for non-provocation and peace they overlook the real issues now at stake - not Czechoslovakia but the position of the democracies as a whole and all they represent"[88].

Czechoslovakia was only a concern to Britain because of the British fear of war, and as the crisis increased the importance of preparing for an Anglo-German agreement outweighed all other considerations. Shiela Grant Duff writes that when she returned to Britain at this time she was appalled by her countrymen's ignorance on the subject of Central Eastern Europe. "In so far as I met anyone remotely in touch with official life, I was amazed at how misinformed they were. It was Czechoslovakia and not Germany who was regarded as a threat to peace, not only because she was an artificial State who should never have been allowed to exist in the first place, but because now, it was being said, she was deliberately provoking Hitler by her abominable treatment of the Germans who should never have been subjected to her"[89].

Hadow even anticipated in July 1938 the later words of Chamberlain by describing the lack of a clear case for defending a state such as Czechoslovakia which was "far-away"[90].

Hadow's Plan

It was in September 1938 that Chamberlain launched the flurried negotiations over the minorities problem in Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich conference at the end of the month. Hitler, by this time, had increased pressure on Czechoslovakia regarding the Sudeten area and had generally heightened tension in Europe over his possible next move. The fear among many was that Czechoslovakia might feel compelled to mobilise in answer to Hitler's threats; a move inviting German invasion and a European war. "In those circumstances", Chamberlain later told Parliament, "I decided that the time had come to put into operation a plan which I had had in my mind for a considerable period as a last resort...I resolved to go to Germany myself to interview Herr Hitler and find out in personal conversation whether there was yet any hope of saving the peace"[91].

On September 15 Chamberlain met with Hitler in Berchtesgaden where Hitler declared that he wanted the Sudeten areas delivered to him by the end of the month or he would go to

war to get them; however, if Chamberlain could assure him that Britain recognised the principle of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, he would be prepared to discuss methods of carrying it out. Chamberlain returned to London to confer with Runciman and the Cabinet and, at this point, it was advocated that an international commission be invited to handle the transfer of the Sudeten territory and an international force be set up to keep order in this operation. The Czechoslovak Government was urged to agree to direct transfer of all territory consisting of over 50% Sudeten Germans, in which case Britain would promise to guarantee the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia against aggression. The Czechoslovak Government at first objected, asking that the dispute be submitted to arbitration under the terms of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1926; but, under pressure from Britain and France, it accepted the proposals[92].

As transfer of the Sudeten territory to Germany gained ground as an acceptable means of deflecting Hitler and avoiding war the method of transfer came under discussion in the British Cabinet and Foreign Office. On September 19 Halifax conducted an academic discussion with Sargent, Cadogan, Vansittart, and Ashton Gwatkin in the supervision of the transfer of territory. Oliver Harvey wrote of this meeting, "He [Halifax] is very anxious to have a few British troops sent to show the flag. He believes

naively that a few British regimental bands marching up and down the Sudeten areas would suffice to keep order"[93]. Basil Newton wrote to Halifax on September 23: "the only practicable as well as equitable alternative to maintenance of order by Czechoslovak Government would be an international force...If it were undertaken by Great Britain alone or by an Anglo-French force, Czechs might be very glad of such a guarantee of fair treatment"[94].

On September 25 Hadow put forward his own plan of supervision of transfer by the British Legion. He wrote to Halifax that the Legion had now offered to supply about 10,000 men and suggested that, with Cabinet approval, the German Government be asked to provide the facilities for their rail journey across Germany. The question of a plebiscite for the Sudeten areas had been generally accepted at this time and Hadow went on to suggest that, on the entry of the German forces, a quarter of the volunteer force would remain in the districts until the holding of the plebiscite "if this be thought necessary in order to reassure British public opinion that this protection was being afforded to the dissident-minority against acts of revenge on the part of the SUDETEN during the first days of the latters' return". The main object of the withdrawal, according to Hadow, was to provide a means of Czech withdrawal and German advance "without collision and acceptable to both Governments".

Hadow went on to state that the idea of accomplishing an Anglo-German understanding through the ex-servicemen of both countries was one of Hitler's main themes, and further proposed that the heads of the British Legion be sent at once to put forward the plan to Hitler personally with only the authority of the British Government making this possible. If the plan were then rejected, the British Government would not be involved. Such an "unarmed peace army" as Hadow was suggesting would, he believed, make an instant appeal to the imagination of the British public and "satisfy PACIFIST OPINION IN GREAT BRITAIN of the 'rightness' of this move"[95].

According to Hadow's own notes, after writing this proposal he gave it to Halifax who promised to ascertain Chamberlain's views on the matter and let Hadow know as soon as possible whether the British Legion might go ahead with the Prime Minister's approval. A few hours later Hadow received this message from Halifax: "The Prime Minister is quite willing that Mr. Hadow should tell the head of the British Legion that the approach of which Mr. Hadow spoke to Lord Halifax this morning, might be made at once to Hitler and the Prime Minister would welcome it if Hitler was also willing to accept it"[96]. Hadow then visited Sir F. Maurice the President of the British Legion who arranged to fly to Berlin that evening along with Hadow and a Colonel Murray. Hadow had also contacted Theo

Kordt, Charge d'Affaires of the German Embassy who telegraphed Berlin to request the interview.

All this occurred just after Chamberlain's second meeting with Hitler on September 22 at Godesberg. Chamberlain had told Hitler that Prague had been persuaded to accept cession of the Sudeten territory, but Hitler answered that this plan was no longer acceptable. The German leader now put forward the claims of Hungary and Poland for rectification of their frontiers with Czechoslovakia and he further demanded unconditional German occupation of the Sudeten German areas by October 1 with any plebiscites being held afterwards. A written formulation of Hitler's demands was then given to Chamberlain who returned to London and reported this change to the Cabinet on September 24. Chamberlain's acceptance of Hadow's plan was possibly part of his now desperate search to find a means of placating Hitler and avoiding a confrontation over Czechoslovakia.

When Maurice arrived in Berlin he told Ribbentrop that he had not come to suggest any alteration to Hitler's memorandum but with a proposal from the British Legion which he had the authority to present to Hitler, and would not present it to anyone else. Maurice then met with Hitler and handed him the proposal. "The Fuhrer replied that he welcomed the proposals in principle, but was determined that the whole of the organs of government in the Sudeten area up to the line of demarcation must be in his

hands by October 1st and said that there would not be time to give effect to the Legion plan in the area up to this line by that date". According to Maurice, Hitler stated that he welcomed the proposal that the British Legion should provide an adequate body of neutral observers in the areas proposed for a plebiscite; "he did not propose to occupy the Plebiscite areas with military force until the end of the Plebiscite. He hoped that the latter would be satisfactorily concluded by the middle of November, so that we might all enjoy a peaceful Christmas!"[97].

Hitler was, thus, undeterred by the British Legion plan in his object of occupying the Sudeten areas by October. Hadow noted this in a letter to Halifax, but focussed on Hitler's stating that it was physically impossible for the British Legion to get to the Sudeten area up to the by October 1st, noting that this was, "unfortunately" the case. Hadow pointed out, however, Hitler's "valuable assurance" that if the German troops reached the line of demarcation stipulated they would not go beyond it but "welcomed with enthusiasm" the despatch and occupation of the plebiscite areas until these were held. "He would, I believe, keep this promise as he was enthusiastic, so Sir F. Maurice said, about the ex-service-men idea despite some very obvious attempts on the part of von Ribbentrop to stampede the whole idea beforehand"[98].

After Maurice's visit to Hitler a communication was sent from the German Embassy to the Prime Minister which was

passed on to the Foreign Office. The message basically reiterated what Maurice had already stated; that Hitler appreciated the notion of the British Legion but felt the proposal was not practicable in its present form. It was stated that, "in view of the situation in the *Sudetendeutsche* district" it was impossible to renounce the occupation set out in the German memorandum. The "evermore chaotic conditions" would not permit any further delay. "In order to show what these conditions are it suffices to mention the fact that at the present time already 190,000 Sudetendeutsch refugees have crossed over into the territory of the Reich"[99].

These remarks were in line with a virulent speech Hitler made on September 26 at the Berlin Sports Palace. After attacking Benes personally Hitler went on to claim that 214,000 Germans had fled Czechoslovakia during the past few days while up to 600,000 Germans had had to leave this country during the previous years[100]. Bruegel comments, "No one dared ask how it was possible that such a mass emigration had remained completely unknown to the outside world until 26 September 1938"[101].

If Hitler was undeterred in his course, Hadow was also in his and on September 27 wrote up a fresh proposal incorporating his former one, this time involving the King. Hadow's idea was that, as Hitler had not rejected the British Legion plan for occupation but only stated that it was physically impossible, the

King should send a public message to Hitler asking him, "in order to save Europe from the horrors of war", to transport 10,000 men from the British Legion across German territory on September 29 as far as the Czech frontiers and consent to their policing the entire area envisaged by Hitler. The force would occupy this area until the terms for transfer of the territories had been arranged and until the plebiscite was held in the remaining areas. Hadow felt this message could only come from the King and, if publicly sent, would so line up public opinion in Germany - "which is now NOT for war since Mr. Chamberlain's visit and offers" - that the German Government would accept. "The alternative is definitely WAR, as was clearly evident in Berlin yesterday; [Hadow was referring to Hitler's speech at the Berlin Sports Palace] yet the German nation has nothing but regret and a passionate desire for cooperation with Britain"[102]. Hadow sent this message to Buckingham Palace where it was left with Sir A. Hardinge, Secretary to the King, who sent back the unencouraging reply that such a suggestion must come from "experts" or approved by them. Hardinge telephoned Cadogan about the matter who sent for Hadow as he "saw objections"(it is not clear from Hadow's papers what these were). The matter was then dropped[103].

The idea of the British Legion policing the Sudeten areas until the plebiscite was held still was regarded as feasible,

however, and on the 28 September Sir Nevile Henderson sent the message from Berlin that it would be "clearly desirable" if the British Legionaries could be ready for instant departure should they be required for the Sudeten areas. F.K. Roberts of the Central Department minuted, "Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible and an advance party of this kind would presumably be available"[104].

Up until this date Hitler seemed bent on a policy of aggression, but on September 28 he received a message from Mussolini appealing to him to postpone the German mobilisation. News then arrived in Berlin of mobilisation of the British fleet. These two factors along with the disappointing response from the German people to Hitler's decision to occupy the Sudetenland worked enough influence on Hitler for him to agree to a final meeting in Munich with Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini. Russia and Czechoslovakia were excluded from this meeting.

At Munich it was agreed that the occupation of Czechoslovakia would be spread over a period of ten days beginning on October 1, an international commission was to be formed to arrange the carrying out of the transfer, all plebiscite projects and special areas were dropped, a time limit for the settlement of Polish and Hungarian claims was set, and Britain and French guarantees against aggression were made immediately. The latter were to be followed by German and

Italian guarantees once the Polish and Hungarian questions were settled. The Czechoslovak Government was then informed of the agreement and was given little choice but to capitulate[105].

When Chamberlain returned to London on September 30, Oliver Harvey reported "vast crowds in the streets - hysterical cheers and enthusiasm. P.M. on balcony at Buckingham Palace. But many feel it to be a great humiliation"[106]. Hadow was probably among those hysterically cheering, but many, in fact, did have growing doubts about the whole business during this time. On September 24 Cadogan had recorded in his diary his reaction to Chamberlain's report to the Foreign Office after meeting with the Cabinet: "I was completely horrified - he was quite calmly for total surrender. More horrified still to find that Hitler has evidently hypnotised him up to a point"[107]. Sargent, while watching the return of Chamberlain from the Foreign Office commented, "For all the fun and cheers you might think that they were celebrating a major victory over an enemy instead of merely a betrayal of a minor ally"[108].

A few voices were also being raised as well in Parliament. On September 28 just after Chamberlain spoke of his negotiations with Hitler so far and received the message that Hitler would meet with him in Munich the next morning, the Communist M.P. Mr. Gallacher spoke: "No one desires peace more than I and my party, but it must be a peace based upon freedom and democracy

and not upon the cutting up and destruction of a small state. I want to say that the policy of the National Government has led to this crisis [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Yes, and if there is peace at the moment it is the determined attitude of the people that has saved it. What ever the outcome the National Government will have to answer for its policy. I would not be a party to what has been going on here...I protest against the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia"[109].

One of the most trenchant critics in the Cabinet of Chamberlain's conciliatory policy at this time was Alfred Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty. Duff Cooper stated that no faith could be placed in any of Hitler's promises and continually urged for general mobilisation. After Munich he resigned. Duff Cooper was also critical of Hadow's plan for the transfer of the Sudeten areas. On September 29 he wrote to Halifax that he personally felt it would be unwise to use the British Legion for temporary occupation of the ceded territories, pointing out that the analogous body in Germany was probably drilled, disciplined, and well organised. "As you know however our British Legion is simply a collection of middle aged and elderly men who have been at some time in one of the Services and who meet together occasionally with the laudable purpose of wearing their medals and drinking beer. They differ in hardly any respect from a collection of Conservative working men's clubs". Duff Cooper felt

the result of sending a collection of these men to the Sudetenland would be ludicrous and possibly disastrous[110]. Halifax replied that he was himself fully conscious of these difficulties and the Foreign Office was in the process of sending a telegram to the Munich delegation suggesting it would be better to use the Belgians and Dutch "who, marvellous to relate, seem quite anxious for the job"[111].

While the idea of the British Legion was still under consideration, Hadow, apparently, was, at one point, suggested (possibly by himself) as taking a direct role in the policing of the transfer. Halifax again, however, already had his doubts as indicated by a letter written to him at the time by the Chairman of the British Legion Major Fetherston Godley. "I quite understand about Mr. Hadow", wrote the Chairman, "and in view of what you say would not think of pressing the request for his services, and I am sure that with the very fine class of Liaison Officer which we are obtaining, we shall have adequate personnel to deal with any matters arising"[112].

The British Legion was, of course, never used and the plebiscite never carried out. An international commission was formed but was so harassed by Hitler that the new line of demarcation agreed upon at Munich was practically the same as that demanded at Godesberg. While at Munich, Chamberlain had acquired Hitler's signature to a declaration that Britain and

Germany would never go to war with each other - an agreement which turned out to be meaningless.

At the beginning of October Henderson sent a message to the Foreign Office on the establishment of the Sudeten German areas, and Vansittart voiced his disgust over the whole business. "In my opinion", he wrote, "the proceedings of the International Commission have been scandalous. Sir N. Henderson's principle is always to give the Germans everything...he has simply reproduced Godesberg, after we had flattered ourselves publicly on having got away from it - a source of great potential embarrassment to us though not to him. And over three quarter of a million Czechs are now apparently to be under German rule. It is a shame"[113]. Weinberg writes that in the immediate period after Munich the humiliating circumstances for Czechoslovakia and the shame and regret among the Western Powers led the latter to "resent and turn away from those they had treated rather shabbily - a not uncommon reaction - and to refuse to make any real effort to assist Czechoslovakia in its desperate attempt under new leaders and new policies to work out a new life for its people within the new boundaries"[114]. The subject of Czechoslovakia certainly disappears from Hadow's correspondence after September 1938 as if already forgotten, while he began to turn his attention to other methods of appeasement.

After Munich

The aftermath of Munich represented a time of divided opinion in Britain. While a sense of relief was felt by some, many began to feel uncomfortable with the direction of events in relation to the direction of British foreign policy. This mood of uneasiness made itself felt in the Foreign Office and Cabinet with, for example, the resignation of Duff Cooper, and the misgivings expressed by Oliver Harvey: "The P.M. is infatuated with Hitler and believes he can trust him"[115]. Voices raised in opposition to the policy of appeasement were becoming louder and more numerous.

To Hadow, however, Munich was a sign that Hitler could be reasoned with and peaceful agreement with Germany was possible. He was particularly impressed with the Hitler-Chamberlain declaration made at Munich, and in October 1938 wrote that through the Munich Agreement and the declaration, "personal contact" and "mutual respect" had been established between Chamberlain and Hitler. The declaration, to Hadow, was "none other than public recognition of the will-to-peace and hatred of war between these two great nations". Encirclement of Germany was, he continued, "a thing of the past" and this change would result in a gradual lessening of

claustrophobia on the part of Germany[116]. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, however, was now being increasingly subject to criticism as the events of 1938 to 1939 and the attitudes of the dictators made it appear inadequate and eventually mistaken. To Hitler, Munich was a flawed triumph and his subsequent expressions of dissatisfaction and regret over abandoning his original intentions reveal an attitude which helped to shape his policies after September 1938.

The more objections to this policy were raised, nonetheless, the more it seemed to become an obsession to those such as Hadow who still advocated it. To the policy-makers in Britain, despite any misgivings over the morality of Munich, the view generally held just after this event was that, war having been avoided when it appeared inevitable, it must be possible to arrive at peaceful solutions to other problems. Thus, overtures to Berlin were redoubled, the Anglo-German declaration at Munich being regarded as an encouraging sign. Hadow himself now turned his attention to British influence in the Mediterranean, having dismissed German expansion to the East as inevitable and incontrovertible. In October he wrote that the front line of defences against the German advance into the Danube Basin was pierced when Germany took over Austria, and Britain and France made a serious mistake in "bolstering an outflanked bastion, Czechoslovakia" long after it was apparent that Germany could

advance as far as the Black Sea whenever she saw fit. To attempt to halt this advance was, to Hadow, impossible and would only serve to "irritate" Germany; nor, Hadow believed, was this type of resistance necessary to British vital interests[117].

Hadow was reflecting the line taken in British policy after Munich, and Cadogan wrote similarly in a review of the European situation, believing that Britain should cut her losses in Central and Eastern Europe and let Germany find her *lebensraum* and establish herself as a powerful economic unit. "We should do everything we can", Cadogan wrote, "to maintain the best relations with, and give assistance as may be possible to, Turkey and Greece. It follows, of course that we should spare no reasonable effort to resume our former friendly relations with Italy". Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Roumania, Cadogan felt, were bound to fall in with an economic plan with Germany, but he did not see an economically strong Germany as such a bad thing[118].

Hadow's views corresponded with those of Cadogan, but Hadow also felt that Yugoslavia as well as Turkey and Greece could be brought into what he termed the British "zone of influence". This "zone of influence" policy was one which he felt would have to replace the League ideal: "the time has come when self-protection requires abandonment of ideals in favour of self-protection; and the Mediterranean is our life-line". Hadow wrote that once Germany was on the Mediterranean "we may

well despair of our future"; however, asserting British influence in this area could be done "in a spirit of friendly rivalry...and by use of the weapons we have, of finance and credits"[119].

Yugoslavia was, at this time leaning very much towards the influence of Italy, and John Balfour, who was head of the American Department and for whom Hadow had written his memorandum, noted that Yugoslavia "will not play if she is likely to be faced with a hostile Italy as well as Germany". On the general idea of the Mediterranean coming into the British zone of influence, Balfour pointed out that Italy could also claim this area, and thought it unlikely or even impossible for that country to abandon the Axis[120]. Hadow's and Cadogan's analysis, thus, hinged on the attitude of Italy which Hadow personally believed was favourable. Balfour's objections, he felt could be countered by "the very obvious desire of Italy" to make friends with Britain "before Germany swallows up Italian trade in the Danube basin". To Hadow, an early settlement of an Anglo-Italian agreement was of immense importance[121].

Hadow's focus on Italy was a fairly standard reaction in the British Government and Foreign Office after Munich. The more intransigent Berlin appeared at this time, the more eagerly the appeasers turned to Rome. At the end of October Phipps wrote to Halifax, "Francois-Poncet feels that Mussolini is now, so to speak, the key to Hitler, who is very subject to the influence of the

Duce"[122]. In November Britain surrendered to Italian demands that the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938 be ratified and on November 16 the agreement was signed. To Mussolini, however, the Axis was still fundamental; for example, he not soon after decided to accept the German proposals for turning the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance[123].

Later, in January 1939, Chamberlain and Halifax met with Mussolini in Italy. The purpose of the meeting was to come to some sort of understanding regarding a demonstration made in the Italian Parliament in November 1938 raising a call for the French possessions of Tunisia, Corsica, Nice and Savoy. Mussolini hoped by the meeting to persuade Chamberlain to put pressure on France to relinquish her hold on these territories, but the tactic failed.

Hadow, characteristically, had put forward a plan which he attempted to get to Chamberlain before the meeting in the hopes that it could be presented to Mussolini. The plan was for a Four-Power consortium in the Far East (the four powers being Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) and Hadow sent it to Hutchison requesting it be passed on to the Prime Minister. "This I do because I was lucky enough to get endorsement from a highly-placed Italian as to Mussolini's attitude and both his hopes and his fears about the Rome conversations"[124]. The Consortium proposed was to run on economic lines in which

Germany and Italy would be given the right to take payment for their exports both in Chinese exports and in Colonial raw materials. Hadow's plan was still based on the idea that once the dictators were satiated they would settle down - despite the growing evidence that they were not likely to ever be satiated. "Recent events", he wrote, "have greatly strengthened the chances of successful promotion of this plan and have also - by showing clearly how great is the danger facing Britain in the Far East - made its early consideration advisable".

Hadow believed that Mussolini would be amenable to the idea because he was in dire need of a "triumph". The Italian economic situation was not happy and "from an unimpeachable source it has been learnt in the past week that, failing a quick success in SPAIN..., he [Mussolini] must have successes in some other sphere to allay Italian fears and no small measure of grumbling". If Mussolini failed to come to some sort of advantageous agreement with Britain Hadow wrote that this leader could be tempted to listen to Ribbentrop and Goebbels "when and if the latter can persuade HITLER to risk all in a war for WORLD POWER; to which both Mussolini and Hitler are still, on the above excellent authority, in principle averse"[125]. (There appears to be no evidence that Hadow's plan reached Chamberlain or that it was presented to Mussolini).

The meeting, as it turned out, was a charade similar to the

declaration made at Munich. While Chamberlain wrote afterwards that he was satisfied that the chances of peace had definitely been strengthened[126], Ciano wrote, "Nothing was accomplished. I have telephoned von Ribbentrop that the visit was a fiasco"[127].

The focus on Italy followed by the British Government and taken up by Hadow was partly the outcome of a growing uneasiness over the behaviour of Germany after Munich; a feeling which, among the British public, began to grow censorious. The continuing British advances to Germany suffered a severe setback, for example, in November 1938 when a German Jew Herschel Grynszpan shot and mortally wounded a Third Secretary in the Germany Embassy in Paris Ernst von Rath. The German press immediately laid responsibility on underground activities of Jewish propaganda, and accused British politicians as the instigators of the crime. On November 10 Goebbels organised a general harassment of Jews which included looting and arson of synagogues, homes, and businesses in the Reich, and new measures were declared to eliminate Jews from the economic life of Germany and Austria. The worldwide press reaction was one of shock and horror, particularly in Britain and the United States. Hitler's speeches had meanwhile become increasingly more bellicose since Munich, especially regarding Britain. This trend was intentional as Hitler needed to

get the German public behind his regime in any future war, and on October 8 he delivered a vehemently anti-British speech at Saarbrücken which set the theme for the continuing anti-British tone in the German press and other speeches.

The effect of Germany's behaviour generally on Britain was a definite rise in scepticism about the possibility of peace. Hadow, however, wrote a lengthy memorandum at the end of November which gave an explanation of Germany's actions which bordered on justification. He wrote that the decision to implement the Anglo-Italian agreement, the visits between London and Paris "without promise of corresponding 'gestures' between Britain and Germany", the recent Anglo-American Trade Agreement "which an unwisely jubilant American Press has characterised not only as a blow to German exports but also as Democracy's answer to Germany's treatment of the Jews", had all contributed to a returning sense of isolation among the German people and a belief among them that Munich was only a mirage. "With their ingrained inferiority-complex and exaggerated fear of loss of prestige, the leaders of Germany have characteristically turned for comfort to increased ruthlessness and abuse; and even the more moderate may, if the means cannot soon be found of turning their minds back to cooperation and appeasement, be tempted to listen to the extremists who are promising World-domination if they will but risk unsheathing the sword before the Democracies

are ready"[128].

Although Hadow still defended Germany, his ideas on the Mediterranean may well have been a response to the increasing calls for a firm stance against the Nazis. To Hadow, overtures to Italy would be a means of "trumping the German ace"[129], his attitude being that Germany should only be challenged in an economic sense and through the appeasement of Italy as both countries could still be reasoned with. Consequently, in February he denounced recent tales "of imagination and mystery" used as an attempt to work up a "war scare" in Britain and the United States - tales which he stated were based on slender evidence. The BBC, Hadow claimed, was being used to "sting Germany and reawaken suspicion of our designs for the overthrow of the German Government by sowing dissatisfaction among their people". This view was apparently shared by Neville Henderson as well as "other reputable persons". Hadow urged that these "mischief makers" be stopped, and that Britain take heed of Hitler's recent broad hint for a possible economic solution to the world's problems[130].

The "economic solution" was meanwhile being explored in the Foreign Office and Government. Ashton-Gwatkin had had exploratory talks with the Germans in Berlin in February and written that Goering wanted economic cooperation to begin immediately, and this would lead to "political agreements"[131].

Arrangement were made for trade negotiations at Dusseldorf. At the beginning of March Hadow again urged that efforts towards an economic settlement through Goering be increased[132].

Hadow's recommendation of approaches to Goering is another example of his increasingly irrational view of Germany during the climax of appeasement. From November 1938 he had begun urging informal approaches to Goering with plans such as his own for a four-power consortium, which he felt would act as a counter-attraction to Ribbentrop's "wild scheming". Such approaches would, Hadow believed, have the psychological effect of "bringing Germany out of the cold", and, by taking this step, Chamberlain "would once more have set Europe on the road to appeasement, whose beginning was Munich and whose early continuation is vital to the peace of Europe"[133].

Hadow's tunnel vision seems to have become worse in February 1939 when he passed on to the Foreign Office a summary of a report on a visit to Germany by Major Joubert of the South African Staff Corps. Ironically, this report gave a clear indication of the character of the Reich and the practical method of dealing with Hitler, stating that German foreign policy was one of "primitive leaders with primitive ideas and using primitive methods", and relied on force which they were in danger of misapplying: "War could be averted if Great Britain stated definitely that she was strong enough and would not hesitate to

fight"[134].

Hadow, however, wrote that the principal interest of the report lay in the views on the attitude of the army towards their leader. He admitted that all signs pointed toward Hitler being able to count on the loyalty of the military at the outset of war despite their own private doubts, but felt this was all the more reason to conciliate Germany economically to detract Hitler from "the whisperings of gamblers such as Ribbentrop or Goebbels" who would have their leader risk all in a swift decisive war. Hadow did not refer at all to the report's recommendation that Britain take a firm stance against Germany[135].

Hadow's assessment of Germany's leadership was one shared by the ever-decreasing number of those still clinging to appeasement. Vansittart had already warned against such illusions in December 1938 when he circulated a memorandum in the Foreign Office communicated to him by a German expert Mr. Rennie Smith. Smith stated that the "conservative" opponents of Hitler actually desired an imperialism of a slower and more prudent sort, but their opposition could only have been serious had Hitler not scored his successive triumphs over the Western Powers: "as a rule people do not revolt against victorious Governments. Unless Hitler suffers a resounding military or diplomatic defeat there can hardly be any effective opposition to him in Germany...The German people must be taken as it is - as a

whole people subject to a purposeful military Government, and compelled by this Government to enter upon the greatest political experiment it has ever undertaken in the thousand years of its history"[136]. This memorandum was circulated to Hadow, but he was oblivious to its warnings, and merely put a pencil mark next to a sentence which stated that neither Germany, Italy, nor Japan desired a world war or even a war with the Western Powers or the United States.

In the winter months between Munich and the German occupation of Prague, Hadow clung to the illusion which, for many, would be broken in March 1939. German recalcitrance was a defensive reaction against isolation from the Western Powers, surrendering of Eastern Europe and economic arrangements in the Mediterranean were called for, while Italy was to be approached as a counter-balance to and restraining influence on Germany. While at first taking a confident attitude in initiating plans which were apparently advantageous to all parties, in the late 1930s Hadow had become seemingly insecure in his adaption or acquiescence to each plan or event advantageous only to the dictators.

War's Shadow

An examination of Hadow's despatches from 1938-1939

leaves the distinct impression of a man increasingly panicking with the build-up of enormous tension in Europe. While his fear of war in 1938 made him urge compliance with or accept as legitimate every German move, he maintained this course even in the late summer months of 1939. Hadow's error of judgment had been compounded by the tense atmosphere of the late 1930s which clouded his vision and heightened his emotions. There is less evidence, during Hadow's posting in London, of his lengthy and vigorous examination of background to each situation previously characteristic of his reports and arguments. Much more evident is a tendency to jump to conclusions or grasp at straws while directing the majority of his energy to influencing the decisions of Chamberlain. As suggested earlier, his behaviour depended increasingly on the actions of Hitler.

As illustrated in his despatches in Vienna and Prague, Hadow's increased prejudice regarding communism and the Soviet Union constituted a major blind spot to his vision of events in Central Europe in the 1930s. This factor, in respect of the appeasers in general, became more crucial to the policy carried out by Britain in 1938 and 1939. In the face of the growing German threat, a collective stance involving Russia would have checked Hitler and possibly weakened his position internally as well as externally. Churchill recognised this, as did the Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov, both making appeals for

Anglo-Russian cooperation. Chamberlain, however, was as averse to such action as Hadow and the rest of the appeasers, and made this clear from the start in purposely omitting Russia from a statement he made in February 1938: "the peace of Europe must depend on the attitude of the Four Major Powers of Europe: Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves"[137].

Hadow's ostensible reasons for dismissing the Soviet Union as an ally hinged on doubts regarding the effectiveness of the Soviet army, particularly after the recent purges. When Litvinov made his appeal to the West in March 1938 (which Britain rejected), Hadow commented that Soviet Russia was "quite unfit to sustain an offensive against any first-class power", and doubted whether she would even dare mobilise her army "for fear of an internal revolution led by the latter against the Stalin factor, which has tried to destroy the officer-caste"[138].

In a report on possible opposition to Germany in case of an attack on Czechoslovakia, he wrote that, in regard to Soviet aircraft, Russia's bombers had been reported to be obsolete and, thus, her possible help to Czechoslovakia was automatically discounted. Hadow also wrote that the Russian army was now unfit, for lack of leadership, to wage an offensive war and, furthermore, "the optimism of the French Military Attache as regards Russian help for Czechoslovakia should France decide to go to the latter's aid was shared by no other military

observer..."[139].

Hadow was consistently seeing half, if not a quarter, of the picture, and his greatest mistakes were usually exposed in his recommendations on British action - what that country should or should not do and what was worth preserving or defending. According to Hadow, friendly relations with Germany were worth preserving; Czechoslovakia was not worth defending. Hadow was quick to ignore or by-pass the real significance of events such as the Austrian *Anschluss*, the German reaction to Britain's response to the May Crisis, and the behaviour of Germany during and after Munich.

The German occupation of Prague in March should have given Hadow the clearest sign of German intentions. On the pretext of establishing order between the Czechs and Slovaks, Hitler had marched into Prague on March 11, meanwhile forcing the new President Hacha to sign an agreement putting Czechoslovakia under German protection. The occupation took London by surprise, but the British Government, even at this point, took its familiar line of tacit acceptance. The British public, however, was not so complacent, and pressure began to increase on the Government to commit itself openly. On March 28 Churchill, Eden, and 32 others tabled a motion in the House of Commons calling for the formation of a genuine National Government with full emergency powers. The widespread

disquiet which this motion represented was not calmed by Chamberlain's assurance that he was planning moves which went further than negotiation[140].

The moves that Chamberlain mentioned were guarantees to Poland, Roumania, and Greece. Although the display of German intentions made Churchill's idea for a Grand Alliance with Russia all the more desirable, Poland was still considered by the British Government as the key to European policy; there was no point in seeking Soviet assistance if Poland and Roumania were alienated by it. The motive of the appeasers, as reflected in Hadow, still appeared, even at this stage, to be peace at all costs, and the aim of a peace front involving Poland and Roumania was not to prepare for military action but to lure Germany to the conference table.

Hadow himself had not been happy over the British guarantee to Poland and wrote a lengthy critique of it in April. The ground and method chosen for what he described as Britain's new "momentous stand" after Prague suffered from two inherent weaknesses. The first was, as the Foreign Office had already convinced itself, that Poland was unlikely to accept any alliance or guarantee based on Russian participation: "The rulers of Poland know full well that, in the present state of the Polish masses, the arrival in Poland of Soviet troops would be the signal for Communist outbreaks which would destroy their personal

properties if not their own lives". The second weakness was that, apart from Russia, no military help of any decisive value could reach Poland in case of German attack.

Hadow was equally critical of the guarantee to Roumania to which he wrote his arguments could be applied with even greater force: "why should Roumania's oligarchical rulers be expected to choose self-immolation, by inviting Russian armies into their territories, rather than vassalage, however uncomfortable, under the protecting-shield of Germany?". Hadow continued, "Nor has Britain seemingly been able to extract from [the Polish Foreign Minister] M. Beck even a conditional promise to go to the aid of Roumania to whom even a British or Franco-British guarantee would be inconvenient if, by turning the German attack down the Danube, he could win a respite for Poland". To Hadow, any Anglo-French attempt to guarantee Roumania was likely to fail in the objective of encouraging other Eastern European countries to resist German aggression, and was more likely to precipitate a German descent on Roumania caused by the desire to forestall the Western powers in "their Soviet-aided 'encirclement'"[141].

Chamberlain's view of the situation was, in fact, not all that different from Hadow's but he probably promoted the guarantee to Poland because he felt it would act more as an incentive to improved German-Polish relations than as a guarantee for war. When the guarantee was announced and Beck visited London in

April 1939, the full extent of the deadlock between Germany and Poland over Danzig was not revealed; thus, those such as Hadow perceived Poland as leaning more towards Germany than the Soviet Union.

The British Government had meanwhile been halfheartedly pursuing negotiations with the Soviet Union, but what Chamberlain failed to realise was that, in guaranteeing Poland and Roumania, association with the Soviet Union - who was now growing disillusioned by British rebuffs and vacillation - would be difficult except on that country's terms. The new situation made a Soviet understanding more attractive to Germany as Stalin was now protected by a belt of guaranteed territory. When Britain turned down a conference with Russia and unilaterally guaranteed Poland and Roumania, Fitzroy Maclean, a Secretary in the British Embassy in Moscow, confided his "despair" to Charles Bohlen of the American Embassy: "He felt, and it seemed obvious, that the British government had given away all its bargaining chips"[142].

Hadow, it appears, was not in favour of any commitment in the East, particularly one involving Russia. At the same time that he was denouncing the guarantees to Poland and Roumania, he warned of a "sinister" side to Soviet activity in the Baltic, and wrote that "entirely neutral" friends of his "are regretfully unanimous in believing that war's shadow is ominously near if

we sign whatever Moscow asks of us"[143]. Hadow had earlier warned of Soviet activity in the Baltic, stating that Russia clearly sought to establish a "virtual protectorate" over the Baltic States, and that Anglo-Soviet negotiations had pushed these states into "re-insurance" agreements with Germany. To Hadow the moral issue was clear: "Is this country, under the guise of protecting small countries from German encroachment, to be party to a bare-faced Russian veto upon the liberty-of-action of the Baltic States?". If this were the case, he wrote, Britain must be prepared to see all Baltic states prefer German protection in case of war to Soviet invasion[144].

Throughout the summer of 1939 Hadow carried on expressing his disapproval. "A formula is insisted upon", he wrote, "which would give Russia to interfere unashamedly in the internal affairs of the Baltic countries and, by making some pretext for declaring war out of this right to check 'indirect aggression' to involve us in an European war"[145]. Hadow was referring to difficulty between Britain and Russia over the guaranteeing of certain states including those such as Finland who did not wish to be included, and the use of the words "indirect aggression" in the agreement for the justification of intervention. By this time the Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov had been replaced by Molotov, and the change has been suggested as representing a change in Stalin's intentions regarding the

possible agreement with Britain. Litvinov, it is believed, sincerely desired a firm alliance with Britain; Molotov, however, made more difficult demands during negotiations when he took over in May 1939, and it is possible that Stalin was so doubtful of Britain as an ally at this point that he was merely testing her to see if she could offer him anything more secure than he could achieve through an agreement with Hitler.

The spreading rumours of a possible Nazi-Soviet pact were not taken seriously by the British Government or in the Foreign Office, one reason being that those such as Hadow could not appreciate the Soviet nightmare of having to fight Germany alone on her own soil instead of meeting the attack in either Poland or the the Baltic states. This accounts for the insistence of inclusion of these states in the Anglo-Soviet agreement which Hadow saw as merely an excuse for Soviet aggression. Both sides did, in fact, want an agreement but not the same agreement and, in the end, Hadow and others' determination to keep the Soviet Union out of Poland and the Baltic States outweighed the securing of Russian aid against Germany.

In his adamant objection to any cooperation with the Soviet Union, Hadow demonstrated the basic aversion to that system of Government which caused him to accuse the Soviet Union ironically of intentions more applicable to Germany. In July 1939 he wrote, "Every concession to the Soviet point of view has been

followed by a fresh and more serious demand"[146]; and in urging his plans for the Mediterranean, he wrote that no expense should be spared in preventing the Soviet Union establishing communist supremacy over capitalism[147]. Even in 1939, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat to Europe, in Hadow eyes, than Germany.

The announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on August 21, 1939 must have come as a severe shock to Hadow but no mention of it is made in his despatches. While Britain, reeling from this blow, quickly signed the Anglo-Polish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Hadow was still pushing for conciliation. On August 31, 1939 he wrote in a memorandum titled "Germany and Great Britain: settlement": "There is now every sign that Germany will not fight, because he knows that his people no longer believe he can win"[148]. At 4.45am the next day the German attack on Poland began. A month later, Hadow was transferred to Argentina.

While Hadow's assumptions about the British and German public were simplistic and usually assumed to be in agreement with his own views, his real naivete in London is perhaps best demonstrated in his perception of Hitler: that the latter was always looking to Britain for guidance, would be wholly amenable to friendly suggestions or ideas such as Hadow's own for the transference of the Sudetenland, and, even after concluding the Nazi-Soviet Pact, would still prefer the choice of peace through a

settlement with Britain. Hadow interpreted the importance of economics to Hitler wrongly especially as regards their overriding quicker methods of expansionism, and clung to the idea of Hitler as more moderate than his colleagues and ultimately desirous of peace. In the summer of 1938, for example, he showed a lack of knowledge of *Mein Kampf* which makes his study of this book suspect. Arguing that a fight with Germany was not inevitable even if German national unity was allowed, Hadow wrote, "Aggressive aims may be deduced from Hitler's writings, but 'Mein Kampf' can equally be quoted as showing that the German aim is national unity, and the government of other races is to be avoided"[149].

All of these characteristics of Hadow in the late 1930s were signs that his mind was proceeding along a single track without deviation. Appeasement, to those who still supported it at this time, had become a mission. Under such circumstances, a lack of unimpaired judgment seems inevitable. While real experts with their unpleasant warnings were shunted aside, lesser figures such as Hadow seemed better able to make themselves heard. Hadow's adapting himself to each idea of Chamberlain's as well as each move by Germany in 1938-39 show the extent to which events were running away from him as they were from the British Government. Hadow represents a lack of control during this period: as the tide of German aggression came sweeping in,

he found himself floundering on the rock of appeasement - a strategy without a basis and increasingly without substance. By the time war broke out in September 1939, Hadow's confusion over matters seemed complete as he wrote of the "mad unanimity" of the war atmosphere and the poor prospects of war in the West[150].

6 Appeasement

Chamberlain and Henderson

The character of appeasement is complex; but, although it is more easily attached to particular views than particular men, there were certain people who epitomised this policy. Because Hadow represents many, if not most, of the traits attached to appeasement, a tight comparison can be made between him and two men who fall into this category: Neville Chamberlain and Nevile Henderson. The comparison requires a closer study of all the facets of appeasement as it expressed itself in the varying personalities of those responsible for its formulation and execution, and further illustrates the motivating forces behind Hadow's support for appeasement.

The advent of Chamberlain to power and the posting of Nevile Henderson to Berlin had issued in a new dimension to appeasement: it became an "active pursuit", as opposed to the Baldwin era of passive acceptance of German actions. If Neville Chamberlain is thought to be the personification of appeasement, the British Ambassador to Berlin Nevile Henderson runs a close second. Both were largely instrumental in the vigorous formation and carrying out of this policy through the similarity of their views and the importance of their positions. Although Chamberlain had not deliberately arranged the posting of

Henderson to Germany to assure coordination of his policy, the British Prime Minister did not fail to take advantage of the new ambassador's enthusiasm over coming to terms with the Nazis, and Henderson's efforts to by-pass the more sceptical and slow-moving Foreign Office were tacitly encouraged. Hadow's ardour in promotion of appeasement was obviously less influential, especially after his transfer from Prague to London, but the similarity of his character and outlook to Chamberlain and Henderson makes him highly comparable to the two.

From the evidence of Hadow's actions he not only felt justified but also encouraged to a certain degree to voice his opinions to Henderson and attempt contact with Chamberlain. Hadow must have felt an affinity with both men. All three, for example, felt the influence of the effects of the First World War. Hadow had experienced the horrors of it first hand as he never failed to remind his superiors. Henderson had been posted in Paris during the War and received personal accounts from soldiers on leave, and he later wrote, "The long casualty lists, the wet winters, the ghastly waste of human life in long drawn-out battles with little progress to show at the end of them, was just a tragedy which left an enduring impression on one's mind"[1].

Chamberlain, during the war, was made director general of national service and consequently found himself working in an

impossible situation under difficult conditions with little administrative help. He resigned his post after seven months. The period following Chamberlain's resignation was, according to Larry Fuchser in *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement*, the worst in his life[2]. Later that year (1917) his cousin Norman was killed in battle in France. Chamberlain was very close to Norman and Iain Macleod writes that this death affected him more deeply than his father's, and "sowed in him the seeds of his life-long hatred of war"[3]. The personal tragedy Chamberlain felt over the war (he also lost his cousin Johnny), coupled with the humiliation of failure in office made it easy for him to share in the national disillusionment with war afterwards.

The origin of the appeasers' rather pious convictions, apart from pacifist sentiments, can be traced to a strong attachment to a now old fashioned order. Socialism and internationalism was on the rise and the values attached to the Empire were waning. Those in traditionally higher social positions felt threatened. What Felix Gilbert writes of Henderson can be applied to both Hadow and Chamberlain: "Unintellectual and traditional in his thinking, clinging to the values of the past - like many men of a conformist character in times of changing values - he grasped after a faith, an absolute"[4]. This link with an older - and to their minds, better - era, caused a blinkering of the appeasers' outlook

on the international situation and a slightly paternal attitude in the expression of their policy. The outlook was too simple and left too many gaps in its analysis of the dictators' policies but was put forward in such terms as to make it appear the only clear and reasonable approach. Chamberlain stated at the end of 1937, "We are not drifting; we have a definite objective in front of us. That objective is a general settlement of the grievances of the world without war. We believe that the right way to go about that is not to issue threats, but to try to establish those personal contacts to which I have already alluded, and that only by friendly, frank discussion between the nations can we hope to arrive at a situation when once more we shall be able to remove anxiety from our minds"[5].

Chamberlain's belief in "friendly" and "frank" discussion with Germany illustrates a feature of the Empire legacy that appeasers such as himself, Hadow, and Henderson were still influenced by; namely, the importance of Britain. Because she was so influential, Britain could afford to be magnanimous. Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons in 1938 that Britain was a "great" country, "a country to which countless of millions of people look up for leadership, because they respect her. It is for a great country to do what a small or weak country cannot always afford to do - to show magnanimity, and whoever inspires to lead

her must be ready to ignore abuse"[6]. Hadow felt this so ardently that he constantly called for greater British involvement not only in the Sudeten German question, but earlier in the economic difficulties of Austria. In 1937 he urged Lady Layton in a letter concerning press statements about Germany to "be fair" so that Germany would have to recognise Britain's impartiality and Britain could tell that country to make friends with her neighbours while she watched and counselled. "On these lines you will see that Germany will not only give heed to ALL England says, but you will be surprised how quick will be the progress of peace-making in Europe"[7]. He even believed that a statement from the King during the Munich crisis would carry weight with Hitler. That Hitler might view Britain as a country diminishing in importance and run by old vacillating men did not occur to any of them. One of Henderson's worst mistakes was overestimating his importance to the Nazis as a representative of Britain. Hitler's interest in this diplomat had little to do with British opinion and much to do with sounding out the limit to which he could push this country.

The simplicity of the appeasers' outlook is most apparent in their diagnosis of German intentions. Chamberlain believed at the end of 1937 that Hitler wanted control of Eastern Europe and a close relationship with Austria - but not annexation. He believed

in potential disarmament and the possible return of Germany to the League of Nations, and saw no reason why he could not simply tell Hitler that Britain would recognise his conquests in Eastern Europe if these were achieved peacefully[8]. Hadow and Henderson shared this belief and it was maintained in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. Hadow's assumptions as to German plans were so consistently idealistic that they could only have been a projection of his own wishes. In 1936 he claimed Hitler's motto was "Before North Bohemia, Austria; and both must of themselves come to us"[9]. In May 1938 he wrote of the Sudeten German problem, "Germany does not wish to create minority problems for herself"[10]. In July of that year he stated, "It is...assumed that Germany is incorrigibly aggressive and that no satisfaction of real grievances will make any difference to her policy of aggression...If German aggressiveness should some day be proved by an attack on non-Germans, it would be a case for resistance; but such proof has not been furnished"[11]. Henderson echoed these sentiments to Halifax in August 1938, "For what my opinion is worth the last thing which the Germans want is serious trouble or to be involved in a general war"[12].

Hadow, Henderson, and Chamberlain all shared an irritation with the press - a characteristic which could help to explain a certain amount of sympathy with fascist regimes. Fuchser writes

that Chamberlain became increasingly impatient with the British democratic process which so easily allowed all forms of dissent. He felt there was a flaw in the system "which demanded that the Government reveal its every intention while the fascist states were under no such restrictions"[13]. Henderson wrote that, while he respected the British press, he felt it had handicapped his efforts to improve Anglo-German relations, and that the reports were often biased and unfair: "It did not help me in my diplomatic task if Hitler's back was being constantly rubbed up the wrong way by Press criticisms"[14]. This was exactly the line Hadow took in his aspersions on the Press. In 1937 Hadow sent a private plea to Leeper, Head of the News Department in the Foreign Office, to use his influence in damping certain press articles which "rubbed salt into wounds without doing much constructive good" (he was referring to articles critical of the Nazi regime)[15]. Leeper replied that such action was not within his power, and went so far as to say, "Believe me, it is not the Foreign Office who encourage polemics, but if the pro-Germans here start it, the other side will reply quite rightly"[16]. By "pro-German", Leeper meant J.L. Garvin, editor of *The Observer*, and Lord Rothermere, who he believed were "scared stiff" of Germany and "quite uncontrollable" in their abuse of the Czechs. While the appeasers were responsible in their views on the increasingly violent tone of

the German press, they were, perhaps, secretly envious of the tight control men such as Goebbels had over this institution.

Like Hadow, both Henderson and Chamberlain worked hard at carrying through appeasement, but they were older than Hadow and suffered a certain amount of physical strain. Chamberlain only managed to survive the first year of the Second World War, and Henderson suffered from a complaint which turned out to be throat cancer. The stress of their roles during the late 1930s complicated by illness could have clouded their judgment. Hadow himself apparently went into the hospital in 1939 - a fact he kept secret from all but his closest friends, and the reason for which he told nobody[17].

In addition to the exhausting demands of their roles, a certain amount of social loneliness can account for the obsessive pursuit of appeasement by Henderson and Chamberlain, if not so much in Hadow's case. Chamberlain was quite reserved, forming few friendships and rarely confiding in anyone. Henderson, having spent more time away from his native country than in it, retreated into a caricature of "Englishness", always dressing the part and playing the role as he saw it[18]. This practice coupled with his servile attitude towards the Germans may have done little to endear himself to his contemporaries in the Foreign Office. Hadow was much more of a social person and

loved to entertain but, due to his nature, made as many enemies as he formed loyal friendships. Because of the strength of their convictions and either natural - or, in Hadow's case, self-induced - isolation, all three men inured themselves to criticism. Henderson developed a complete blindness to it, Chamberlain ignored or by-passed it, and Hadow fluctuated between dismissing it or bombarding opponents with his own opinions.

While Hadow and Henderson were both diplomats of similar background and character, Hadow and Chamberlain are comparable in more isolated terms. Chamberlain was a political animal and, although their outlook was basically the same, Chamberlain's background and position were not. The most obvious difference between Hadow and Chamberlain is that the latter directed the policy of appeasement while the former merely championed it. Chamberlain was, thus, automatically concerned with the politics of his policy, but he also went beyond Hadow's idealistic pursuit of appeasement through moral argument. That Hadow was a diplomat and Chamberlain a politician accounts for a large part of this difference; but Hadow did behave quite undiplomatically at times, and Chamberlain often assumed the role of diplomat in his efforts to directly control Britain's foreign policy. Chamberlain was calculating and, according to Fuchser, inclined to view political power as the basis of human relations:

"His personality was such that he could not conceive of any human interaction except on the basis of power, and his leadership rested ultimately on his ability to coerce"[18].

Compared to Hadow, Chamberlain's motives behind appeasement policy were complicated. He shared Hadow's moral conviction in regard to the rightness of his policy, but was manipulative in making sure it was carried out. The shifting of Vansittart to the less influential post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser is one illustration of this side to Chamberlain as is the resignation of Eden. There can be no doubt that the absence of Eden was a relief to Chamberlain, but the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons, "in our view, there was no necessity for my right honourable Friend to leave the Government". He added, "It is for each man to decide for himself what his duty and his conscience enjoin upon him to do"[19].

Chamberlain had a sincere belief in his duty, but was arguably unscrupulous and more cynical in his methods than Hadow. In 1937 when Mussolini wanted *de jure* recognition of his conquest of Abyssinia, Chamberlain wrote a friendly personal letter to the Italian leader without consulting Eden. Eden writes, "I made no difficulty about the incident at the time, thinking that there was no deliberate intent to by-pass me as Foreign Secretary, but that it was merely a slip a Prime Minister new to

international affairs". Eden was wrong, however, as Chamberlain wrote of the episode, "I did not show my letter to the Foreign Secretary, for I had the feeling he would object to it"[20]. Hadow was more direct and not so manipulative - not merely because he was not in a position to manipulate, but because his style was more of a man trying to force his opinions on all those with which he was acquainted. He did, however, attempt to by-pass the official channels in the Foreign Office in order to push his ideas through to those he felt would be more sympathetic.

In his whole-hearted support for appeasement Hadow developed a strong loyalty to Chamberlain which, had Hadow's position in the Foreign Office been higher, the Prime Minister might have made more use of, as he made use of Henderson's. From the time that Chamberlain assumed power and Hadow wrote to Henderson of his approval of the new Prime Minister, (see page 275) the First Secretary consistently defended his leader as Britain's primary hope for maintaining peace. Hadow was constantly aware of those he perceived to be doing all they could "to undermine and weaken the position in this country of the Prime Minister"[21], and of "continuous attempts to pull down and scatter all that the Prime Minister had so wisely built up"[22]. This was one of the reasons Hadow kept trying to reach Chamberlain with his ideas and memoranda. Hadow obviously

felt that it was important that Chamberlain was fully informed and presented with the most choices in carrying out his policy, but he probably also believed it was important to let Chamberlain know he had at least one ally in the Foreign Office and could count on that minority of support.

In attempting contact with Chamberlain Hadow was not as direct as with Henderson and approached the Prime Minister by sending memoranda and recommendations to people such as Hutchison and Butler, requesting that these be shown to Chamberlain. Hadow was encouraged to a certain degree by both. In August 1938 he wrote to Hutchison asking him to read some enclosed memoranda, and, if he agreed with them, to put them before the Prime Minister for whom they had apparently been written. Hadow requested their authorship be kept secret, however[23]. Less than a week later Hutchison replied, "I have read your letter and burnt it. I take your view so strongly that I am leaving shooting and going to London tomorrow Thursday night to try and catch the P.M. on Friday in London[24].

Hutchison did catch up with Chamberlain. On August 19 Chamberlain wrote to Halifax that Hutchison had telephoned that morning with an urgent request that he see him as he had important information to communicate. Hutchison apparently told Chamberlain that he had learned through various contacts

that Hitler "meant business this time" and it was essential that, if the German leader was to be stopped, Britain should approach him and come to some understanding with him as soon as possible. "There was really nothing new in what Hutch had to say", wrote Chamberlain, "but perhaps it may usefully be compared with von Kleist"*. According to Chamberlain, Hutchison had left a long memorandum of his views[26].

Hadow later wrote to Hutchison thanking him for letting him know of his "interview" with the Prime Minister. He enclosed more information for Hutchison, adding, "Butler would probably object to my approaching the P.M. direct so that there can be no question of my, or your, sending on the copy enclosed". If, however, Hutchison could "recast" the information so as not to betray its origin for Chamberlain's "personal use", Hadow wrote he would gladly take the risk[27].

*Later part of the unsuccessful coup attempt of July 1944, Edwald von Kleist-Schemzin had come to Britain to warn the Government of Hitler's intentions. Von Kleist stated that Britain was no longer in danger of war but in the presence of the certainty of it and there was no prospect of a reasonable policy being pursued by Germany so long as Hitler was in power. He believed, however, that if war could avoided, this might act as a catalyst to the end of the present regime in Germany[25].

Chamberlain was also guilty of the tendency to avoid the advice of all save those in agreement with him. He, in particular, preferred the advice of "amateurs" such as Sir Horace Wilson who was Chief Industrial Adviser to the Government and had little experience in foreign affairs. This tendency was all the more dangerous when applied to the claims of Hitler and fellow-Nazis as opposed to those of clear-sighted diplomats such as Rumbold and Phipps . It was moreover a tendency which was likely to encourage Hadow to try to reach the Prime Minister with his memoranda. In September 1938 Chamberlain wrote to his sister just before Hitler's belligerent speech at Nuremberg that he believed Hitler would not present an ultimatum at Nuremberg but his future plans were uncertain. Fuchser writes, "On this and other occasions, Chamberlain's analysis as he presented it to his sister was a restatement of Henderson's despatches. It therefore seems that Henderson's views, perhaps because they so approximated his own, almost always received Chamberlain's closest attention"[28]. This could also be true of those recommendations and memoranda of Hadow's which managed to filter through to Chamberlain.

Hadow's respect for Chamberlain stemmed partly from an approach to foreign relations which both expressed as an appeal to reason. This was part of the pre-World War I legacy of the belief in the victory of rationality over passion. The suppression of emotion, it was felt, and the reliance on logic and goodwill, would bring about the solution to any conflict. Chamberlain's family tradition caused him to adopt this approach more rigidly than Hadow who applied it to communication and cooperation between states and the suppression of personal suffering and pain; but Hadow was younger and more volatile than Chamberlain, and prone to passionate appeals on behalf of appeasement. Like Chamberlain, he would state his argument as the only practical one, but would punctuate it with impassioned pleas for "fairness" which were underscored, put in upper case letters, or ended with an exclamation mark. Chamberlain purposely rejected this style in his speeches because he wanted the public to believe that peace was possible and to avoid the mass hysteria of war[29].

The suppression of emotion was more evident in Chamberlain, but both he and Hadow often adopted overbearing attitudes in promotion of their policy. William Rock writes of Chamberlain, "He could be stern, obstinate, and uncompromising, quite intolerant and sometimes rude toward those who did not share his views"[30]. A.L. Rowse writes in *All*

Souls and Appeasement, that if one had not got a duodenal ulcer to begin with "he [Chamberlain] was enough to start one off"[31]. Those who knew or worked with Hadow are all in agreement that he could be quite overpowering. One friend wrote to Hadow while the latter was in Kitzbuhl, "if you ski as violently as you growl, I should not think there is a person in K[itzbuhl] with whom you have not yet collided"[32].

In outlook, Hadow and Chamberlain varied to some degree again due to the political machinations of Chamberlain; for example, both wanted to exclude Russia from any form of European agreement, but Chamberlain felt less threatened by communism than Hadow. He was suspicious of the bolsheviks but was not so concerned about the ideology of communism, and felt that agreement with the dictators was a crucial enough pursuit that the additional argument of fascism acting as a bulwark against communism was unnecessary[33]. Hadow, as already shown, encompassed all the standard fears of communism, which were, in fact, linked to his fears of a second world war. By 1939 he was writing of Soviet intentions to "stand on the sidelines until the ebb and flow of war shall have provided them with opportunity for a successful appeal to the war-weary masses of all nations by which they may justifiably calculate upon winning the ultimate victory for the Proletariat against

Capitalism and true Democracy"[34]. Hadow and Chamberlain also differed over the guarantee to Poland in 1939. Hadow felt that it made no sense, but Chamberlain saw the political necessity of it in the public reaction to the German invasion of Prague and the importance of displaying some form of deterrent to Hitler.

Hadow and Chamberlain did bear a resemblance to each other on the questions of disarmament and rearmament, and in the importance both attached to economics. The difference between the two men in these issues again lies in the importance of politics to Chamberlain. In the early 1930s Hadow supported disarmament and put forward his own suggestions as to how it should be carried out, mainly through a four-power pact between Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, and through pressure on a hesitant France[35]. At this time, Chamberlain held a commitment to rearmament, but, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, he felt the need to cut defence in order to balance the budget. He gained influence in the rearmament program but modified the Defence Requirements Committee Report, his primary motivation being fiscal restraint. A further motivation was opposition to a continental army like that prior to the First World War[36]. After 1935 Hadow and Chamberlain began adopting the same views on rearmament. Both used the argument that Britain was not militarily prepared to combat the growing strength of Germany.

Hadow used this argument rather hypocritically, having supported disarmament to begin with, although he added the rider that there was a shortage of men willing to "man the guns"[37]. It could be argued that, like Chamberlain, Hadow was using this latter defence to support a conclusion on foreign policy he had already reached.

Both Hadow and Chamberlain believed that a country's strength and political health depended on its economic vitality. Chamberlain was influenced in this respect from his background in trade and fiscal responsibility in the early 1930s. Hadow had been appointed commercial secretary while in Persia and Turkey along with his other duties and had thrown himself wholeheartedly into the work involved in this position. While Chamberlain was originally concentrating on the economic health of Britain, Hadow took a special interest in the economic situation of those countries to which he was posted, particularly Austria. Hadow constantly urged economic cooperation with Europe, outlining plans which made a point of including Germany. Hadow's argument was that an economically strong Germany would become more responsible and less likely to force Europe into war[38]. Chamberlain later came to express the same view in objecting to a Foreign Office idea of countering German economic expansion in the Balkans with a revived Danubian

Federation. He was doubtful that the strengthening of Germany's economic situation was necessarily bad, and suggested that its improvement might quieten Germany and make her less interested in political adventures[39].

The similarity between Hadow and Chamberlain thus lies in their adoption of the policy of appeasement and their conclusion that it was the most sensible course of action. The difference is in the method of adoption. Chamberlain was instrumental in the formulation of this policy and his pursuit of it was, at times, ruthless. He not only ignored the advice of those not in agreement with him, but sidetracked or disposed of them whenever possible. Hadow was more inclined to try and convince those who disagreed with him that he was right, although he often failed to address certain arguments which were presented to him and put stress on those statements which supported his reasoning.

The similarity between Hadow and Henderson in the appeasement years was more acute and at times they appeared to be speaking with one voice. Both adopted the self-righteous tone of appeasement and used their "moral rectitude" to overstep the boundaries of their positions. While Hadow defended his undiplomatic actions through his deep convictions and patriotism, Henderson wrote in the same manner to Halifax, "the stakes for which we are playing are too high to allow me to

remain silent on a matter on which I feel so strongly"[40]. Henderson and Hadow, like Chamberlain, came to believe ardently in the moral duty of their actions - an error that came about partly through their disillusionment with war. In the Foreign Office Hadow saw himself as part of a minority in his desire for peace at all costs, and his growing indiscretion and bias in his reports probably partly originated from this feeling. While in Czechoslovakia, Hadow wrote to O'Malley, "I would ask you to believe that nothing matters to me more than the prevention of war and the maintenance of true democracy"[41]. In London Hadow wrote to Hutchison that he preferred to take the risk of incurring official displeasure to "sitting and watching events with that fatal official complacency", and added, "I fear you will think I am a very bad official; but trust you will believe in my patriotism, which transcends the narrow bonds of officialdom"[42]. To Henderson he wrote, "I hope you will succeed and wish I could help; but in the Northern Department one is side-tracked and anyhow a 1st Secretary is easily smothered though, as you will see, not silenced!"[43]. It was this sense of moral isolation expressed by Hadow which made his (as well as Henderson's and Chamberlain's) form of appeasement not too far removed from a dangerous fanaticism.

Henderson, even after his debacle in Berlin expressed a

belief that he had a "mission" beyond the duties of a British diplomat in Germany: "When I left the Argentine Republic in March 1937, it had been my supreme ambition and my earnest prayer to play a part, however humble, in contributing to the preservation of world peace. I believed that this could only be ensured through Anglo-German co-operation, and for two years I fought with all my heart and strength for that end"[44]. Henderson, it seems, pictured himself in the role of a "great ambassador", making his mark in history. (Unfortunately, the mark he made was not the one he pictured). Like Hadow, he sensed a lack of sympathy from the Foreign Office and by-passed his immediate superiors through direct correspondence with Halifax.

Just after Henderson replaced Sir Eric Phipps in Berlin April 1937, he made a speech to the German-English Society about which he himself writes, [it]aroused considerable criticism in certain circles in England and earned for me in some British journals the appellation of 'Our Nazi British Ambassador in Berlin'. I have never felt the least remorse for that speech" [45]. The speech and others Henderson made in Berlin did not escape Hadow's attention and he sent the new Ambassador to Berlin a letter concerning the recent changes in the Cabinet and the effects these would have on British policy. Hadow had apparently heard

through Sir Kingsley Wood that Henderson was felt to have struck "the right note" in his first speeches in Germany by both the Cabinet and Chamberlain, and that Henderson could reckon on the latter's support along these lines. Hadow had also received the message that Chamberlain meant to direct the foreign policy of Britain himself instead of letting it be governed from departments in Whitehall. "I apologise for repeating what is no doubt stale news to you; but I was so cheered myself by this information - whatever may be Sir Kingsley Wood's influence or lack of influence in the Cabinet - that I felt I must pass it on!" Hadow added in a postscript that if Henderson had any comments to make on certain of his despatches they would be useful in reinforcing what he (Hadow) had tried to put forward "as to the right way to promote better relations between this country and Germany and so promoting peace in our time instead of the reverse"[46].

Hadow had no doubts as to the wisdom of Chamberlain's course of action and he obviously felt he had an ally in Henderson. In May 1938 he sent the latter a memorandum he had written for Strang, noting that it had "fortunately" come to the notice of the Secretary of State, "who - against the opinion of the Pundits of the Office who were aghast and unhappy at its bluntness - pleased to endorse it". Hadow continued, "All that you have said will of

course come true; but here the clique who would not allow of any right on the German side are still doing what they can to bring on the day of reckoning". Hadow reassured Henderson that his telegrams and those of Newton were receiving anxious attention in political circles. Hadow also sent Henderson a copy of a memorandum he wrote on Russia which was endorsed by Halifax, but Hadow felt it had little effect in the Office. He added that he had no authority to send on these documents and hinted that he had "certain contacts" within the Cabinet, "but this I should not say and I cannot claim that they are really effective in action". Hadow concluded, "May I wish you all success in your fight"[47].

Like the majority of appeasers Hadow and Henderson were determined to view Nazism with an "open mind", they felt more at home with Germanic people, they were convinced that the peace of Europe hinged on an understanding between Britain and Germany, and they sincerely believed that Germany was not intending to start a war. Both felt strongly that the biggest mistake in British and French foreign policy would be to exclude Germany politically and economically. Henderson wrote in *Failure of a Mission* that Europe would never be stable until Germany achieved prosperity. "The theory that, if Hitler were treated as a pariah, the German nation would itself overturn him

and his regime had no foundation in fact, and was merely the outcome of wishful thinking. The reverse was actually the case, and the denial of help and the refusal of all sympathetic understanding merely drove the nation to despair and to cling closer to him as the sole defender of German interests"[48].

While both Hadow and Henderson did their best to excuse the excesses of Germany and the Nazi regime, neither felt any qualms in taking a belligerent attitude towards Benes and the Czechs. Hadow attempted to be fair to the Czechoslovak President from the beginning of his appointment to Prague, but ended up referring to Benes as a schemer who made democracy a misnomer for the state of Czechoslovakia. Henderson called the Czechs "a pig-headed race" and believed Benes was "not the least pig-headed among them"[49]. During the May Crisis of 1938 Henderson accused the Czechs of spreading rumours of German troop concentrations "for the express purpose of serving as a pretext for planned partial Czech mobilisation"[50]. Hadow wrote that he "reluctantly" endorsed the suspicion that Benes was behind the military moves, intending to wreck Hodza's negotiations for a compromise. He continued, "in this case I most earnestly endorse Sir N. Henderson's estimate of Germany's absolute determination to secure justice for the *Sudetendeutsche*; by peaceful persuasion if possible, but, if not, by early use of

force"[51]. If Henderson was more frank than Hadow about his affinity with the Germans, he was also more outspoken in his antipathy towards the Czechs. While Hadow at least tried to keep up a thin semblance of fairness to the Czechs as a whole, Henderson confided at the Nuremberg Party Conference of 1938 that he had no personal sympathy at all with the Czechs, and considered the placing of Sudeten Germans under Czech domination to be a grave mistake. He apparently expressed his aversion to the Czechs in very strong terms[52].

Both Hadow and Henderson misinterpreted the decision-making process in Germany; seeing it as a struggle between moderates and extremists. At the height of the Czech crisis, Henderson wrote about "Hitler's own love for peace, dislike of dead Germans, and hesitation of risking his regime on a gambler's throw"[53]. He became involved in a complicated game designed to support "moderates" in Nazi Germany and, at one point wrote to Halifax, "My impression is that Hitler is being not only egged on but deliberately misled by the extremist faction here"[54]. In 1938 Hadow wrote that Germany's leadership was in a struggle between two opposing groups for the "soul" of Hitler. On the one hand were Ribbentrop, Goebbels, and Himmler "who are on the side of a violent solution of Germany's problems by means of an attack upon the Democracies". Opposed to them,

according to Hadow, were Goering, the army leaders, and "the vast mass of 'moderates'" of all classes "who are convinced...that Britain is desirous of peaceful settlement with Germany and afraid of the issues of Ribbentrop's adventures"[55].

Hadow and Henderson's sharing of outlook can be attributed to some degree to a similarity in background and character. Both came from a privileged class and attended public school. Neither had spent much time in Britain apart from their schooling, but they shared a strong identification with the British Empire and perceived a crumbling of this edifice. Henderson and Hadow combated the insecurity they felt with regard to twentieth century changes in their own ways: Henderson identifying himself with all he believed to be typically British, and Hadow averring a strong and unwavering patriotism. Their response to what they perceived as growing weakness within the British and European system caused them to view the repressiveness of dictatorial regimes (apart from the Soviet Union) with a certain amount of sympathy. Henderson believed that dictators were not always reprehensible and were often necessary[56]. He had been posted to Turkey just before Hadow in the early 1920s and wrote that Mustapha Kemal had built up a new Turkey on the ruins of the old and that "his expulsion of the Greeks, which perhaps suggested to Hitler that he should do the same in Germany with

the Jews, has already been forgotten and forgiven"[57].

Hadow was not so enamoured of Kemal or the Turks as Henderson but shared his impatience with liberal regimes. Carefully saving all his despatches from the 1930s, Hadow intended to write an "inside history" of why democracy fails "because it looks at local instead of world events and 'too late' is its motto"[58]. A good many of Hadow's and Henderson's postings before the Second World War were with right-wing repressive regimes. Both had been posted to Turkey, and Henderson was later posted to Belgrade where he was labelled pro-Yugoslav and pro-dictator[59]. Both were sent to Argentina; Henderson just before he went to Berlin, and Hadow just after his posting in London.

Felix Gilbert writes in *The Diplomats* that it is a danger in the diplomatic profession that those sent abroad often associate themselves with the government to which they have been assigned and defend its policies; "this tendency grows in direct proportion to resistance of the home office to such persuasion"[60]. While this is applicable to Henderson, it is less so to Hadow who tended to feel more affinity to a particular people than to a regime in the countries he was posted. Hadow's selective sympathy for "underdogs" coloured his view. He despised the Turks for their treatment of the Kurdish tribes and the Greeks, and despised the

Czechs for their treatment of the Sudeten Germans. His great liking for the Austrians was influenced by his regret over their declining economic state. But the Nazi treatment of the Jews failed to strike an equally sympathetic note in Hadow. This may be due to a certain amount of anti-semitism which he shared with Henderson, Chamberlain, and other appeasers[61]; or it may be that had Hadow been posted to Germany as he requested, sympathy for the Jews may have been aroused. This was apparently not the case with Henderson.

The similarity in Hadow and Henderson's analysis of the European situation probably arose at least partially from Hadow's access to Henderson's telegrams and despatches. The basis of these officials' outlook was already the same; in which case Hadow was likely to pay a large amount of attention to all that Henderson reported. That Hadow, unlike his colleagues in the Foreign Office, was inclined to accept Henderson's statements at face-value in the same manner that Henderson fell victim to the deceit of the Nazis demonstrates a lack of scepticism in both men when it came to reading statements which reinforced their wishes. Felix Gilbert writes that Henderson was "probably by nature the least sceptical man alive"[62]. Hadow was perhaps a little less guilty, but this did not stop him from accepting reports from the Sudeten Germans without question.

Henderson was also probably a worse culprit as regards listening to what he wanted to hear and interpreting events to suit his outlook. As Rock points out Henderson did not fail to notice the dangers in Nazi policies or even to be irritated by them[63]. But this official had determined his course even before he arrived in Berlin as he himself admits[64]. So, like Hadow, he concentrated on what appealed to him or helped to prove his point and discarded that which contradicted it. While their form of optimism was welcomed by Chamberlain and his cabinet, the simplicity of it was irritating to officials in the Foreign Office such as Sargent. Ian Colvin writes in *Vansittart in Office* of Henderson's "irascible exchanges" with Sargent, "who put penetrating questions to him about German protestations that the Reich had no control over the Sudeten Germans"[65].

That Hadow and Henderson were quick to see where their views were most welcome demonstrates a lack of diplomacy on both their parts which was a further source of irritation to the Foreign Office. Cadogan eventually reprimanded Hadow in October 1938 for his circumvention of his immediate superiors, and, of Henderson, to whom he was initially sympathetic, Cadogan came to write, "N.H. really does want a gentle jab in the mouth occasionally"[66].

If Hadow's and Henderson's behaviour frustrated the

Foreign Office, it suited the needs of Chamberlain in carrying out his policy and the relative weakness of the Foreign Office added encouragement to the two officials. Both were vigorous and unshakeable in their pursuit of appeasement from 1937 to 1939, even after committing drastic errors. On March 11, 1938 Henderson claimed he did not believe Hitler was thinking in terms of *Anschluss* or annexation[67]. The next day German troops marched into Vienna. Hadow made the same mistake just before the attack on Poland. Both officials, in their enthusiasm for the Chamberlain's policy, unwittingly but determinedly adopted the narrow vision associated with appeasement.

Outside Support

The appeasement of Hadow, Chamberlain, and Henderson was not merely a product of their character and background, but also a reflection of a mood prevalent among some politicians and officials in Britain. This mood found expression in Mosley's Fascist movement, in the Anglo-German Group set up in 1933 under Lord Allen of Hurtwood, in public speeches and letters to newspapers on Anglo-German cooperation, and in books such as *Ourselves and Germany* by Lord Londonderry. As in the case of Chamberlain and Henderson, Hadow was not slow in observing

those who had influence and who shared his opinions, and he maintained unofficial contact with as many as possible - especially after he was posted to London - despite the undiplomatic behaviour his actions entailed. These contacts usually involved Members of Parliament or public figures, although he also had at least one contact in the Cabinet.

Hadow's chances of success in influence in the Cabinet lay, as he realised, with those favoured by Chamberlain who interpreted their jobs with official realism as opposed to political idealism. In order to better guarantee a free hand in the direction of Foreign policy, Chamberlain had surrounded himself with civil servants whose opinions did not necessarily match his, but whose loyalty and general agreement made his course easier. Neville Thompson writes "Chamberlain preferred Cabinet Ministers whose detached, unemotional and empirical approach to problems made them resemble good civil servants rather than politicians in touch with the mood of the electorate. Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir John Simon, Lord Halifax, and Sir Kingsley Wood were his idea of what a cabinet minister should be, not the emotional and temperamental Anthony Eden and Duff Cooper"[68]. It was in such people - whose characters in many ways were the antipathy of his, but whose outlook was similar - that Hadow saw a chance for fulfilment of the policy he endorsed. They placed

hopes in a European solution to German aggression which by-passed rearmament and collective security, and Hadow hoped to assist in providing the solution. He, thus, made overtures to Sir Kingsley Wood who was felt to be closer than most to Chamberlain.

Kingsley Wood had been Minister of Health until May 1938 when he replaced Lord Swinton as Air Minister. Despite the financial restrictions on the Air Ministry, Swinton had managed to provide shadow factories for production of aircraft, begun designs to improve air staff requirements, and developed a radar system. Wood's instincts, however, leaned more toward accommodation of Germany, and on assuming office, he shelved the plan for a Vickers shadow factory at Castle Bromwich which Swinton claimed would have greatly increased the number of Spitfires at the Battle of Britain[69]. Maurice Cowling writes of Wood, "If his critics spoke of him as a 'cynical professional', that meant merely that he registered the civic mind and was the successful propagator of a reactionary reassurance foreign to the elevating half-truths of aristocratic idealism"[70].

The first record of Hadow's communicating with Wood comes just after his arrival in London in August 1937. Hadow sent some of his despatches from Prague to Wood, stating that there could be no objection to their being made use of. Hadow

expressed the hope that Wood would present his "case" to the Cabinet and "stop the drift that is leading Central Europe towards the abyss of war"[71]. In this letter Hadow mentioned that Wood had visited Prague and talked to Benes. It is probably then that Wood met up with Hadow and a similarity in views encouraged the First Secretary to maintain this contact when he was posted to London. Duff Cooper wrote of Wood, "He clings to the idea of friendship with Germany and hates the thought of getting too closely tied up with the French"[72]. In April 1938 Wood and Simon argued strongly in the Cabinet against any new commitment to France[73]. Hadow sent memoranda to Wood throughout 1938, usually just before Cabinet meetings on foreign policy, and these were accompanied by letters asking Wood to use what influence he could on the course of British foreign policy. Hadow was obviously aware of Wood's closeness to the Prime Minister, and he must have been encouraged to a certain degree by this Minister, although there is no evidence of any replies from Wood.

Of those in Chamberlain's "inner circle" the Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax fits less easily than the others into the category of appeaser. Hadow did not try to influence Halifax in the way that he approached Wood and had little direct contact with the former, probably because he was more answerable to the

Foreign Secretary for his actions as an official in the Foreign Office. But Halifax did fulfil Chamberlain's policy to the best of his ability as a loyal civil servant, and Hadow made attempts to sway him indirectly through public figures such as Lord Noel-Buxton.

Halifax had taken over as Foreign Secretary after Eden's resignation in February 1938, much to the relief of Chamberlain, who had found Eden to be increasingly uncooperative in his foreign policy, particularly in regard to Italy. To Halifax, foreign affairs were not a matter of absorbing interest and his approach towards Chamberlain's course, although not convinced, was pragmatic. Lord Birkenhead wrote of Halifax, "it sometimes seemed to others that he was doing his work at the Foreign Office as an unpleasant duty, that he had no strong convictions about it, and few preconceived views about European problems"[74]. Halifax understood Chamberlain's policy to be to show Hitler he could get most of what he wanted as long as he did not start a war, and he carried out this policy until, even to him, it appeared unfeasible. To begin with he was sufficiently in agreement with such a policy that he maintained a personal correspondence with Neville Henderson on Germany. Keith Middlemas writes, "Halifax was amenable to any advice put forthrightly enough. Aloof but tolerant, he could always be jolted by reference to his duty or to the moral implications of diplomatic decisions"[75].

It could be that Hadow was aware, to a certain extent, of these aspects of Halifax. Some of his memoranda were sent to the Foreign Secretary through Noel-Buxton, their authorship being kept secret. In September 1938 Halifax was becoming doubtful of Chamberlain's policy with regard to Czechoslovakia and began drifting towards the hard-liners in the Foreign Office and supporting the enforcement of a warning to Germany. Chamberlain eventually managed to swing him back to his line of thought, but not without some convincing. During this time Hadow sent directly to Halifax - on the suggestion of Birkenhead - an analysis of Czechoslovakian answers to the demands of the Sudeten Germans, which had been requested by Halifax. Hadow wrote that he was sending it for the Foreign Secretary's private information only "in case you should need it at this morning's Cabinet and not yet have time to receive it officially"[76]. It is possible that Hadow had got wind of Halifax's crisis of conscience and was doing what he could to help redirect the Foreign Secretary's support towards Chamberlain's policy.

The resignation of Eden brought with it the resignation of Lord Cranborne, who had been Under-Parliamentary Secretary of State and he was replaced by another civil servant more loyal to Chamberlain, R.A. Butler. A contemporary wrote of Butler during this time, "Butler is not handicapped by genius,

originality or emotion. He is an ideally efficient Minister, industrious, full of accurate information which he is too cautious to divulge"[77]. That Hadow felt he had an ally in Butler is understandable given the statements the new Parliamentary Under-Secretary made about Anglo-German relations on assuming office. Butler stated repeatedly that he hoped for a close and trusting relationship with Germany and would do all he could to promote this goal. The German Embassy in London received the impression that Butler "is quite sympathetic toward Germany and has no prejudices against us, and that his attitude toward the French orientation is understanding but critical"[78].

Hadow's correspondence with Butler was limited to official minutes and memoranda until June 1938 when he began writing personal letters to this minister. The first one began, "I realise - none better - the impropriety of addressing myself 'out of turn' and behind the backs of my superiors to you; only sheer fear of the results of the present drift driving me so to do". Hadow went on to ask, "Are we so afraid to take the initiative and assume responsibilities in order to save peace...?"[79]. That Hadow felt inclined (if not compelled) to tell his superiors what action they should take seems obvious, but, if his communications sounded impatient at times, they were never disrespectful. His letters to Butler often began "without wishing to bother you", or "Though

loth to spoil your weekend" before commencing with a usually long explanation of the dire situation in Europe. Like Kingsley Wood, it is uncertain whether or not Hadow received encouragement from Butler, but he apparently received no discouragement and continued to write to this minister throughout the summer. It is likely that both Wood and Butler found Hadow's information useful, especially as it went along with their line of thinking. If his actions were thus not strictly in line with his duties, they were willing to turn a blind eye as merely receiving his letters and memoranda would not hurt them to any great extent.

Of his contacts outside the Government and Foreign Office, Lord Noel Buxton was one with whom Hadow corresponded a great deal in the late 1930s. The once Labour M.P. and author of several publications on history and politics was in general agreement with Hadow on foreign policy, especially on the subject of Germany and Czechoslovakia. According to Richard Griffiths in *Fellow Travellers of the Right* Noel-Buxton deplored the anti-German policy found in debates in the House of Commons; and, although he was aware of the violence and repressive measures characteristic of the new Germany, he managed to find excuses for them. In an article entitled "England and Germany" Noel-Buxton wrote "there is a solid base of reason which gives

strength to German demands; this is particularly true with regard to the former German colonies, and also to the sufferings of the 'Sudeten Deutsch' minority in Czechoslovakia. It must be the aim of British statesmen, not only for the sake of peace, but in the interests of...world justice..., to come to terms with Germany over the whole field of foreign policy"[80].

After corresponding with Hadow throughout the first half of 1938, Noel-Buxton sent him a copy of a letter he had written to Halifax. In the letter he thanked the Foreign Secretary for letting him see a memorandum on a possible plebiscite for Czechoslovakia, and went on to make recommendations similar to Hadow's: "We should tell Benes that, if he does not in a short time reach an agreed settlement with the Sudeten Germans, and if the Sudeten Germans (having failed to obtain autonomy) appeal for a plebiscite, on the question of transfer to Germany, Great Britain would have publicly to make it clear that she could not support resistance to self-determination"[81]. Hadow thought Noel-Buxton's letter was "excellent", but remained dubious on whether such recommendations would be followed by action on the part of the government. He wrote to Noel-Buxton, "I beg you if you possible can not to be put off from SEEING HALIFAX and trying to convince him of the utter urgency of the situation and the paramount need of sending an emissary - with Cabinet sanction -

to Prague"[82]. Noel-Buxton's reply, despite his sympathy with Hadow's cause, was not so encouraging; he wrote that he could not see what more to do and added, "I saw Halifax so lately that I must take care not to put him against me by boring him"[83]. Noel-Buxton had also approached Cadogan on the subject who recorded in his diary in July 1938: "Noel-Buxton at 5: wants us to threaten Czechs with plebiscite. Told him why we didn't approve"[84].

Like Hadow, Noel-Buxton felt an affinity with the German people which coloured his views on foreign policy. The origin of this feeling in Hadow could probably be found during his posting in Austria, but Noel-Buxton's dates as far back as 1912 when he stated in an interview to the *Daily Chronicle*, "I want to insist on the fact that there is no essential conflict of interest between the Germans and ourselves...There is ample room in the world for the commercial ambitions of both people"[85]. When Hitler gained power in 1933, Noel-Buxton wrote to *The Times*: "However much we, with our English tradition see to deplore in the German situation, we must admit that the Allied policy since the war is mainly responsible for the abnormal psychology of today. Would it not perhaps be produced in similar circumstances in other countries with a degree of violence at least as great?"[86].

Apart from Noel-Buxton, Hadow was also in touch with

Captain Archibald Ramsay and Sir Arnold Wilson. Conservative M.P. for Peebles, Ramsay was prominent in the Right Club which was part of the anti-war movement. His background was similar to Hadow's: he had come from a long line of Scottish military men, was educated at Eton and Sandhurst, and took part in World War I when he was wounded invalided out of the army. In 1937 Ramsay suddenly became aware of the "Communist menace" and was chairman of the United Christian Front, one of his chief concerns being the maintenance of Christian society against the "godless". Ramsay's sympathy with Germany combined with his anti-communist feelings caused him to join the Coordinating Committee in 1938, a gathering of right wing groups formed to present a united front against Communism[87]. Hadow appeared aware of Ramsay's anti-communist sentiment as he often mentioned Russia in his correspondence with this M.P.

Wilson was a Conservative M.P. for Hitchin, Hertfordshire, whom Gilbert and Gott describe as a Parliamentary Appeaser[88]. Griffiths writes that he was a complicated appeaser. After visiting Nazi Germany in 1934, Wilson developed a strange mixture of admiration and repulsion for the regime. He was impressed by Hitler who left on his mind "an indelible impression of single-mindedness, with great reserves of strength"; but he defended the Jews and criticised

Nazi regimentation. *The Manchester Guardian* described Wilson as "the most consistent panegyric of the new regime that we have yet heard"[89]. The European situation after 1936 drove Wilson towards a desire for an alliance with Germany and this is when he fell in line with Hadow. In the summer of 1938 Hadow wrote to both Ramsay and Wilson asking them to raise certain questions in Parliament. Wilson did, in fact, raise the questions suggested by Hadow on Czechoslovakia, but Ramsay appeared too concerned with the spread of Russian influence in China and the legitimacy of the incorporation of the Ukraine and Georgia into the Soviet Union.

Hadow also had some correspondence with Barrington-Ward, the Deputy Editor and Chief Leader-Writer of *The Times* from 1934. According to Gilbert and Gott Ward "supported and encouraged [Geoffrey] Dawson [editor of *The Times*] in devoting *The Times* to a more thorough and consistent appeasement policy than any other newspaper"[90]. In September 1938 Hadow sent Ward an analysis of Czech proposals for the Sudeten Germans. "I need hardly add", Hadow wrote, "that I show my faith in this respect in the scrupulous impartiality of the 'Times' by laying before you documents which will I trust show you how far the proposals are from being what they purport to be"[91]. (No doubt, Hadow interpreted *The Times* leanings

towards appeasement as impartial). Ward thanked Hadow for allowing him to see the "valuable studies" of the proposals, remarking that they were a striking exposure of limitations. "In any case peace will not now be secured without a much more drastic solution, and we must all hope that the P.M.'s courageous tactics will, even now, open a way to it"[92].

The public figures with whom Hadow corresponded show the extent to which the concern for European peace and justice for Germany could lead to a belief in Hitler's good intentions. Noel-Buxton and another friend of Hadow's, Corder Catchpool, were both members of the Anglo-German Group whose main aim was to maintain good relations between countries and which had a strong pacifist element. According to Griffiths the group was innocent in nature and fired by a concern for good relations between Britain and Germany. Hadow probably watched the activities of this group with great interest. It carried on from 1933 although many of its original members soon became aware of its impossibility with Hitler in power. Ramsay and Wilson represented the concern of many in Parliament for coming to terms with Germany, while Barrington-Ward showed a slant in the press towards this aim. The goal was maintenance of peace and Hadow probably felt he was not only in touch with the British public through his associations with these men, but that he could

help to enlighten it even further through his efforts, and thus put pressure on the Government to act. Hadow interpreted the public feeling as possessing "a will to appeasement".

Ministers such as Kingsley Wood and Butler are identifiable as appeasers and the fact that Hadow gravitated towards such men is understandable. But appeasement, even as late as 1938, was not excluded to the fanatics. Just after Munich, the letters of support sent to Chamberlain included one from Roosevelt and one from Baldwin, and even Eden wished luck to the Prime Minister before his last meeting with Hitler. Larry Fuchser points out that it was not just naive and foolish old men who believed the Munich agreement had some chance of success, and that it was difficult to foresee the future course of events. He also notes, however, that many of the letters written after Munich represent an immediate outpouring of emotion[93].

This latter point grows in significance with the drop in support for Chamberlain's policy in 1939. Hadow's "contacts" decreased during this time not merely because Cadogan discovered his indiscretion in October 1938. His engagements diary for 1939 records meetings with Noel-Buxton and Ramsay, but no more attempts to reach Kingsley Wood or Butler are apparent and, particularly after the invasion of Prague, Hadow probably began to find himself more isolated in his opinions. It

was the pragmatism of the Ministers that appealed to Hadow to begin with because it coincided with his belief in a "reasonable approach" to foreign policy. This is rather ironic as Hadow himself was emotional and volatile, although constant in his opinions. But the pragmatic approach which he saw in these men arose out of a lack of conviction which caused them to drift towards appeasement in 1938 in the avoidance of any unpleasant confrontation. It was equally this lack of conviction which caused them to drift away from Chamberlain's policy when it grew clearly untenable, and when public opinion began to turn against it.

Because these men were civil servants at heart, they could not be relied upon to maintain a policy - even in loyalty to their Prime Minister - in the face of strong opposition and weighty evidence. Kingsley Wood's cautiousness, for example, kept him in the Government where he eventually became Chancellor of the Exchequer, while it was he who had to advise Chamberlain to resign in 1940. (Cadogan once scathingly referred to Wood as "a chicken-hearted little mutton-head"[94]). Hadow was sent off to Argentina on the eve of the war and from then on his career was mildly successful but never fulfilled its promising start; while Henderson retired after Berlin having been refused the posting back to Belgrade. Halifax, however, went on to become

Ambassador in the United States, and Butler rose through the ranks to become Deputy Prime Minister in 1962. Because these men never embraced a policy fervently in the manner that Chamberlain, Henderson, and Hadow did, they survived the aftermath and recriminations of the Chamberlain years, and the taint of appeasement did not damage their careers. Hadow was probably correct in assuming that his approaches to them in 1938 might meet with success, but he would have been optimistic to assume that he could hold them to a steady conviction whatever the course of events that followed.

The Middle Ground: Cazalet

The line between appeasers and anti-appeasers in the 1930s was not always definite, although the two camps became more discernible from 1938 to 1939. Opinions regarding Germany's intentions, the threat implied by Russia, and the involvement of Britain in European affairs were mixed and sometimes contradictory in respect of the motives behind the pursuit of appeasement. One of Hadow's associates and close friends Captain Victor Cazalet can be seen as a bridge between the two factions of appeasement and anti-appeasement, which made his agreement with Hadow on certain points understandable, and, in the end, his ultimate rejection of the philosophy of appeasement at

the same time possible. Cazalet can also be used as a representative of a majority of British opinion during this time.

Conservative M.P. for Chippenham from 1924, in the 1930s Cazalet travelled around Central Europe studying the concerns of different countries. In the late 1930s he developed links with members of the British Government close to Chamberlain, as well as a friendship with the Prime Minister himself. By supporting certain aspects of appeasement, Cazalet helped to encourage more fervent characters such as that of Hadow to pursue this policy in the belief that it was in the interest of the majority of Britain. But Cazalet's more ponderous approach caused him to fall in less with the line of appeasement as evidence of German aggression increased.

Like Hadow, Cazalet had suffered first-hand experience of World War I at an impressionable age, and entries in his diary often resemble those of Hadow. While fighting in the trenches in France he described three successive days as "Hell" and wrote of a friend dying in his arms. In his biography of Cazalet R.R. James writes that the experience of war was not as traumatic for Cazalet as for many of his contemporaries, but "His dislike of war and patriotic clap-trap had been confirmed"[95]. Dislike of the former would have made Cazalet akin to Hadow, while the latter would have probably separated the two.

Cazalet twice visited Austria while Hadow was posted there but missed him on the second occasion. "I was absolutely miserable at not seeing you", he wrote. "However I had some good talks with a lot of people. I have made some notes on my trip for Anthony Eden and am sending you a copy"[96]. Like Hadow, Cazalet took a pessimistic view of Austria. "Vienna", he wrote, "is a terribly sad town with masses of beggars, who really look and are half or wholly starved. How can it work - this top-heavy state and town?"[97]. After visiting Hungary and Czechoslovakia, he presented a plan to Eden that the British Government should encourage the formation of a League of Nations of Central Europe. Hadow wrote to Cazalet after his second visit, "Would that more people at home could see the urgency of the situation as you do! And the need for a British lead...", and went on to state as if he felt Cazalet would be in agreement that there would be no peace for Europe "until and unless Germany is included"[98].

Cazalet, however, like many others in Britain at this time, was shocked by the Nazi regime. "The conduct of Germany toward her neighbour [Austria]", he wrote in a letter to *The Times*, "has been inexcusable, monstrous, and barbaric. One might ask of what use is the League of Nations or of what influence is Christian civilisation if a nation of 60 million is to be allowed to bully, browbeat, and blackmail a neighbour of six

million into obeying her wishes?"[99]. In 1935 he recommended a close understanding with France and Italy backed by the Little Entente which he believed Germany would not dare oppose. "Germany's one object", Cazalet wrote, "is to separate England and France"[100].

In 1936 Cazalet shared public confusion over the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the proper method of dealing with Germany. "People really getting frightened of Germans", he wrote in June. "It is hard to know how to proceed. I doubt if you can hope to restrain Germany if she wants to take over German speaking districts. Anyhow we can but reason and pray that some intervention of Providence will decide the rest"[101]. To Cazalet, the Nazi regime was a shocking occurrence, but one he felt other countries would have to resign themselves to and hope a solution would come about. Such an attitude was useful in fuelling appeasement: although settlement with Germany was not necessarily welcomed, it began to be seen it as a necessity. After Henderson's conciliatory speech towards the Germans on arrival in Berlin, Cazalet asked whether it was not "the duty of His Majesty's representatives in all countries to establish and maintain the most friendly relations possible with the countries to which they are accredited"[102].

Such sentiments kept Cazalet in agreement with Hadow as

well as his views on the Spanish Civil War: "I...trust and pray that General Franco will win a victory for civilisation over Bolshevism"[103], and he was also fooled by Henlein, seeing the latter as "an essentially honest and rather simple-minded man"[104]. Hadow was sending Cazalet his ideas at this time and Cazalet wrote to Hadow at one point during meetings with Butler, Simon, and Hoare, "I think your notes admirable. I shall hardly change a letter - and still claim them as my own"[105]. In articles and speeches he proposed a federal constitution for Czechoslovakia, the right of appeal by minorities to the International Court of Justice, and the guaranteeing of Czechoslovakia's neutrality by the Great Powers.

One thing, however, which separated Cazalet from Hadow and other appeasers was his increasing concern with the issue of Jewish refugees. In May 1938 he expressed abhorrence of the fate of Austrian Jews and concern for their future[106], and in July stated in the House of Commons: "It is quite impossible to exaggerate the situation in which many hundreds of thousands of Jews and others find themselves in Central Europe today"[107]. This concern coloured Cazalet's attitude toward Germany and James makes the interesting statement that Cazalet's public proposals during this time were deliberately based on the assumption that Germany genuinely required a peaceful solution

to minorities problems in Europe, but it was an assumption which Cazalet, in private, did not believe[108]. Like many bordering on appeasement, Cazalet came to accept Munich as a "regrettable necessity" and his first reaction was one of relief: "Poor Czechs - I am sorry for them, but it is partly Benes' fault. He always pushed the policy of keeping Germany down". Colleagues of Cazalet, however, claim that Cazalet hated Munich, seeing its only merit as buying time for rearmament[109].

To claim that Cazalet became increasingly disillusioned with Germany would be wrong because he had always found the Nazi regime distasteful and, for a while, merely supported agreement with this country as Britain's only alternative. Because he did not share Hadow's enthusiasm for conciliation of Germany at the expense of other nations, he gradually distanced himself from his friend's proposals, many of which relied on a claim to patriotism which Cazalet probably would not have agreed with. When Hadow asked him to pass a memorandum he had written onto Chamberlain, Cazalet became reluctant. "All I would ask you to do", Hadow had written, "would be to ask the Prime Minister to give the document his personal attention as coming from one who knows his subject and has taken pains to investigate his facts"[110]. Cazalet replied immediately, "I am terribly sorry but I simply cannot take the responsibility of

sending your thing on to the Prime Minister", but he did offer to enclose a note if Hadow wanted to send the document on to Butler[111].

In 1939 Cazalet grew increasingly critical of the British Government and although there are a few records in Hadow's engagement diary of their meeting during this year, their correspondence in general appeared to drop off. Cazalet had become much more involved in the Jewish refugee question and was growing dismayed at Hitler's progress in Europe. When Germany occupied Prague in March, Cazalet wrote, "just so appalling as to be unspeakable. It has roused the ordinary 'man in the street' as nothing else has. We seem very near war. It looks as though Hitler is determined to dominate Europe. I think we ought to promise action if a single German soldier crosses the border of Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia or Holland"[112].

Cazalet joined the R.A.F. in 1939 and when war broke out, he developed a friendship with the Prime Minister of the Polish Government in exile General Sikorski which led to his becoming liaison officer between the Free Poles and the British Government. In July 1943 he was killed in a plane crash along with Sikorski. Like Hadow, Cazalet held an abhorrence of war through his experience of it, but in the late 1930s he recognised that Germany was going too far and that he should resign himself to the

possibility of another war. Hadow was a "fighter" for his cause and would not accept this. His desperation in the search for peace blinded him to circumstances which, by this time, Cazalet felt it was necessary to face. In this recognition of German intentions, Cazalet, despite his loyalty to Chamberlain, fell out of line with appeasement along with a large majority of Britain, and left Hadow in the minority of those still supporting it.

Voices of Doubt

Cazalet, in his dislike and mistrust of the Nazi regime, and eventual disillusionment with the idea of conciliating Hitler, reflected sentiments which were taken even further by the anti-appeasers. Apart from the German Government being brutal in a domestic sense, critics of appeasement argued more and more that its aggressive foreign policy was unlikely to change if it was presented with anything less than effective opposition. The simplicity of continuing to assume anything else was what the anti-appeasers objected to and it represents a way of thinking which seems common to the appeasers. Vansittart, when reflecting on the causes and origins of the Second World War, wrote that, to the appeasers, men were supposed to be continually rising "on stepping stones of their dead selves to higher things" as this was Man's destiny; "an abstraction", he argued, "that never

e x i s t e d " [1 1 3] .

The dichotomy of opinion between Hadow and Orme Sargent is one clear illustration of the difference in psychology as well as philosophy between the appeasers and anti-appeasers. Hadow constantly appealed to logic and reason, but his outlook, like many appeasers, was idealistic and tended toward generalisation. Sargent, according to Lord Gladwyn, had a sharp, cutting edge to his mind. "He was realistic and thus inclined to be pessimistic in his general outlook, and nobody could 'debunk' some high-falutin' theory better than he"[114]. While Hadow's view took in moral and historical concerns and was often emotional in its appeal, Sargent's cynicism made him more capable of weighing both sides of an argument without jumping to conclusions. His later criticism of appeasement was typically pragmatic. He felt that the policy stood condemned not so much because it was immoral or dangerous, but because it proved ineffective and "Chamberlain ought to have known it would be ineffective". Sargent dismissed the excuse that Munich bought time for Britain to rearm as he doubted whether the year's grace was of greater benefit to Britain than Germany and pointed out that this argument was dishonest as the Munich agreement was, at the time, felt to have guaranteed long-lasting peace[115]. Hadow, however, still clung to the "buying time" theory even after

the war.

Because Sargent's approach tended to be reasoned, cynical or even pessimistic, it is small wonder that Hadow's despatches irritated him not merely because he felt their conclusions were wrong but also because they were so adamant. It was often along these lines that the appeasers clashed with anti-appeasers. To the latter it seemed that those who pursued agreement with Germany were not facing facts so much as jumping to conclusions which made them ardent and inclined to emotional appeal. Statements by Hadow such as "Germany responds to us as no other nation" were not likely to sit comfortably with Sargent's queries as to the sincerity of the German Government's interest in the Sudeten German question and Phipps' belief that Hitler was more concerned about detaching Czechoslovakia from France and Russia than whether any of his actions met with approval from Britain. In their ardency the appeasers were often inclined to give the impression that they had a monopoly on the desire for peace, whereas those in the Foreign Office or Parliament who made objections or put up barriers were seen as "war-mongers".

While Sargent was as much an anti-appeaser as Vansittart, by maintaining a quiet cynicism he continued to operate a little more influence within the Foreign Office than the latter who was eventually reduced to writing long memoranda

which often went unread and trying to influence events through the sending of covert information to outside allies such as Churchill. It may be partly because Vansittart gradually exercised less influence in the Foreign Office, that his relations with Hadow were less acerbic. This could also be due to a certain similarity in character between the two and an apparent friendship which survived the division. Fourteen years older than Hadow, Vansittart could have been an example of the fulfilment of the potential promise of his junior. Like Hadow, he felt a keen sympathy for underdogs and had been remembered at Eton as suppressing bullying through firmness of personality. Ian Colvin writes: "He had unending patience and kindness in forlorn causes"[116], and describes how Vansittart once potted with a pistol at a butcher bird who was tearing smaller birds to bits[117]. Also like Hadow, Vansittart wrote poetry and spoke many languages fluently. Both were highly sociable and very industrious.

A further resemblance between the two was that, like Hadow, Vansittart could be his own worst enemy, despite the brilliance or correctness of his views. Eden writes that Vansittart held decided views on international affairs and his instinct was usually right, "but his sense of the political methods that could be used was sometimes at fault...Even about Germany, where he

was abundantly right, he expressed himself with such repetitive fervour that all those except who agreed with him were liable to discount his views as too extreme. As a result he sometimes injured the very causes he wanted to promote"[118]. Hadow was no less fervent, the glaring difference being that both men's perceptions of Nazism and what British foreign policy should be were poles apart.

Vansittart's apparently unshakeable faith in Henlein provided further common ground for himself and Hadow. When Henlein came to London again in May 1938 Vansittart still seemed to trust him: "I found Herr Henlein far more reasonable and amenable than I had dared hope, and I am sure that he will desire to remain so"[119]. After the Second World War, Vansittart defended his actions in regard to Henlein and wrote of the 1938 visit, "The truth is that I and a friend of mine - in a desperate endeavour to avert the final calamity - got Henlein over here with the deliberate purpose of frightening him"[120]. The "friend" Vansittart refers to could conceivably have been Hadow as Colvin writes that this visit came about by an indirect feeler from Henlein sent through Hadow who was convinced that Henlein could be used to find a solution to the Czechoslovak dilemma. If this were the case Vansittart's defence of his actions is rather questionable, and it seems clear that Hadow, at least, had no intention of

frightening Henlein and was probably more concerned to frighten Benes.

Much of appeasement sprang out of reaction to historical anti-Germanism in the Foreign Office. Vansittart has been described as a "professional" anti-German who explained that it was not merely Nazism which he disliked. He apparently did not hate all Germans, only "the bloody-minded bulk"[121]. Hadow, in contrast, was inclined to ignore the excesses of the Nazi regime because he saw Anglo-German friendship as vital to European peace. His criticism of prejudice towards Germany followed the lines of Thomas Jones who believed "diplomats should have nothing to do with hatred of anybody. It is silly and dangerous"[122]. These two different views affected both Hadow's and Vansittart's assessment of foreign policy. While Hadow believed that the First World War should not recur and that the Versailles Treaty had been unduly harsh to Germany, Vansittart believed that in 1911 the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had failed to stress to the Dominion Prime Ministers the imminent danger in Europe. "These lessons", writes Colvin, "Vansittart had laid up in his heart"[123]. Hadow had the experience of war laid up in his heart, which caused him to pursue his course with as much vehemence as Vansittart pursued his.

Like resistance to appeasement within the Foreign Office, those outside this establishment who were against the policy were initially limited by their lack of direction, agreement, and clearness in regard to an alternative policy. Neville Thompson writes that opposition to appeasement is like a mirage: "the more it is studied, the less substantial it appears". He adds, however, that it never vanishes completely. "What remains is a picture of sporadic and discontinuous dissent, of individual critics and small cliques but no cohesive group"[124]. This is one reason why, in the Foreign Office, Hadow could feel he had an affinity with Vansittart and an enemy in Sargent, and why his disagreement with critics of appeasement could be profound but not bitter. Hadow, for example, kept up a correspondence with Lord Birkenhead throughout the late 1930s, even though Birkenhead later voiced the opinion that Churchill was "the only voice of sanity" during this time[125]. Hadow's regard for Vansittart also survived as the former's son-in-law notes that Lady Hadow gave him the impression that they had always liked Vansittart. (He does remember, however, Hadow making derogatory passing remarks about Churchill)[126].

Political anti-appeasers were obviously less confined by rules of behaviour than those in the Foreign Office. Eden, for example, could be considerably more outspoken on foreign policy

once he resigned as Foreign Secretary. When he resigned Eden moved to the forefront of Conservative criticism of appeasement and formed the "Eden Group" or "Glamour Boys" as they were labelled - an informal discussion group with no barriers on membership. Churchill had his own group which was separate from Eden's although informal liaisons were kept up between the two by Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys. While Eden's group merely followed the line of supporting traditional diplomacy, Churchill was less reserved in his criticism of government policy and more specific in offering alternatives such as the Grand Alliance system.

Churchill and his followers, although not necessarily anti-German, held very little of the appeasers' sympathy for this country. Churchill did, in fact, like many of the appeasers, recognise and appreciate the leadership qualities of Hitler, noting in 1937, "One may dislike Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement. If our country were defeated I hope we should find a champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to our place among the nations"[127]. But, unlike Hadow and other appeasers, he felt that such qualities only emphasised the need for denial of treaty revision and containment of Nazi Germany.

When Henlein came to London in May 1938, the notes of his

meeting with Churchill, the Liberal Leader Sir Archibald Sinclair, and the M.P. Sir Harold Nicolson were sent by Churchill to the Earl of Birkenhead who sent a copy of these to Hadow. In his letter accompanying the notes Churchill wrote that, as far as he could see, Henlein was adhering to what he had said to them, and it was understood from Jan Masaryk that the Czechoslovak Government would agree to the terms proposed. "Therefore, if negotiations break down, it will almost certainly be because of malignant outside interference"[128]. Hadow took the latter statement to refer to a desire by Germany to see no settlement and felt this statement to be unjust. It was Hadow's opinion that the Czechoslovak Government and the SdP had not come to grips regarding fundamentals and the fault lay largely with the Czechs[129]. Unlike Churchill, Hadow could not read deeper motives in the actions of Germany other than those he wishfully attributed to a desire for raised status and acceptance in Europe.

The notes for Churchill's meeting with Henlein had been prepared by Professor F.A. Lindemann, a well-known physicist who did pioneering work on aircraft during the First World War and became part of Churchill's entourage during the 1930s. Lindemann's admiration for Churchill was profound, and in the area of science and technology, especially regarding the German air menace, he became this man's one-man advisory service.

Hadow met Lindemann in September 1938 and wrote to Birkenhead that he wondered if the professor did not classify him as a Nazi. "If not he is a most generous man for I opposed almost every one of his established ideas as I have read these in reports by others in this office"[130]. It is not surprising that Hadow and Lindemann did not see eye to eye, as Lindemann did more than read dangerous motives in Hitler's policy. According to R.R. James in *Churchill: A Study in Failure*, Lindemann was "almost pathologically anti-German", emphatic on the peril of the German menace, and expressed his views "with a sharpness, and often a harshness, which was unattractive, and his attitudes often seemed to be based less on knowledge than on prejudice"[131]. The conversation between Hadow and Lindemann represents a clash of two extremes in appeasement and anti-appeasement in regard to prejudice toward and against Germany.

A lack of sympathy in the anti-appeasers towards Germany made them, if not pro-communist, at least more amenable to Soviet Russia. While Hadow viewed the Soviet experiment with immense distrust, those deploring the excesses of the Nazi regime saw the Soviet Union as the lesser of the two evils. In 1937 Churchill declared that he preferred communism to Nazism, although "I hope not to be called upon to survive in a world under

a Government of either of these dispositions"[132]. While some were outwardly admiring of the planned Russian economy, many were merely willing to suppress their distaste for the Soviet dictatorship in order to use this country as an ally to restrain Germany. The argument was that the vital interests of Britain and Russia did not conflict and the latter needed peace to maintain domestic order. Moreover, it was felt that Britain should not be manoeuvred into an anti-Soviet crusade by Germany. This last attitude was in direct contrast to the attitude of Hadow and other appeasers who would go to any lengths to suppress communism which they saw as the greater threat to peace.

As regards the argument that there was no real conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and Britain, Hadow would have contended that the ideological difference was radical enough to hinder any proper relations between the two countries. But the critics of appeasement were too concerned with the reality of power politics in foreign affairs to attach great importance to ideology, unless, as in the case of Germany, a country's doctrine justified blatant aggression. During the press for negotiations with Russia after the German invasion of Prague, Eden stated, "in the conduct of foreign affairs it is really not our business what political colour a Government has, nor even how it conducts its

affairs at home, although it is desperately our business how it conducts itself abroad"[133].

Both the appeasers and the anti-appeasers viewed themselves as being realistic. To the appeasers it was realistic to make concessions in order to avoid disruption. To the anti-appeasers such concessions could only be made from a position of strength built on sturdy alliances and a strong defence. The latter viewed the former's realism as not only false, but based on a certain amount of cynicism and immorality. Hadow was no cynic, nor would he have considered himself immoral; to him it was immoral to ostracise Germany, ignore the fate of the Sudeten Germans, and encourage the spread of communism. But ignoring the brutal nature of Nazi Germany required a lapse in principles which did not always sit well with Hadow's idealistic protestations. Nor did the increasing aggression of this country match his emphasis on the belief that she could and would be appeased. It was on these points that Hadow was taken up by those more doubtful in the Foreign Office such as Sargent. It was also in contention of such points that critics of appeasement outside the Foreign Office gradually made themselves heard.

Epilogue

In September 1939 Hadow wrote that the ensuing war offered poor hopes of victory for many years, but promised "the massacre of the flower of youth and manhood of England, France, and Germany, the destruction of their cities, their art and their treasure, the dislocation, which has already begun, of their populations, and the demoralisation which will follow, of their whole society. In a word, the destruction of Western civilisation in a catastrophe the most horrible in history"[134]. The statement reveals the extent of Hadow's fear of another war by 1939. In Hadow's eyes, the society he knew and respected was literally falling to pieces. Art and architecture would be decimated by bombs, national identity would be lost, and the over-all moral effect would leave the path clear for communism. Western civilisation, however, managed to survive - though, perhaps not as Hadow had known it before the war - and Hadow went on to postings in Argentina, Washington, and California.

During the early part of the Second World War Hadow produced plans for reconstruction after the war involving a pooled trusteeship of African colonies. He pointed out the dangers of nationalism in eventual peace-settlements, and wrote enthusiastically - and perhaps idealistically - of "sacrifice of unneeded sovereignty to the common good" and the idea of "moral

citizenship of a . . . materially non-existent super-state". Beneath this continuing faith in a morality-based world government, one might detect Hadow's uneasiness over the future of the world and, in particular, Britain's role in the world[135].

Hadow, nonetheless, adapted himself to post-World War II circumstances. Promoted to Counsellor in Buenos Aires, he threw himself with ardour into studies for the Marshall Aid Plan, and from 1945 to 1948, acted as adviser on Latin American Affairs to the British delegation at the United Nations assemblies in San Francisco. In the 1950s he defended Eden's actions during the Suez Crisis as wholeheartedly as he had defended the policy of appeasement.

Domestic characteristics of Britain moulded by historical tradition, meanwhile, continued to have their effect on the actions of the Foreign Office in the post-war period. Although appeasement became a dirty word, cooperation was still felt to be preferable to conflict, and compromise reached by rational discussion was still a major priority. Hadow demonstrated an ironic realisation of this aspect of British foreign policy during the Second World War: "the 'laissez-faire', which lies at the root of Britain's inability to announce beforehand her peace-aims and objectives, is likely - as much as ever before - to lead to a lackadaisical helplessness in the face of cut-and-dried demands

by determined men of the category already named [those bent on retribution]. These know that if they begin with an impossibly high price they can reckon on Anglo-Saxon love of a compromise to give them at least a substantial part of their demands; even though the latter may, in the first place, have neither justification nor possibility of promoting peace, tranquillity or true Democracy among nations"[136]. Contradictory as this statement might seem in correlation with Hadow's despatches prior to the war, it was most likely made in reference to Russia, as Hadow had adopted a Cold War attitude even before the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and later Eden as Prime Minister made it part of their post-war policy.

It is perhaps to Hadow's credit that he saved copies of almost all of his despatches from the 1930s, despite their reflection on his judgment, although he did retain many of the opinions he held during the 1930s. Benes, for example, he continued to hold in low regard and he did not change his views on the Czechs as a whole. His hatred of communism lasted throughout his life. After the war he linked the question of the break-up of colonies and quick independence to the spread of communism. Working on the question of Latin America, Hadow focussed in 1948 on proposals such as the Guatemalan anti-colonial resolution at the Conference of the Organisation of American States at Bogota,

telling a United States official that his country should abstain from such recommendations: "Even better would be a U.S. abstention from the Commission as a mark of disapproval of proposals which could only serve to help Moscow"[137]. Hadow believed the United States' ingrained fear of colonialism was causing that country to support the independence of countries which would then succumb to communism. "It remains for us to teach a very ignorant continent", Hadow wrote, "what colonialism and its evolution really represent and I can think of no more important work in the defence of democracy against subtle Soviet-directed insinuations"[138].

As this latter statement illustrates, Hadow remained firm in his belief in Britain's prominent role internationally despite his country's diminishing power. He also remained fiercely patriotic. A later defence of his country's policy regarding China demonstrates not only this sentiment, but also the fact that his anti-communism was almost wholly focussed on Russia. In May 1952, an article appeared in *The Los Angeles Examiner* which was headed "Bitter and Costly Lesson" and which reflected the prevalent conservative attitude in the United States towards Anglo-Chinese relations. Britain's Socialist Government, it stated, "rushed headlong to recognise Mao, abruptly casting off Chiang Kai-shek who was then the only hope of China's

liberation". The article pointed out that this action had put a strain on Anglo-American relations, "for America properly refused to have any truck with Mao whatsoever. Britain kept on selling war materials to Mao while British and American lads were being shot down in Korea by Mao's men"[139].

In his reply to this letter, Hadow pointed out the error in the article in confusing recognition with approval. "Recognition", he wrote, "merely admits the validity of a newly-formed government's claim to be in physical control of a people or an area. It signifies no approval of the system or methods by which that government rules". Hadow stated that Britain had made this distinction clear when, in announcing her recognition of the Government of Red China, her government had stated in the House of Commons that it was opposed to and would continue to fight Communism. In defence of his country Hadow wrote, "Those who recklessly fling bitter, unfounded and unsupported accusations at America's most steadfast ally presumably do so in full knowledge of the encouragement they afford to Moscow"[140].

Hadow's later ardent defence of his country in terms of Eden's actions during the Suez Crisis showed no signs of fatigue or cynicism although he again made an ironic statement in reference to prewar events: "I watched the League of Nations impose sanctions upon Italy; and having done so fail to

implement them. From the moment that Mussolini flouted the League of Nations it was dead; killed by the impotence and unwillingness of the Great Nations to answer FORCE (which Nasser used first) by ACTION not WORDS". Hadow, characteristically, viewed Nasser as a pawn of Russia[141].

In terms of energy, Hadow seemed unflagging even after his retirement in 1957 (having received a knighthood in 1953), although he died not soon after in 1963. There is one rare statement he made in 1950 which perhaps portrays a slight regret or wistfulness over his role in the Foreign Office. Implying that those such as himself were being surpassed by a different generation of Foreign Office officials with a different approach to diplomacy, he wrote to a colleague, "We shall go on till we are moved or retired; and such is the way of the "Machine" as it was thirty years ago when I got in. So there is little to wonder at; though much to be sad over if one thinks how scorched are the pants of democracy by a fire they are not even able to extinguish in Washington"[142].

Hadow, on the whole, however, was not a man to look back, and, not being one for self-analysis, it is unlikely that he later examined his motives too deeply in his support in the 1930s of a policy which came into such disrepute after the Second World War. His defence of Chamberlain at the time, in fact, causes him

to fit better into the traditional view of Chamberlain as well-meaning but hopelessly naive, than Chamberlain does himself, as shown in recent examinations of the latter (see Fuchser). Hadow was not a cynical man, and the outbreak of war in 1939 did not make him cynical. World War II, in his eyes, was as unfortunate as World War I, although, being a staunch patriot, he probably came to view the former as necessary. It is likely that Hadow later looked upon the Second World War as the fault of Hitler being an aggressive leader, but he would have been less likely to hold dynamic forces in Germany accountable as he continued to cling to an affinity with the Germans.

While much of Hadow's personality and the influences on his character account for his misinterpretation of the events of the 1930s, his personal experiences - even of war - cannot be held as wholly accountable for his support of appeasement. Eden, for example, was the same age as Hadow, had fought just as bravely in the First World War, and suffered numerous family losses. In the 1930s, however, his vision did not become clouded once the intentions of the dictators had been made plain. Eden, at this point, could not bring himself to avoid the facts. Hadow, although by no means a cowardly or ill-intentioned man, did manage to avoid the facts, up until and even after the outbreak of war. His idealism had reached a point where it based itself increasingly on

wishes and hopes, rather than a careful analysis of the situation.

It is often the case that when people fear or feel threatened by a certain truth, they do their best to convince themselves of the opposite. This was the case with Hadow. Something was developing in Europe which was unfamiliar to him and menacing. It was something he and the other appeasers could not come to grips with and the threat itself was misinterpreted. The role of his own country was undergoing a subtle change and this also created an unease in Hadow and prompted him to overstress British involvement and importance. The mistake that had been made in the 1930s, however, was not, as Hadow believed, the failure to bring potentially cooperative nations together, but a failure to recognise naked aggression. In his mistaken altruism, Hadow advocated a policy which, far from appeasing Hitler, encouraged that leader to the detriment of other nations.

Appendix

[Hadow to Sargent - Hadow Papers]

9th August, 1932

Dear Sargent,

I enclose with this letter a Memorandum setting forth the results of the Lausanne Loan battle on the Anschluss problem in so far as I have been able to gather and weigh them. The corollary seems to be:

a) is Great Britain as sure as France seems to be that the Austro-German "*Zusammen-Schluss*" is a real and a pressing danger by comparison with the economic stagnation if not ruin which now stares Central Europe in the face?

b) if not what can Great Britain do to put an end to the political battle which France and Germany are fighting in this cock-pit to the detriment of our preponderant economic interests?

I have laid stress upon the economic aspects of the "*Zusammen-Schluss*" (a word which has now taken the place of "*Anschluss*" where Austrians want to emphasise the economic significance of the movement) because it is at least doubtful whether any political party in Austria sees personal advantage in, and would therefore be prepared to support in fact as well as in

theory, a political-anschluss.

France, of course, argues that economic union would lead to political absorption of Austria; but they choose to forget that Konigratz and Sadowa lie almost as close to Austria as Sedan still lies to France and that the attitude of Prussia towards Bavaria - with which Austrians have much closer sympathies and affinities than with arrogant Prussia - does not tend to strengthen the cause of *Anschluss* in this country.

Given the undoubted absence of any national spirit and the phlegmatic disposition of the great mass of Austrians it does not seem as if anything short of actual invasion would persuade the political cliques of this country to divest themselves of their parochial and personal advantages by handing Austria over to Germany; and invasion I doubt whether Germany would risk even in a disguised or Hitlerian form.

The economic aspects of the problem therefore seem those which need weighing above all else by an unbiased yet greatly interested power such as Great Britain which could, by stern counsel, restrain the political zeal of the contestants and insist that natural tendencies, as well as economic forces, shall be given first consideration in the task of laying a bogey which today occupies a high seat in the council-chambers of Latin and

Germanic Europe.

(incomplete)

[Sir Godfrey Nicholson to Hadow - Hadow Papers]

23rd October, 1933

Dear Hadow,

Many thanks for letter of October 18th and cheque. I have got marooned in Zurich. I am in a clinic having my stomach put right. I am writing in bed with a linseed poultice - hence pencil and bad writing.

I have met a good many interesting people here both Swiss and foreign. I don't like this situation - the danger is not immediate - but in the late spring on the Eastern frontier. I am all for cooperation but not with the present regime. Many though the faults and failings of democracy may be, it does not depend for its existence on the suppression of freedom of speech and press. When you have public opinion absolutely under your thumb, to mould in any way you like, and when you can suppress any news from abroad which you feel is contrary to your ideas, war is a certainty sooner or later. The mistake we have made is to have recognised tyrannies without protesting. We want to be friends with the man in the street, and to see him prosperous and happy; but we must have free access to his mind. At the moment he intellectually, a slave and will do his masters bidding, wherever

that may lead him - and Europe. In my opinion, we must always be prepared for war as long as some of the Great Powers are ruled by tyrants, good or bad. Everyday that these regimes persist we slip back further and further towards the dark ages- with the added danger that nowadays scientific progress enables you to make 100% of your people think 100% as you want them to - thanks to an inspired press and the wireless, etc. That's why I think England, the old champion of liberal thought, must come into the open for what she believes in. The disease is contagious, and the epidemic must be stopped.

[Hadow to Lady Layton, wife of Sir Walter Layton, editor of The News Chronicle - Hadow Papers]

1st March, 1937

Dear Lady Layton,

First of all let me thank you for a very kind letter which showed me that, not only had I rightly learnt to appreciate a wide-awake and open mind (the latter a rare part of the visitors we see here) but that you had time to extend sympathy to one who not only appreciates it but is cheered thereby to make further efforts.

I have no axe to grind other than a desire to promote PEACE which is a result of my personal knowledge of war and in this I now know that I share your views.

Please then do not think I am abusing your kind offer to help by drawing your attention to the tone of the enclosed articles from the "NEWS CHRONICLE".

You will notice that throughout both the Correspondent gives his readers to believe that the HENLEIN party are known to be Nazi agents. I can only answer that for 2 full years I have tried by every means to obtain proof - however slight - of this Henlein-Nazi connection; but in vain. Even the Government

Press cannot let me have it privately and have never published a single document in proof of the contention.

Yet, on the principle of "giving a dog a bad name" *The News Chronicle* correspondent never refers to the Henlein party as other than "Henlein NAZIS".

Again, although the article of 18th February contains a declaration by the Minister for Foreign Affairs himself (Dr. Krofta) that "talk of war is unwise and highly dangerous...I am convinced that war can be avoided" and further on "there is ground for hope that our relations with Germany will improve", the article in question begins in large-type

"...reported hostile intentions of Germany..."
"assiduous plotting of Nazi agents..."

Lady Layton, as an Englishman and not an official I venture to say that this is neither fair-play, nor is it helping to promote "neighbourliness" and consequently understanding between the two peoples.

Such statements will have the inevitable result of taking away from us the immense moral power we have over Central Europe today by making both Henlein and Germany believe that we are not willing either to be fair-minded or to promote a better understanding between peoples; but rather that we WANT bad

relations to persist on the principle of "divide et impera".

I KNOW that such is not your wish or that of your husband who, like myself, have children who cannot escape another war.

I assure you that we are not far from promoting a far greater measure of goodwill and understanding in Europe than has existed for many years. But for this we need the backing of all peace-loving peoples in England and the great weight of the Press in forming men's minds.

Do not think I am pleading for tolerance of kindness towards Germany. I only ask for FAIRNESS in the removal of these little irritations of daily headlines and cutting words, and if you can help in this manner, believe me, England will have good cause to be grateful to you.

"We do not want war" is the universal cry in our country. "Then", I answer, as my father taught me to do when I was still at school, "leave the word unspoken that will cause another pain - especially if you cannot PROVE that it is entirely true and necessary".

Be fair so that Germany has to recognise our impartiality and you will be in an immeasurably stronger position to say to that country;

"peace we want and WILL HAVE; so get on with the job

of making friends with your neighbours and to made sure of this we will watch and counsel with SCRUPULOUS FAIRNESS, though we cannot and will not allow wrongs to go covered any longer ON EITHER SIDE'.

On these lines you will see that Germany will not only give heed to ALL England says, but you will be surprised how quick will be the progress of peace-making in Europe. Whereas at present we are confessedly PREPARING FOR WAR however much we may protest to the contrary; for people are ceasing to believe in our FAIRNESS and that, and that alone, gives our STRENGTH in Europe today.

I have spoken too fully and from the depths of my heart to be even prudent. For of such open expression of opinion an official who wants to "get on" should never be guilty. But I really do not care; for of what use would promotion be to me if I had to serve in or watch another war?

Every proof I can give you is therefore freely at your disposal at any time and all I ask is that others shall not get to hear of my so doing. For the Foreign Office is easily shocked and I want to go on fighting in Central Europe for "Peace and appeasement" such as I am convinced we can attain without for a moment sacrificing democracy or our own principles, or bringing on war by refusing a fair hearing to those who are the causes of other countries' bitterness.

If you have borne with me thus far I will not overtax your patience but ask to be excused for putting before an impartial tribunal a matter of very great importance to the peace of Europe and the future of my country.

[Hadow to Peter Matthews - Hadow Papers]

28th July, 1938

Dear Matthews,

Very many thanks for sending me your analysis, a preliminary glance at which does not in the least reveal to me the "profound disagreement" you mention; but rather the contrary!

And in any case it is always very interesting to me to ponder over the "other point of view" so that I hope to spend a profitable evening going carefully through and noting what you have said.

If it would interest you to run over my notes pray ring me up and come to a meal when we can discuss the matter alone and without the bustle and hurry of this Office.

If I may venture one criticism from my preliminary and hasty reading it is the extreme similarity of your deductions with regard to the inevitable antagonism between the Czechs and the Sudeten to the arguments used by German diplomatists and others to "prove" - to the most unfortunate conviction of their Government in Berlin - that the British Empire was bound to disintegrate in case of war because of the fundamental differences of race and opinion between its component parts.

The factor accurate-thinking and logical men like yourself - if I may venture this description - forget is the weariness and fear of the Masses, which tends to override, God be praised, even the Memories and bitternesses you so rightly enumerate, and which are today making for Peace, so long as it is accompanied by a certain measure of concession.

It is the constant harping, by educated men, upon the impossibilities of such rough-and-ready settlements, with their valuable feature of gaining time for the next step, and the apparent inability of Intellectuals ever to bury the hatchet and preach its burial, by example as well as word of mouth, that is to me the most effective barrier to the Peace which ALL ex-service men without exception are working for.

This is not meant as a lecture; but I feel strongly that if we would only say "there IS a way and we WILL find it" instead of always dissecting, analysing and making known our conclusion that there is NO way, or that the only road is so strewn with nails and glass that no car can possibly pass without puncture we should find to our surprise - as Temperley rightly said of Benes - that, by his constant repetition of a formula too hopelessly opposed and divided "negotiators" suddenly found to the surprise of all concerned that they HAD achieved enough to be declared

"agreed".

This "will to peace" and even more its promotion is the task above all of our independent Intellectual opinion; and it is its absence in many cases, despite an unconvincing lip-service, that we of the last war most deplore.

Again I say this has nothing to do with with you; for I do not seek to discuss matters with the above type, knowing that he is far better equipped intellectually than I and able so to pick holes in what I claim that I do not convince but merely send him away more certain of the rightness of his negative point of view; whose logic I do not dispute, but whose conclusions are luckily often falsified by history.

That is why, for all the truth of the Chamberlain statement that Lord Runciman has been "set adrift in mid-sea in an open boat" I believe that there is a hope of achieving, by exercise of moderation and fairplay in this land, the beginning of a settlement not only of the Sudeten question but, as you entirely rightly say, of Germany's far great interest: an independent but Neutral Czechoslovakia strong for self-defence as is Switzerland, and therefore by no means a negligible quantity in case of war, but not the natural irritant and fear to Germany that Belgium or Holland would be to us were one were one or other of these

countries to conclude an alliance with let us say Germany which would place their aerodromes and ports theoretically at the disposal of the latter in case of, as well as enabling Germany to ship aeroplanes, survey aerodromes and arrange depots for spare-parts etc. in time of peace and in preparation for "*der Tag*".

May I bespeak your not unpowerful help in persuading the Intellectual circles who to a large extent mould public opinion by their writings to prepare the way of peace by insisting both in and out of season that WE can achieve and ensue it by resolute FAIRNESS to both sides.

With apologies for this long diatribe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[Given to Lord Halifax and discussed at breakfast Sunday 25/9[1938] - 9:00am. He promised to ascertain PM's views and let Hadow know as soon as possible whether the Legion might go ahead with approval to Hitler. Copy given to F. Godley, British Legion at Croydon Aerodrome 5:00pm, 25/9 - Hadow Papers]

In a memorandum submitted yesterday it was suggested that:

A British volunteer-force be sent forthwith to facilitate the surrender of the Sudeten territories by acting as
MILITARY POLICE

a. in the districts already accepted by the Czechoslovak Government for surrender to Germany under the Anglo-French Plan until the German forces enter and take over.

b. In the PLEBISCITE areas as demanded in the Hitler memorandum until (25th November) after the above Plebiscite.

THE BRITISH LEGION HAS NOW OFFERED TO SUPPLY

10,000 PICKED MEN FORTHWITH

up to another 10,000 men within a week.

It is therefore suggested that, if the Cabinet approve

1. The GERMAN GOVERNMENT be asked to afford them facilities for rail-transportation across Germany during the coming week.

2. The first 10,000 men be sent

7000 to the Sudeten areas of NORTHERN and WESTERN BOHEMIA.

1000 to the SOUTH BOHEMIAN DISTRICTS

2000 to the MORAVIAN-SILESIA districts.

3. As soon as possible the CZECHOSLOVAK Government be asked to facilitate their distribution to the principle GENDARMERIE and STATE POLICE posts and thence to the minor posts of the same forces.

4. Until 30th September they would be occupied only on patrol work; being for this purpose unarmed save possibly for a revolver.

5. They would be reinforced by the second 10,000 in order if possible to have the full force of 20,000 in

CZECHOSLOVAKIA before 1st October.

6. On the entry of the GERMAN FORCES - upon prior GERMAN guarantee that these would not go beyond the Anglo-French Line -

a quarter of the above volunteer force would remain in the districts until the Plebiscite if this be thought necessary in order to reassure British public opinion this protection was being afforded to the dissident-minority against acts of revenge on the part of the SUDETEN during the first days of the latters' return.

the remainder would be moved forward into the PLEBISCITE AREAS, which they would occupy until 25th November.

7. A special force of Ex-officers - for which over 75 qualified men have already offered themselves - would act as interpreters and Liaison officers between the Czechoslovak and later the German forces.

8. Accommodation would provide no difficulty as the INNS of the districts are mostly clean and the food good.

9. The main duty of the above force would be

To see that the CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY FORCES were evacuating the districts before 1st October to avoid the risk of "collisions".

To take over the districts between the time of the departure of the CZECH GENDARMERIE and POLICE and the arrival - on their heels - of the German forces.

Further details would need to be worked out both here and on the spot without delay.

The main object of the scheme is, however, to provide a means of Czech withdrawal and German advance without collision and acceptable to both Governments. For this purpose British ex-service men are particularly suitable.

They have during late years had excellent relations with the Ex-service organisations in both Germany and Czechoslovakia.

As ex-soldiers who have retained some loose discipline they can act as MILITARY POLICE, though their very presence would so reassure both sides as to fulfill the object.

By working in with both sides they would demonstrate BRITISH IMPARTIALITY to Europe as a whole and to both

countries in particular.

The inhabitants - Sudeten-Germans - are very friendly and would themselves, as proved by recent months, reduce any risk to the volunteers, to a minimum; since they are highly-disciplined and want to show it.

Being VOLUNTEERS and picked-men the force would not be a liability to HMG as would be armed-forces.

The idea of accomplishing an ANGLO-GERMAN understanding through the EX SERVICE MEN of both countries is one of HERR HITLER'S main themes. The presence of 800 German ex-service men in this country is proof of his not having given up this idea.

It is therefore suggested that the heads of the British Legion be sent at once to make this proposal to Herr Hitler personally; armed only with the authority of HMG to do so, as their plan. HMG would then not be involved if it were rejected.

The plan for an "UNARMED PEACE ARMY" of MEN who, having known the horrors of war are now again offering themselves to prevent it would, it is suggested, make an instant appeal to the imagination of the Public in GREAT BRITAIN, and thus satisfy the PACIFIST OPINION IN GREAT BRITAIN of the "rightness" of British policy and of this move.

If accepted in principle the plan would be worked out and submitted in detail within the next 48 hours or less.

The first steps would be

- a. an approach to Herr Hitler by the Legion
- b. if results are favourable notification to the Czechoslovak Government for their acceptance and cooperation.
- c. recruitment and despatch of the force not later than 28th September.

*[Lord Alfred Duff Cooper to Halifax) C11431/11169/18, FO
371-21783]*

29th September, 1938

My dear Edward,

I noticed that in the last plan of settlement which you put forward you were contemplating the possibility of the British Legion playing some part in the temporary occupation of the ceded territories. Personally I feel that it would be unwise to make any such use of them. The Germans have not turned down the suggestion, but, no doubt, the analogous body in Germany is a drilled, disciplined and uniformed formation with officers, non-commissioned officers and a proper organisation. As you know however our British Legion is simply a collection of middle aged and elderly men who have been at some time in one of the Services and now meet together occasionally with the laudable purpose of wearing their medals and drinking beer. They differ in hardly any respect from a collection of Conservative working men's clubs. They have no uniform, most of them have had no training for the last 20 years and they have no organisation or officers. If they were sent out to the Sudetenland in order to carry out complicated duties requiring above all discipline, training and

tact, I am afraid the result would be disastrous. I did mention this matter to Ashton-Gwatkin at the aerodrome this morning and I hope he will report what I said to the Prime Minister.

[Halifax to Duff Cooper C11431/11169/18, FO371-21783]

29th September, 1938

My Dear Duff,

Many thanks for your letter. I have been fully conscious myself of the difficulties in the British Legion plan. I saw Maurice this afternoon; he told me that if the plan matured they had it in mind to make their selection from officers and ex-N.C.O.s. But this only partly relieves the doubts that I share with you which were also, I understand, felt in the course of discussions with the War Office this afternoon. We are, I understand, sending a telegram to Munich tonight to suggest that it might be better to use the Belgians and Dutch who, marvellous to relate, seem quite anxious for the job. We are putting all the difficulties of the British Legion plan to Munich.

[Memorandum by Hadow, August 31, 1939 - Hadow Papers]

GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN

SETTLEMENT

There is now every sign that Hitler will not fight, because he knows that his people no longer believe he can win.

His retreat lies, therefore, by way of the promises that are inherent in Mr. Chamberlain's first letter to Hitler (24th August) indicating that, while firmly resolved to prevent a settlement of the Polish problem by force, we are prepared - if the Polish problem be solved by negotiation - to discuss the wider problems affecting international relations with Germany.

Already Hitler has indicated that he intends to use this bridge, for he has clearly stated that the Polish settlement is to him only part of the Anglo-German settlement which he desires above all else.

Moreover he has asked for some "token move" on our part about Colonies, and shown that the problem of raw materials and credits are ever-present in his mind and that of Mussolini.

When, therefore, Poland and Germany decide upon negotiations Germany's attitude with regard to every claims other

than Danzig will be governed almost entirely by their hopes of concessions on the three great international issues:

RAW MATERIALS and ECONOMIC AID

COLONIES

DISARMAMENT

To obtain disarmament - our chief need for without it the whole economic fabric of Europe will fall to bits under the waste of unproductive and prodigal spending - we shall have to be ready for concession on Raw Materials and some accommodation as regards Colonies.

It is, I suggest, virtually certain that - in his present situation - Herr Hitler will make his demand for an indication of OUR PLAN for an INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT of the above issues his FIRST step at the German-Polish conference should such take place.

But the problems are essentially NOT for this country alone, but for the EMPIRE AS A WHOLE to decide upon.

TIME IS VITAL.

Notes

1 *Unlikely Diplomat*

1. Nevile Thompson. *The Anti-appeasers*. Oxford:1971, Clarendon. 28.
2. See William Rock. *British Appeasement in the 1930s*. London: 1977, Arnold. 23; Keith Robbins. *Appeasement*. Oxford: 1988, Blackwell. 7-8, 25-26, 79-80; Larry Fuchser. *Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement*. London: 1982, Norton. 4.
3. Mrs. E.P. Paynter. May 1987.
4. Nigel Hadow. October 16, 1986.
5. Lord Gladwyn. October 20, 1986.
6. Mrs. A.H. Michie. September 1986.
7. Hadow's war diaries. November 19, 1914.
8. *Ibid.* January 8-9, 1916.
9. *Ibid.* c. 1918.
10. John Laffin. *Letters from the Front*. London:1973, Dent. 53 - 55.
11. A.D. Lindsay. "War Against War". *Oxford Pamphlet* 1914, Oxford University Press.
12. Laffin, *op.cit.* 70.
13. Hadow to Frau Schalk. March 10, 1934. Hadow Papers.
14. Mrs. A.H. Michie, September 1986.
15. Foreign Office Minute: "Soviet Policy in Persia, Turkey, and the Hejaz". July 29, 1935. E4494/81/34. FO371-20841.
16. Loraine to Foreign Office. July 2, 1922. E6576/6/34. FO 371 - 7806.
17. Loraine to Lord Curzon, including report by Hadow. February 5, 1924. E1124/336/34. FO371-10141.
18. Report by Hadow on Trade, c. 1924. Hadow Papers.
19. Memorandum by Hadow. April 10, 1924. E4643/336/34. FO371-10141.
20. Hadow to Department of Overseas Trade. September 19, 1924. Hadow Papers.
21. Memorandum by Hadow. August 10, 1927. (E3537/1692/44). Hadow Papers.
22. Memorandum by Hadow: "Turko-Italian-Greek Negotiations". May 8, 1928. Hadow Papers.
23. Hadow to his parents. April 2, 1927. Hadow Papers.
24. Hadow to unknown correspondent. October 18, 1927. Hadow Papers.
25. Lindsay to Austen Chamberlain. June 2-3, 1925. E3384/3384/44. FO371-10870.
26. Hadow to his parents. April 2, 1927. Hadow Papers.
27. Hadow to G.H. Hadley. January 14, 1931. Hadow Papers.

28. Sally Marks. *The Illusion of Peace*. London:1976, MacMillan. 72.
29. Martin Gilbert. *The Roots of Appeasement*. London: 1966, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 103; Marks, *op.cit.* 34.
30. Memorandum by Addison. March 23, 1925. C4287/549/18. FO371-10729.

2 Austria: Appeasement Defined

1. Hadow to Remnant (personal and confidential). September 14, 1933. Hadow Papers.
2. Hadow to Frau Schalk (personal). March 10, 1934. Hadow Papers.
3. Hadow to Captain Victor Cazalet (personal). April 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
4. Memorandum by Hadow for Selby (personal). June 14, 1934. Hadow Papers.
5. Hadow to Sir Walter Layton (strictly personal). August 23, 1934. Hadow Papers.
6. Hadow to O'Malley. July 23, 1931. Hadow Papers.
7. Memorandum by Hadow for Selby: "Policy in Regard to Central Europe". January 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
8. Memorandum by Hadow: "Great Britain and Central Europe". May 25, 1932. Hadow Papers.
9. Cited in Gilbert, *op.cit.* Appendix I, 189.
10. Hadow to Selby (personal). November 11, 1933. Hadow Papers.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Hadow to Cazalet. April 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
13. Memorandum by Hadow: "A European Sheltered Area". No date, c. 1933-4. Hadow Papers.
14. Shiela Grant Duff. *A Parting of the Ways*. London:1982, Owen. 50.
15. Jurgen Gehl. *Austria, Germany and the Anschluss*. London: 1963, O.U.P. 27.
16. Hadow to O'Malley. August 4, 1931. Hadow Papers.
17. Hadow to Sargent. September 1931. Hadow Papers.
18. Memorandum: "Great Britain and Central Europe". May 25, 1932. Hadow Papers.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Hadow to Simon. January 2, 1933. Hadow Papers.
22. Hadow to Cazalet. April 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
23. *DBFP*, 2/II. London:1946, HMSO. No. 76.
24. *DBFP*, 2/VI. No. 395.
25. Bernays to Hadow. No date, c. 1933-34.

26. Nicholas Rostow. *Anglo-French Relations 1934-36*. London: 1984, MacMillan. 46.
27. *Ibid.* 10.
28. Martin Kitchen. *The Coming of Austrian Fascism*. London:1980, Croom Helm. 276.
29. Hadow to O'Malley. July 23, 1931. Hadow Papers.
30. Hadow to Lord Reading. September 14, 1931. Hadow Papers.
31. Memorandum by Hadow: "Austria and the Anschluss". August 8, 1932.
32. Hadow to Sargent. August 9, 1932. Hadow Papers.
33. Ian Colvin. *Vansittart in Office*. London:1965, Gollancz. 18.
34. *Ibid.* 19.
35. *DBFP*, 2/I, no. 307, note 5.
36. Hadow to Phipps. April 1933. Hadow Papers.
37. F.L. Carsten. *The First Austrian Republic 1918-1938*. Aldershot:1986, Gower. 164.
38. Gehl, *op.cit.* 54-8.
39. Hadow to Simon. January 2, 1933. Hadow Papers.
40. Hadow to Selby. May 29, 1933. Hadow Papers.
41. Hadow to Simon. August 17, 1933. C1353/2092/3. FO 371-16644.
42. Hadow to the Foreign Office. August 17, 1933. C7370/2092/3. FO371-16643.
43. Hadow to Selby (personal). January 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
44. G.L. Weinberg. *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, I*. London:1970, University of Chicago Press. 88.
45. Gehl, *op.cit.* 92.
46. Although the official version was that the assassination was carried out by Otto Planetta, Hadow later supplied evidence to support the theory that Major Fey, the State Secretary in charge of public security affairs and former leader of the Vienna Heimwehr was the actual culprit. In 1938 (the exact date is uncertain) in a memorandum marked "secret" Hadow reported information given to him by a former Austrian citizen "whose close connection with the Legation in London and hatred of the Nazi regime make it impossible for 'it' to return to Austria". According to this informant, the priest who had seen the wounds on Dollfuss' body "besought Dr. Schuschnigg [who replaced Dollfuss as Chancellor] NOT to cover up the obvious fact - known to at least fifteen people - that DOLLFUSS HAD RECEIVED A SECOND AND FATAL SHOT AT CLOSE RANGE WHICH WAS NOT FROM PLANETTA'S REVOLVER BUT FITTED THAT OF FEY, which lacked bullet". This evidence, wrote Hadow, explained why Fey shot himself after the assassination. Hadow Papers.

47. Memorandum by Hadow: "Nazi Putsch of 25th July, 1934. Hadow Papers.
48. Weinberg, *op.cit.* 103. David Irving. *The War Path*. London:1978, Joseph. 41.
49. Selby to Hadow, c. 1933. Hadow Papers.
50. Nicholson to Hadow. October 23, 1933. Hadow Papers.
51. Hadow to Selby. January 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
52. Hadow to Cazalet. April 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
53. Minute by Selby. January 9, 1934. Hadow Papers.
54. Hadow to Simon. November 12, 1934. Hadow Papers.
- Minutes on despatch from Hadow. November 15, 1934. R6380/37/3. FO371-18358.
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57. Hadow to Frau Schalk. March 10, 1934. Hadow Papers.
58. April 1926. *DBFP 1/I*. London:1947, HMSO. Appendix X.
59. Richard Griffiths. *Fellow Travellers of the Right*. London:1980, Constable. 12.
60. Rock, *op.cit.* 41.
61. Rodd to Hadow. August 23, 1932. Hadow Papers.
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63. Hadow to Phipps. January 2, 1933. Hadow Papers.
64. Hadow to Simon. August 17, 1933. Hadow Papers.
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3 Czechoslovakia: Appeasement Applied

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2. Radomir Luza. *The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans..* New York: 1964, N.Y.U.P. 28-9.
3. Hadow to Sargent. December 21, 1935. Hadow Papers.
4. *Ibid.*
5. J.W. Bruegel. *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*. Cambridge: 1973, C.U.P. 122.
6. Luza, *op.cit.* 69.
7. Hadow to Sir Samuel Hoare. December 27, 1935. R7759/234/12. Hadow Papers.
8. Bruegel, *op.cit.* 145-6.
9. Hadow to Eden. January 31, 1936. Hadow Papers.

10. Memorandum, March 9, 1936. Hadow Papers.
11. Hadow to O'Malley. May 9, 1936. R2789/32/12.
F O 3 7 1 - 2 0 3 7 4 .
12. Hadow to Eden. September 25, 1936. Hadow Papers.
13. Memorandum, c. October 1936. Hadow Papers.
14. Hadow to Bentinck (Private). December 8, 1936. Hadow
P a p e r s .
15. April 1947, 11-12. Cited in Luza, *op.cit.* 50.
16. Luza, *op.cit.* 90.
17. Hadow to Eden. February 24, 1937. Hadow Papers.
18. Hadow to Eden. March 2, 1937. Hadow Papers.
19. Hadow to Newton. May 14, 1937. Hadow Papers.
20. Hadow to Eden. July 29, 1937. Hadow Papers.
21. Hadow to Eden. August 23, 1937. Hadow Papers.
22. Memorandum, c. December 5, 1937. Hadow Papers.
23. Hadow to Hoare. December 27, 1935. Hadow Papers.
24. R.W. Seton-Watson. *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*. London: 1943, Hutchinson. 353. See also Elizabeth Wiskemann. *Czechs and Germans*. London: 1967, Macmillan. 208-211; Bruegel, *op.cit.* 136.
25. Hadow to Eden. January 31, 1936. Hadow Papers.
26. Hadow to Eden. September 25, 1936. Hadow Papers.
27. Memorandum, c. December 5, 1937. Hadow Papers.
28. Bruegel, *op.cit.* 137.
29. Luza, *op.cit.* 102 (fn).
30. Bruegel, *op.cit.* 148-9.
31. Hadow to Sargent. December 21, 1935. Hadow Papers.
32. O'Malley to Hadow. June 11, 1936. R2789/32/12,
FO371-20374.
33. Hadow to O'Malley. June 9, 1936. Hadow Papers.
34. Hadow to O'Malley. June 22, 1936. Hadow Papers.
35. Bentinck to O'Malley. December 3, 1936. Hadow Papers.
36. Memorandum. December 3, 1936. Hadow Papers.
37. Weinberg, *op.cit.* 314.
38. J.W. Bruegel. "German Diplomacy and the Sudeten Question Before 1938". *International Affairs* XLIV, October 1968.
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39. Hadow to Hoare. December 27, 1935. Hadow Papers.
40. Luza, *op.cit.* 75.
41. R.M. Smelser. *The Sudeten Problem 1933-38*. Folkestone, Kent: 1975, Dawson. 160.
42. Hadow to O'Malley. June 17, 1936. Hadow Papers.
43. Smelser, *op.cit.* 150-1.
44. Hadow to Eden. February 24, 1937. Hadow Papers.
45. Telegram from Hadow to Foreign Office. February 16, 1937. R1131/188/12.

46. Hadow to Eden. March 3, 1937. Hadow Papers.
47. Hadow to Lady Layton. March 1, 1936. Hadow Papers.
48. Grant Duff, *op.cit.* 136.
49. Hadow to Vansittart, c. March 1937. Hadow Papers.
50. Memorandum, c. March 1937. Hadow Papers.
51. Hadow to Newton. May 14, 1937. Hadow Papers.
52. Hadow to Eden. August 23, 1937. Hadow Papers.
53. Smelser, *op.cit.* 206.
54. Hossbach Memorandum. *DGFP*, D/I. No. 19.
55. Hadow to Hoare. December 27, 1935. Hadow Papers.
56. Hadow to O'Malley. June 17, 1936. Hadow Papers.
57. Hadow to Eden. August 8, 1936. Hadow Papers.
58. Masaryk to Vansittart. July 28, 1936. R4705/32/12,
F O 3 7 1 - 2 0 3 7 4 .
59. Hadow to O'Malley (personal). July 9, 1936. Hadow
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60. Hadow to Eden. September 25, 1936. Hadow Papers.
61. Hadow to Eden. February 24, 1937. Hadow Papers.
62. J. Harvey. *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey*
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63. Hadow to Eden. March 2, 1937. Hadow Papers.
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65. Hadow to Newton. May 14, 1937. Hadow Papers.
66. Hadow to Eden. September 23, 1937. Hadow Papers.
67. Memorandum, c. December 1937. Hadow Papers.
68. R.W. Seton-Watson. *A History of the Czechs and*
Slovaks. London: 1943, Hutchinson. 354.
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FO371-21127.
71. Bruegel, *op.cit.* 137.
72. January 31 - February 6, 1936. R675/32/12, FO371-20373.
73. Bruegel, *op.cit.* 137.
74. O'Malley to Hadow. March 4, 1937. Hadow Papers.
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76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Central European Observer*, fortnightly review. May 2,
1941. [cited in Luza, *op.cit.* 78].
79. Hadow to O'Malley. June 17, 1936. Hadow Papers.
80. Hadow to Eden. September 25, 1936. Hadow Papers.
81. Hadow to Vansittart. March 1937. Hadow Papers.
82. Mrs. B. Riggs, September 1986. (Hadow's sister-in-law).
83. December 10, 1935. R544/247/3. FO371-19493. [cited in
Bruegel, 135, as FO371-19463].
84. Note by Norton. December 10, 1935. *Ibid.*
85. April 16, 1936. R22/32/12. FO371-20374.

86. Newton to Eden. April 27, 1937. Minute by Sargent, May 5. R2886/188/12. FO371-21128.
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 88. Hadow to Eden. January 31, 1935. Hadow Papers.
 89. Hadow to O'Malley. June 31, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 90. Hadow to O'Malley. May 9, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 91. Hadow to Eden. June 22, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 92. Hadow to O'Malley. September 9, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 93. Hadow to Eden. September 25, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 94. Hadow to Vansittart. March 1937. Hadow Papers.
 95. Hadow to Eden. August 10, 1937. Hadow Papers.
 96. Hadow to Eden. July 29, 1937. Hadow Papers.
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 110. Hadow to Lady Layton. March 1, 1937. Hadow Papers.
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 116. Hadow to Eden. October 8, 1936. Hadow Papers.
 117. Memorandum: no date, c. 1936. Hadow Papers.
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4. Sargent to Phipps. August 13, 1931. FO800-274.
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7. Sir Walford Selby. *Diplomatic Twilight*. London:1953, Murray. 24-26.
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9. Middlemas, *op.cit.* 10-11.
10. Nicholas Rostow. *Anglo-French Relations 1934-36* London:1984, MacMillan. 15. Gilbert, *op.cit.* 133.
11. *Dictionary of National Biography*. London:1981, Oxford U.P. 892.
12. Rostow, *op.cit.* 25.
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28. Minute by Collier, November 22, 1935. *Ibid.* 727-8.
29. Memorandum by Vansittart: "Britain, France, and Germany", February 3, 1936. *Ibid.* Appendix IV.
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69. Hadow to Sargent. March 18, 1937. Hadow Papers.
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